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In 1972, Brian Bond noted that, ‘considering the enormous importance of efficient staff work 
in modern warfare, it remains a field that has been badly neglected by military historians.’1 
Whilst recent years have seen the publication of some works providing an examination of 
aspects of the development and reform of staff training and the General Staff from the middle 
of the nineteenth century to the Second World War, this is still a field of study requiring 
further examination in order to understand and appreciate its full nuance and complexity. In 
the context of the British Army in the interwar period, the majority of studies have focussed 
on seeking to explain the poor performance of British forces in the Second World War 
through the examination of doctrinal, technological, political and social issues affecting the 
army in this period. Where such studies have dealt with staff training, they have consistently 
highlighted two key failings in the provision of interwar staff training: namely a failure to 
produce enough trained staff officers and an over-focus on strategic issues and the training of 
commanders. Although these key failings have been frequently highlighted and certain 
reform attempts mentioned in connection with them, there has been no in-depth mining of the 
reasoning behind the failure to implement these reforms. This thesis will challenge the 
existing narrative by establishing why, despite being aware of these key failings, the army 
failed to take corrective measures until 1938. It will clearly demonstrate that this was not due 
to a lack of opportunity and that across the interwar period the War Office had six 
opportunities to effect significant reform. Instead, it will show that a limited number of senior 
officers in influential posts and holding attitudes towards leadership more representative of 
the nineteenth than the twentieth century, held back a growing wave of reformist intent.  In 
doing so, it will provide the first examination of the issue of broader attitudes to staff training 
and efforts at structural staff reform within the army across the interwar period.  
 
This thesis is primarily a study of attitudes within the senior ranks of the British Army 
regarding the provision and scope of professional training for officers beyond the cadet 
colleges and regimental depots, viewed through the lens of the interaction between senior 
army officers and the Staff College in the interwar period. Rather than undertaking an in-
depth analysis of the training provided at Camberley, or the interaction between the 
practicalities of officer training and the development of military doctrine, it seeks to establish 
 
1 Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), p. 4. 
 10 
how the long-term struggle for professionalism within the British officer corps clashed with 
traditional social and institutionally held attitudes surrounding the role of the officer and 
competing priorities, such as the need to improve the attractiveness of the army as a career. 
The key difficulty of such a study is to establish the location of its analytical focus, whether a 
theoretical examination of institutional attitudes within the British Army or an examination of 
the Staff College from a strategic or operational perspective. Primarily the focus is 
operational, with the Staff College remit being to train officers for staff roles within brigades, 
divisions, corps and armies. These are all operational formations as defined by the literature 
and it was within these formations that the greatest impact of the proposed reforms to staff 
training would have been felt in the opening years of the Second World War.2 Together with 
this focus on the operational level, this study equally sits within the broad scope of studies 
examining institutional cultures and scholarship on innovation.3 In essence, through its 
analysis of the attitudes to innovation in staff training in the context of the British Army’s 
institutional cultures, this thesis will establish the impact of these attitudes in the context of 
the provision of trained staff officers to the operational formations of the British Army.  
 
Defining the Scope and Terms 
In order to undertake such an examination, it is vital to define the scope of the various terms 
to be utilised throughout the thesis and to establish the relationships between the various 
departments involved in the process of reform. These are definitions of those key terms 
directly related to the staff, namely: Staff College, staff work, staff training and doctrine. 
Although seemingly self-explanatory, these terms have been used to encompass a number of 
different definitions across the primary and secondary literature, and as such it is crucial to 
establish a watertight definition for use throughout the thesis. In this context, Staff College 
will refer purely to the Staff College, Camberley and not to the combination of Camberley 
and the Indian Army Staff College, Quetta. This definition has been chosen as in all cases 
 
2 The operational level as defined in Richard Holmes, Chris Singleton and Spencer Jones (eds.), The Oxford 
Companion to Military History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198606963.001.0001/acref-9780198606963-e-
939?rskey=qrVPvu&result=1 - accessed 20th August 2019;  Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris, Robin 
Prior and Jean Bou (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) https://www-oxfordreference-
com.ezproxy.brunel.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acref/9780195517842.001.0001/acref-9780195517842-e-
328?rskey=MwFWdG&result=10 -  accessed 20th August 2019 and Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. 
by Michael Howard & Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).  
3 For a definition and view of the existing landscape these fields see Aimée Fox, Learning to Fight: Military 
Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 5-
7. 
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where reform of staff training was discussed by the officers involved in the various reports 
and committees examined by this thesis, they did so primarily in the context of Camberley. 
Therefore, whilst the historiography generally utilises the term to cover either institution, this 
thesis will apply a narrower definition of this term. Although adopting a narrower definition 
of the term Staff College, this thesis follows the broadly accepted definition of staff work. 
This definition suggests that staff work consists of the practical, day-to-day duties of a staff 
officer, largely relating to administrative and logistical organisation, but also encompassing 
different levels of operational planning and providing support to the commanding general.4 
Whilst there is some examination of staff duties connected with the higher levels of 
command, combined operations and imperial strategy during the examination of the 
formation of the Imperial Defence College (IDC), the principal focus is on reforms affecting 
staff training for operational level staff work.  
 
Moreover, it is equally important to triangulate the definition of staff training within the 
broader context of officer education. Christopher Bellamy has defined military education in 
its broadest sense as, ‘a general term covering the full range of instruction in the art and 
science of war, from basic military training to higher education at master's and doctoral 
level.’5 In the context of the British Army in the interwar period, this definition covers the 
cadet colleges at Woolwich and Sandhurst, regimental training either with formations or in 
regimental depots, professional training provided at civilian universities, professional courses 
such as those at the School of Musketry or the School of Artillery, training received at the 
Staff College and training undertaken at the IDC. In contrast, the use of staff training in this 
thesis refers only to those activities undertaken either at the Staff College, its Junior and 
Senior iterations from 1939, wartime short staff courses or the IDC.6 These courses 
 
4 See Field Service Regulations Volume I Organization and Administration (London: HMSO, 1923), Ch. V, VI, 
VII, David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 164, Mark Frost, ‘The British and Indian Army Staff Colleges in 
the Interwar Years,’ in Douglas E. Delaney, Robert C. Engen, and Meghan Fitzpatrick (eds.) Military Education 
and the British Empire, 1815-1949 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), pp. 152-175, Edward Smalley, The British 
Expeditionary Force, 1939-40 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 180 and Niall Barr, ‘Command in 
the Transition from Mobile to Static Warfare, August 1914 to March 1915,’ in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman 
(eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience (Stroud: Spellmount, 
2007), pp. 14-15.   
5 Christopher Bellamy, ‘Education, Military,’ in Holmes, Singleton and Jones (eds.), The Oxford Companion to 
Military History, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198606963.001.0001/acref-
9780198606963-e-400?rskey=9EuVKi&result=7 – accessed 20th August 2019. 
6 A.R. Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College (London: Constable & Co., 1927), pp. 85-110, David 
French and Brian Holden Reid (eds.), The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939 (London: 
Frank Cass, 2002), p. 5, Fox, Learning to Fight, pp. 88-92, Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, pp. 
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represented the upper end of centralised professional training for army officers and similarly 
represented the only further education provided beyond that required for their regimental 
roles. As will be shown throughout this thesis, the relationship between the War Office and 
the reform of staff training in the interwar period was highly complex and frequently 
influenced by Victorian and Edwardian attitudes towards officer education in general. It is 
this interplay between institutional ideologies and training requirements which underpins 
much of the analysis to follow. 
 
Furthermore, in a thesis which sets out to examine why the British Army failed to reform, it 
is crucial to define failure in the context of staff reform. To do so, a baseline of success has 
been established in the form of the short wartime staff courses of the First World War and the 
reforms implemented by the Army Council as a result of the 1938 Massy committee. These 
measures have been highlighted as successes as they overcame the two major shortcomings 
highlighted in the British staff system, namely the low numbers of officers trained and the 
perceived focus on higher level training at the Staff College. Both the measures adopted in 
the First World War and those implemented in 1938 resulted in the training of far larger 
numbers of staff officers for junior posts and recognised the importance of training in day-to-
day staff work in the context of modern, industrial warfare involving mass armies. Thus, 
within this thesis, failure is broadly defined as any action which did not work towards these 
aims or that recognised the fundamentally changed nature of staff work from 1914. Such 
failure does not entail outright opposition to reform, but can be equally be a lack of 
alternative proposals to address key failings or lack of engagement with the debate on 
reforms to the system of staff training. Although methodologically a very broad definition, 
the variation of response by individual officers contributing to this debate necessitates such 
broad definition in order to establish an analytical framework in which to examine the 
problem of the reform of staff training in the British Army between the two world wars.        
 
It must also be remembered that developments taking place in the British Army in the 
interwar period did not occur in a vacuum, but in the context of wider developments in 
strategic and doctrinal thought. As noted above, the central analysis of this thesis rests at the 
policy level and consequently, whilst reforms to the Staff College will be located within the 
 
51-81 and Brigadier T.I.G. Gray, The Imperial Defence College and the Royal School of Defence Studies 1927-
1977 (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1977), pp. 1-32. 
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broader context of British military doctrine, it is on wider policy towards officer education 
which this analysis will focus. Military doctrine has been extensively examined both as an 
analytical tool within the historiography and as a key determining principle in studies of 
political science.7 In doing so, a broad definition has been reached, with Geoffrey Sloan 
identifying military doctrine as being the, ‘fundamental principles by which military forces 
guide their actions in support of objectives.’8 For the British Army, these principles were laid 
down in the various issues of Field Service Regulations (FSR), published in three volumes 
covering organisation and administration, operations and higher formations.9 This doctrine 
theoretically governed the conduct of military policy in the interwar period by establishing 
the types of war to be prepared for and how the British Army was to organise itself and 
conduct the operations required in war. Whilst it is not the intention of this thesis to assess 
the effectiveness of British doctrine in this period, the dichotomy between doctrinal 
development and the reality of the army’s role in interwar defence planning forms an element 
of the institutional mindset within the senior ranks of the British Army affecting responses to 
proposed reforms. 
 
Key to this dichotomy is the relationship of British Army doctrine to the structure of the army 
staff. David French has argued that as a result of interwar developments, the British Army’s 
command and control system in the early years of the Second World War was committed to, 
‘an inflexible and autocratic management system…[with a] reliance upon detailed, written 
orders.’10 This system centred on a single commander supported by a staff divided into three 
branches, General (G), Quartermaster (Q) and Administrative (A). These three branches 
existed from the brigade up to the War Office, each with its own defined set of duties.11 The 
 
7 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 34-81, Clausewitz, On War, Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of 
War, Special Edition [1836] (El Paso, TX: El Paso Norte Press, 2005), pp. 140-201, Elizabeth Kier, Imagining 
War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 
pp. 10-39, Martin Samuels, Piercing the Fog of War: The Theory and Practice of Command in the British and 
German Armies, 1918-1940 (Solihull: Helion, 2019), pp. 50-96 and French, Raising Churchill’s Army, pp. 12-
48. 
8 Geoffrey Sloan, ‘Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis and 
Theory.’ International Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 2 (March 2012), p. 243. 
9 Field Service Regulations Volume I, Organization and Administration (London: HMSO, 1923 [re-issued 1930, 
1939]), Field Service Regulations Volume II, Operations (London: HMSO, 1920 [re-issued 1924, 1929 and 
1935]), Field Service Regulations Volume III, Higher Formations (London: HMSO, 1935).   
10 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p. 161. 
11 For the division of duties between the various staff branches see Field Service Regulations Volume I, 
Organization and Administration (London: HMSO, 1923). 
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relationships between the various branches and the different levels of command and control 
are best demonstrated in the figure below. 
Fig. 1 Connections between Staff College, WO, CIGS and Secretary of State.12 
 
This autocratic system of management was to be influential in obstructing the course of 
reforms to staff training. Much like the organisational chart above, not only is it vital to 
define the various terms to be utilised throughout this thesis, but establishing these definitions 
additionally demonstrates the interconnectivity of the various elements of this thesis. As will 
be noted throughout this thesis, many references to the War Office are made. Such references 
will generally refer to those senior military officers comprising the heads of departments 
under the Chief of the Imperial General Staff: namely the Director of Staff Duties, Adjutant 
General, Quartermaster General, Master General of the Ordinance, Director of Military 
Operations and Intelligence and Director of Military Training. This definition has been 
 
12 Compiled from data in Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1980), George Forty, Companion to the British Army, 2nd edn. (Stroud: The History Press, 2009) and War 
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adopted to aid the flow of the arguments developed and where such personnel are involved in 
discussions of reform, reference to civilian members, primarily the Permanent Under-
Secretary and the Secretary of State, will be made separately under their respective titles.    
The interconnectivity of the various elements within the War Office is prevalent within the 
available literature. Whilst there have been very few studies examining either staff training or 
the Staff Colleges as institutions, frequent mention is made of the staff, Staff College and 
staff training within the literature covering the First World War, the interwar period and the 
Second World War. In laying out this literature below, it will be seen that in more recent 
years, historians have begun to look at the staff training curriculum within a number of 
different contexts. Ultimately, much of the existing work attempts to explain the performance 
of the British Army in the First and Second World War through analysis of the pre-war 
periods and the applications of this analysis to wartime operations. As such, although 
touching on a number of different elements of military education, such studies rarely examine 
the wider policies behind such education in sufficient detail to examine the pedagogical 
beliefs underpinning these issues. This, despite correctly identifying the two key failings of 
interwar staff training highlighted above. Therefore, this thesis will add to the literature 
discussed below, building on its analysis and conclusions regarding British Army operational 
performance. In doing so, it will demonstrate the extent to which the failure of the British 
Expeditionary Force’s (BEF) command, control and intelligence in the opening campaigns of 
the Second World War highlighted by David French, was the result of War Office attitudes 
towards the reform of staff training in the interwar period.13  
These attitudes were based in part on the experiences of the British Army in the late-
Victorian and Edwardian era. This period saw a re-evaluation of cultural and institutional 
understandings of officership and military professionalism.14 For the British in particular, the 
clash between the ideology and culturally significant social construction of the regimental 
 
13 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, pp. 159-162. 
14 For examples see; Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); James Donald Hittle L. DeWitt, The Military 
Staff: Its History and Development, 3rd edn. (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Co., 1961); Hew Strachan, The 
Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gary Sheffield, Leadership in the 
Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political 
Portrait (New York, NY: Free Press, 1960); Ian F.W. Beckett, A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of 
Command in the Late Victorian Army (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018) and David French, 
Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, & the British People c. 1870-2000 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).   
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system and the development of a complex and centralised system of staff training and 
eventual development of a central army staff brought this conflict into stark focus. Explicit 
throughout is the emphasis on the development of complex structures of progressive 
professional training with an emphasis on the development of professional staffs to 
administer, organise and control large national armies in times of war. It is important to note, 
that whilst many of the regressive, conservative attitudes displayed by officers in the interwar 
period had their origins in the Victorian army, such attitudes were not universal and the 
persistence of a belief in regimental ideologies and privileges were not necessarily indicative 
of opposition to reform. Instead, they often served as handy crutches for those officers 
seeking to subvert reforms. Referencing the Victorian British Army in particular, Ian Beckett 
noted that there were several difficulties preventing the army from developing a truly 
intellectual community, but that this did not represent an officer corps mired in intellectual 
bleakness.15 As will be demonstrated in Chapter One, between the relocation of the Staff 
College to Camberley in the 1850s and the start of the First World War in 1914, the British 
Army was able to achieve gradual and continuous reform of staff training, despite continued 
opposition from officers of high standing and influence. It will be seen that although begun in 
the 1850s, it was in the wake of the relative disasters of the Second South African War that 
this process began to accelerate. 
 
The Staff College in the Historiography 
 
Those works providing broad histories of staff training are limited to four studies, two of 
which were commemorative works published by the colleges themselves.16 Of these, only 
Bond presents a truly critical analysis in which he aimed, ‘to illuminate the development-
truly a transformation-which took place in the character of the British Army.’17 In a similar 
manner to this thesis, Bond focuses on the interplay between the developing area of staff 
training and the War Office, discussing this within the broader context of the growing 
professionalisation of European militaries and the debates around implementing 
improvements in officer education. He convincingly demonstrates that from the end of the 
 
15 Beckett highlights that the wide dispersion of the army, customary divisions between the regiments and the 
arms of service and economic and political considerations all limiting the ability of the army in its pursuit of a 
full intellectual community. Beckett, A British Profession of Arms, p. 15. 
16 Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College; Staff College Quetta, Pakistan, The First Fifty Years of the 
Staff College Quetta, 1905-1955 (Quetta: Pakistan, 1962); Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Young, The Story of the 
Staff College, 1858-1958 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1958) and Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff 
College. 
17 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p.3. 
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Crimean War, staff training in the British Army became increasingly practical and after the 
formation of the General Staff in 1906 acquired a sense of purpose alongside the provision of 
staff trained officers to formations.18 Much like this thesis, whilst Bond establishes a 
generally reformist trend among those officers directly involved in the provision of staff 
training, he highlights a number of challenges to the progress of reform. Key amongst these 
challenges was the emphasis on the importance of the regimental officer which asserted itself 
in the 1860s in the wake of the reforms of Edward Cardwell and Hugh Childers, the failure to 
enforce a system of attachment to other arms after completion of the course and resistance 
from the combination of senior officers and the political leadership (many of these ideas were 
to re-appear over the course of the interwar period).19 It is this seminal study of the Staff 
College which provides the foundation of this thesis through its highlighting of a number of 
key obstacles to staff reform in the 1860s, which would prove as challenging to officers 
attempting to reform staff training in the 1920s and 1930s, establishing continuity of 
ideological opposition to the structural reform of staff training.   
 
In contrast to Bond’s critical examination, the remaining works devoted to the study of the 
Staff College, although advancing our understanding of the development of staff training, are 
primarily commemorative in outlook. These volumes focus on the curriculum at Camberley 
and Quetta, social and sporting activities and include generally positive recollections from 
former students.20 Similarly, Brevet-Major A. R. Goodwin-Austin’s study of the Staff 
College up to 1927 focuses primarily on the curriculum, social life at the college and 
developments at the War Office relating to its development. As with Bond, Goodwin-Austin, 
‘found it impossible to divorce the history of the College from that of the Staff in general.’21 
Notwithstanding its place as the first study of the Staff College, this work does not accurately 
place the developments described within the wider context of the British Army.22 Instead, it 
reads very much like a college prospectus for the Staff College.23 Due to the contemporary 
nature of the events discussed, Goodwin-Austin’s chapter on the interwar period (up to 1927) 
is focussed less on attempted alterations and more on the likely experiences of potential 
students. Despite this, he does present information relating to the decline in infantry officers 
 
18 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 326. 
19 Ibid., pp. 105, 106, 116, 135, 139, 171, 192. 
20 Young, The Story of the Staff College, pp. 19-31. 
21 Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, p. xi. 
22 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 5. 
23 Indeed, his numerous references to either potential or incoming students and what they will find confirm this 
impression. 
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as a percentage of students at the college in the 1920s, suggesting that this decline was due to, 
‘an increase in competition from the more technical services and the toughening up of the 
entrance exam itself.’24 However, there is no further analysis of this issue, although as will be 
demonstrated in chapter five, this was the focus of much debate within the War Office 
between 1927 and 1931. Overall, whilst Goodwin-Austin’s work does not present an in-
depth, critical analysis of staff training in the period, it would be foolish to understate the 
importance of this work in providing us with an insight into the world of the Staff College, its 
structure and course content and its engagement with the army as a whole. 
 
Beyond these works, much of the literature on the British Army in the interwar period, whilst 
recognising the importance of the Staff College, allows the examination of its inadequacy to 
fade into the background. Instead, they seek to explain the British Army’s failures in the 
Second World War through the examination of a number of different features of the interwar 
army. These centre on studies of military thinkers, examinations of operational and strategic 
doctrine, the impact of the regimental system, technological developments, imperial 
interoperability and political and sociological changes. The conclusions of these studies have 
done much to advance and develop our understanding of the British Army in this period and 
have established the themes against which the analysis of the proposed reforms to staff 
training will be tested.    
 
The first of these is the historiographical focus on individual military thinkers.25 These 
studies generally paint the Staff College poorly, reflecting the negative attitudes towards it 
expressed by key military thinkers of this period.26 Jay Luvaas argues in his study of the 
enigmatic Major-General J.F.C. Fuller that, ‘Fuller worked to transform the Staff College, 
which he claimed was being run like a school, into a university.’27 Similarly, Brian Holden 
Reid quoted Fuller’s assertion that the Staff College, ‘failed to encourage creative thought, 
but…stifled curiosity by overwhelming students with doctrine which they were expected to 
learn, and forced them to memorize mountains of useless facts about military history.’28 
 
24 Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, p. 276. 
25 See for example Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army (London: Cassell, 1964); John J. Meirsheimer, 
Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988) and Brian Holden Reid, 
J.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987). 
26 See for example Alaric Searle, The Military Papers and Correspondence of Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, 
1916-1933 (Stroud: Army Records Society, 2017), pp. 169, 216, 225.  
27 Luvaas, The Education of an Army, p. 345. 
28 Holden Reid, J.F.C. Fuller, p. 180. 
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Ultimately, such studies are critical of the senior leadership of the army in this period with 
Luvaas noting that, ‘the reverberations from “Uncle George’s” [Field Marshal Sir George 
Milne, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1926-1933] trumpet sounded uncomfortably like 
the parting strains of the Last Post.’29 Basil Liddell Hart’s memoirs were similarly critical of 
the army leadership in this period, particularly towards the progress of mechanisation.30 
Other studies also sought explanations for such behaviour outside the bounds of historical 
enquiry, with Norman Dixon seeking psychological explanations to explain the supposed 
incompetence of military officers.31 Such studies firmly established the ‘lions led by 
donkeys’ myth of the First World War within the development of the British Army in the 
interwar period. 32 While this idea has been largely revised by more recent historiography,33 
conservatism amongst senior officers remains an established feature of the literature of the 
British Army in the interwar period, as will be noted below. Although it is well-established 
that military institutions are, by their very nature conservative, such conservatism did not 
automatically impede reform. 34 Indeed, in the quest for professionalism, often aligned with 
broader military conservatism, any measures to increase military professionalism are 
generally viewed as acceptable. As this thesis will argue, for the British Army in the interwar 
period, this conservatism manifested itself in the minds of a number of senior officers in a 
reversion to late-Victorian and Edwardian attitudes around leadership which, alongside socio-
political hostility to militarism, fundamentally clashed with the desire of more junior officers 
to apply the hard-won lessons of the First World War. 
 
Later, revisionist studies focussed on the apparent failure of the political leadership to finance 
and support reforms adequately during the interwar period.35 Such studies, rarely absolved 
 
29 Holden Reid, J.F.C. Fuller,  p. 335. 
30 Basil Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart, Volume 1 (London: Cassell, 1965), pp. 227-228. 
31 Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence [1976] (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2016). 
32 For example, Basil Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (London: Weidenfeld Nicolson, 1970), 
Strategy, 2nd edn. (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), A History of the World War, 1914-1918 (London: Faber & 
Faber, 1934), The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart, Volume 1.  
33 John Bourne, ‘British Generals in the First World War,’ in G.D. Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: 
Anglo-American Military Experience since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 1997)., Hew Strachan, ‘The Real War,’ in 
Brian Bond (ed.), The First World War and British Military History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), Brian 
Bond and Nigel Cave (eds.), Haig: A Reappraisal 80 Years on (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999) and Brian Bond, 
Britain’s Two World Wars Against Germany: Myth, Memory and the Distortions of Hindsight (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
34 For examples see Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 93-4; Fox, Learning to Fight, p. 1 and Dixon, On 
the Psychology of Military Incompetence, pp. 447-448.  
35 For example, see Franklyn Arthur Johnson, Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial 
Defence 1885-1959 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960) and Robert Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime: 
Britain, 1918-1940, A Case Study (London: G.T. Foulis & Co., 1962).  
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the military leadership from blame, often painting a broad picture of failure at the senior 
levels of both political and military leadership. For example, Franklyn Johnson noted that, 
‘Taken together, the decade from the late ‘twenties to the late ‘thirties formed a period of 
introspection, argumentation and vacillation…And while those constitutionally charged with 
salus populi were fearful that they would lose an election if they acted with realism, the 
military squabbled over shares of a budget too small for any.’36 Similarly, Bond’s seminal 
study British Military Policy between the Two World Wars critically assessed traditional 
assumptions established in the decades following the First World War and is still regarded as 
one of the key texts examining British defence policy in this period.37 Not only did the depth 
of analysis represent a break from previous works on British military thought, but the 
conclusions he reached mark a key development of the historiography. Setting aside the focus 
on mechanisation, Bond’s conclusions rested much more on the political and economic 
failings of the British government, alongside their indecision as to the role to be fulfilled by 
the army in the event of a European war.38 Additionally, Bond’s study establishes the idea of 
an intellectual divide within the War Office. It is this intellectual divide which forms the 
basis for the analysis undertaken by this thesis. He noted that many senior officers who had 
seen service in the Great War remained behind the times in their thinking and were happy to 
revert to imperial soldiering. He also suggested that a number of junior officers, regimental 
officers and lower grade staff officers took heed of the lessons from the Great War and 
understood the need to develop tactics which reduced casualties and made better use of the 
battlefield experiences in the final year of the war.39 These studies do not deal in depth with 
issues of training, due to their focus on strategic policy; however, this does not mean that the 
subject is ignored. Indeed, Bond notes that, ‘at Camberley…progressive students felt that 
instructors were over-concerned with methods of winning the last war.’40 Much like the 
identification of a high degree of conservatism, this identification of an intellectual divide at 
the War Office and emphasis of the indecision attached to the role of the army both serve as 
themes against which the responses to the proposed reforms to staff training will be tested.  
 
Bond’s analysis of British military policy led to a greater interest in the development of 
doctrinal precepts and strategic thought. The examination of these were then utilised to test 
 
36 Johnson, Defence by Committee, p. 247. 
37 Brian Bond, British Military Policy. 
38 Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, pp. 337-340. 
39 Ibid, p. 37. 
40 Ibid. 
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the conclusions of earlier studies and offer an alternative narrative to that of incompetent 
senior officers and recalcitrant politicians.41 One such example of this new trend was Barry 
Posen’s The Sources of Military Doctrine, which sought to establish the principles behind the 
development of military doctrine using the three examples of Britain, France and Germany in 
the interwar years. 42 In dealing with Britain, Posen argued that the central issue with British 
doctrine was that, it seemed, ‘to invest little effort in maintaining a continental intervention 
capability.’43 Such studies, much like the earlier works cited above, continued to take a macro 
approach to historical analysis which, whilst doing much to advance our understanding of the 
broader trends within the British Army in this period, has resulted in historical blind spots 
such as that dealing with broader issues of educational reform which this thesis aims to 
address. Whilst Posen lays heavy stress on the development of doctrine, Elizabeth Kier builds 
on this by seeking to establish why British doctrine developed as it did. Talbot Imlay’s and 
Monica Duffy Toft’s edited volume then examined how this doctrine was translated into war 
plans during periods of political and strategic uncertainty.44 
 
In explaining British doctrine, Kier adopts a multi-faceted approach focussing on the political 
and strategic justification for doctrinal development alongside a study of the British military 
culture and its influence on doctrinal development and it is the latter with which this thesis is 
concerned. In her analysis, Kier lays great stress on ideas of the army officer as a gentleman 
amateur and an army heavily focussed on drill, whilst highlighting wider British hostility to 
standing armies and the British Army’s position as the ‘fourth arm of defence.’45In a similar 
manner to Bond, Kier does not ignore the role played by the Staff College in the development 
and dissemination of doctrine, although much like other works such references are critical of 
the college. Indeed, an interwar officer was quoted as stating that, ‘if there is any specially 
sterling characteristic of life at the Staff College…everyone is expected to do a job of work 
 
41 Examples include Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Brian Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870-
1970 (Guernsey: Sutton Publishing, 1984); Strachan, The Politics of the British Army; Kier, Imagining War;  
David French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1999); Colin McInnes & G.D. 
Sheffield (eds.), Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Allan 
R. Millet & Williamson Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, Volume 2 The Interwar Period (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988); Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) and Matthew Hughes & William J. Philpott (eds.) Palgrave Advances in 
Modern Military History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
42 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. 
43 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 143. 
44 Talbot C. Imlay & Monica Duffy Toft (eds.), The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and Strategic 
Planning under Uncertainty (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
45 Kier, Imagining War, pp. 120-128. 
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without making heavy weather, or taking it, or himself, too seriously.’46 Whilst identifying 
shortcomings in staff training, the intent of such analysis is to underline broader conclusions 
regarding the institutional attitudes of the British Army.  
 
In addition to these broader examinations of policy and doctrine, there have been a series of 
works undertaking close, critical examination of specific aspects of the interwar British 
Army.47 These sought to examine the conclusions of earlier studies against specific facets of 
the British Army. As with earlier examinations, these works were critical of the senior 
political and military leadership in the interwar period and focus on the potential for reforms 
instigated by more junior officers within the army.48 Ultimately, these studies continued to 
focus on the debate regarding the primacy of political and financial influences versus military 
stagnation as the cause of British failures in the opening years of the Second World War.49 
Within this, staff training was rarely mentioned and although taking a narrower approach 
than previous studies of the British Army, these works tend to retain an element of traditional 
analytical themes. As a result, these works generally focus on the relationship between 
doctrine, technology and the senior political and military leadership of the army.  
 
This overwhelming trend within the historiography has been challenged in recent years by 
studies that take a more holistic approach, combining the broad approach with in-depth 
analysis of individual themes and examples.50 In the same way as those studies focussed on 
strategic and operational doctrine subjected the conclusions of earlier historians to critical 
examination, more recent works have added additional layers of analysis to these strategic 
 
46 Kier, Imagining War, p. 124. 
47 See Keith Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 1918-22 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1984), Shelford Bidwell & Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons & Theories of 
War 1904-1945 [1982] (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004) and J. P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military 
Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). 
48 For example, J.P. Harris in his examination of armoured forces in the British Army focuses on the roles 
played by interwar heavyweights such as Liddell Hart and Fuller, alongside figures such as Charles Broad, 
Percy Hobart, John Burnett Stuart, George Lindsay, ‘Tim’ Pile and Gifford Le Quesne Martel. 
49 For example, Harris is firm in his conviction that it was political vacillation and financial stringency which 
caused the British failure to take advantage of its lead in armoured warfare in the interwar period (Men, Ideas 
and Tanks, p. 318). In contrast Bidwell and Graham prioritises mental stagnation in the army as a key 
determinant in British wartime failures (Fire-power, p. 3). 
50 Key examples being David French, Raising Churchill’s Army; French, Military Identities; French and Holden 
Reid, The British General Staff; Brian Holden Reid, Studies in British Military Thought: Debates with Fuller 
and Liddell Hart (Lincoln, NA: University of Nebraska, 1998), Bond, Britain’s Two World Wars Against 
Germany; Edward Smalley, The British Expeditionary Force 1939-40 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015), Douglas E. Delaney, The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces of the Dominions and 
India 1902-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) and Delaney, Engen and Fitzpatrick, Military 
Education and the British Empire. 
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and doctrinal studies. However, where these studies differ is their deeper examination of 
training and the institutional identity of the British Army alongside traditional financial, 
technological and doctrinal factors in assessing British performance in the Second World 
War. It is from these later works that the current interpretation and analysis of the Staff 
College has developed. Equally, such studies emphasise the multiplicity of factors impacting 
British military development and the complexity of applying these factors to operational 
performance in the Second World War. In identifying the failings of interwar staff training, 
these studies have tended to tie criticisms of staff training to a wider failure of the British 
Army to break away from its traditional top-down approach to command and control and 
failings in the provision of training.51 Ultimately, these works highlight the growing 
importance of the Staff College in supplying senior officers for the army, whilst recognising 
the difficulty in breaking the parochial hold of the regimental system and the perceived 
advantages of the regimental officer, over the British officer corps as a whole.52 This thesis 
adds to these conclusions by setting out the impact of these conflicting institutional attitudes 
on the reform of staff training in light of the experiences of the First World War. Whilst the 
existing body of literature generally ascribes the Staff College as one of the problems in 
improving the British Army’s operational capabilities, this thesis argues that the Staff College 
was as much a victim of the army’s institutional uncertainty as its doctrine, the progress of 
mechanisation and resultant operational effectiveness.    
 
The view of the Staff College as part of the problem with the interwar army, rather than as a 
victim of the vagaries of institutional uncertainty within the British Army, has come to the 
fore in recent historiography: In particular, the effectiveness of the officers trained at the 
college and its status as an elite institution within the army.53 These ideas were further 
expanded in Edward Smalley’s study of the BEF in 1939-40, providing an examination of the 
course content and its impact on staff performance in the Second World War.54 This latter 
work, although noting the indecision within the army as to the role of the Staff College, fails 
to examine in detail the reasons for this.55 Recent works do draw attention to some of the 
 
51 See French, Raising Churchill’s Army, pp. 156-184. 
52 David French, “An Extensive Use of Weedkiller’: Patterns of Promotion in the Senior Ranks of the British 
Army, 1919-39,’ in French and Holden Reid, The British General Staff, p. 168 and French, Military Identities, p 
153. 
53 Edward Smalley, ‘Qualified but Unprepared: Training for War at the Staff College in the 1930s,’ British 
Journal of Military History, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2015, pp. 55-72. 
54 Edward Smalley, The British Expeditionary Force, pp. 176-218. 
55 Ibid, p. 180. 
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reform attempts discussed in this thesis, principally the 1925 Report on Higher Education for 
War and those memoranda discussing the allocation of Staff College vacancies.56 However, 
by not examining these examples in detail, or in the broader context of attempts to reform the 
Staff College across the interwar period as a whole, these studies overlook the wider 
implications of these individual examples of failed Staff College reform. As will be shown 
below, this thesis adds to the existing historiography, examining the full picture of attempted 
reforms in the interwar period, centred on a number of key proposals.  
 
Reform of Staff Training in the Historiography 
 
As noted above, where examples are mentioned within the historiography, it is in isolation 
from the other reform attempts and, due to nature of the broader aims of the study, often 
without in-depth examination of broader trends and attitudes towards education and 
professional training. For example, whilst succinctly identifying the two key failings of staff 
training in this period, in reference to the report put forward by Major-General Edmund 
Ironside in 1925, David French states that, ‘in the mid-1920s two commandants at 
Camberley…suggested establishing a new war college to train officers in the operational 
techniques of commanding large formations. However, Milne [CIGS Field Marshal Sir 
George Milne] insisted on retaining the existing system by which senior officers were 
supposedly trained by their own commanders.’57 Similarly, when commenting on later 
successful reform efforts, Douglas Delaney notes that, ‘they implemented a programme to 
double the annual production of staff college graduates, a scheme in fact very much in line 
with the one that had been proposed by Edmond Ironside in 1925.’58 Therefore, whilst 
recognising that reforms were attempted and did eventually take place in the structure of staff 
training, the historiography does not drill down into the question of why these reforms took 
place when they did and what prevented earlier attempts at reform from occurring. This is not 
to suggest these studies are guilty of brushing over an important aspect of the interwar army; 
indeed, both French’s and Delaney’s studies of the regimental system, the structure and 
development of the interwar British Army and the development of an imperial army 
respectively are seminal works in their research areas. Indeed, it is only through their 
 
56 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p. 164, Delaney, The Imperial Army Project, p. 191.  
57 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p. 164. 
58 Delaney, The Imperial Army Project, p. 225. 
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advancing our understanding of these aspects of military history that the historiographical 
gap to be filled by this thesis has been exposed. 
 
In recent years, the most significant output of analysis of interwar staff training has centred 
on the development of the organisation and institutional development of the British imperial 
army. These studies range from broad examinations to those examining specific facets of this 
idea, but all cite the importance of the Staff College and staff training as a cornerstone of this 
effort.59 In addition, some mention specific reform attempts, with both Mark Frost and 
Delaney briefly highlighting Ironside’s Report on Higher Education for War and the reforms 
eventually enacted in the late 1930s.60 However, by and large these studies have focused on 
developing a basis upon which historians can continue to build, with some rarely referencing 
the complex interactions between dominion forces and the British Army.61  
 
Ultimately, although present throughout much of the historiography, examination of the 
broader picture of reforms to the Staff College in the interwar period is required. Existing 
studies present largely critical assessments of significant failings in the system of staff 
training and suggest that the lack of adequate numbers of properly trained staff officers was 
one factor affecting the operational performance of the British Army in the Second World 
War. Alongside the Staff College, studies highlight a number of additional factors affecting 
the operational performance of the British Army including doctrinal and strategic changes, 
technological and financial restrictions on innovation and the inherent institutional 
conservatism of the British Army. For this reason, the principal focus rests on understanding 
the strategic, doctrinal, technological and institutional developments of the interwar period 
and their application to the early years of the Second World War. Whilst the majority of the 
contributory factors cited above have been thoroughly examined in the historiography over 
the past fifty years, a deeper examination of the Staff College has remained strangely absent. 
 
59 For examples see Douglas E. Delaney, The Imperial Army Project; Delaney, Engen, and Fitzpatrick, Military 
Education and the British Empire; Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia, 3rd edn. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army: A History (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada, 5th edn. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007), 
T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillen, 
1998), Pradeep Barua, Gentlemen of the Raj: The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817-1949 (Westport, CT: 
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Oxford University Press, 2001). 
60 Frost, ‘The British and Indian Army Staff Colleges in the Interwar Years,’ pp. 154 and Delaney, The Imperial 
Army Project, pp. 191, 255. 
61 Indeed, regarding Camberley, Desmond Morton in A Military History of Canada simply notes that after 1909 
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Although recent studies of the development of ideas of an imperial army have allowed the 
Staff College’s role in fostering this idea to be better appreciated, even this more positive 
analysis fails to address fully the issues highlighted by the historiography. As a result, we are 
left with only a partial analysis of the role of the Staff College in the interwar army and how 
it was affected by the attitudes held by many senior officers within the War Office and Home 
Commands in the same period.   
 
Beyond these army focussed studies, there is a developing body of work seeking to delineate 
the development of education across the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.62 These studies 
highlight a number of key themes within the study of military education which will be shown 
to have been present within the British army in the interwar period. Key amongst these 
themes, particularly where the Royal Navy was concerned, was the high degree of 
uncertainty present in the minds of senior officers. Moretz noted that, ‘a measure of 
uncertainty greeted any proposal for changes in officer education and while many reasons 
flourished specifying what was deplored, harder was it to find consensus on how to 
proceed.’63 As will be noted throughout this thesis, it was the relative vehemence and 
consistency of objection with which officers opposed reforms to staff training compared to 
the lack of support and objective recognition of the way forward which was to blight 
discussions of reform to army staff training until such coherence of approach was introduced 
in the late 1930s. Similarly visible within the historiography of educational development 
across the other services is the internal institutional struggle between the recognition that 
increased emphasis on training in the technical aspects of staff work and command and the 
desire to maintain not only doctrinal conformity but also service spirit and values. Largely a 
feature of the Royal Air Force’s need to ensure its avoidance of reabsorption back into the 
Army and Royal Navy, one of the drivers behind the formation of the RAF Staff College was 
the Chief of the Air Staff, Hugh Trenchard’s desire to promote an ‘Air Force Spirit.’64 
 
62 Examples include Joseph Moretz, Thinking Wisely, Planning Boldly: The Higher Education and Training of 
Royal Navy Officers, 1919-39 (Solihull: Hellion, 2014); Harry Dickinson, Wisdom and War: The Royal Naval 
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63 Moretz, Thinking Wisely, Planning Boldly, p. 139. 
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 27 
Alongside the need to train officers in both staff duties and the principles of command in its 
broadest aspects, this was a dilemma as pervasive within the British Army as it was within 
the Royal Air Force. Similarly, Moretz’s work highlights that whilst there was a distinct body 
of opposition to reforms to officer education and expansion of the range of courses available, 
there was a broad recognition across the three services among the middle strata of officers, 
that the First World War had ushered in a new era of warfare in which a consistent process of 
training and education was provided to officers in order to ensure they were informed of 
current doctrinal, technological and operational developments and were encouraged to 
develop a culture of learning within the broader military institution.65 What all these studies 
highlight is the inherent complexities in defining, adapting and adopting the various 
educational lessons of the First World War.  
 
Studies of the Royal Navy in this context are most informative in establishing individual 
service differences of approach. As Moretz establishes, whilst drawing inspiration from the 
British Army’s adoption of a General Staff and the structure required to train officers for it, 
the Royal Navy in the interwar period recognises the need for simultaneous training in 
technological developments beyond and officer’s own specialty and the requirement to ‘top 
up’ knowledge prior to certain appointments.66 Such an approach was not seen in the British 
Army beyond a brief interlude of shortened wartime training and the eventual reforms put in 
place as a result of the 1938 Massy Report. Despite the clear difference in approach to officer 
training, Moretz also highlights a naval emphasis on the ‘salt horse’ an officer with no 
particular specialisation, whose additional time spent at sea was perceived to side-step the 
need for formal education and as capable of fulfilling senior roles as the staff trained 
officer.67 Comparisons with the concurrent efforts of both the British Army and the Royal Air 
Force argue that whilst the other services made staff training a precondition of accession to 
the highest command and staff roles of the service in the interwar period, the Royal Navy 
focussed on its education and training aspects, utilising the expertise and proficiency of the 
various courses established in future assignments.68 In a similar manner, Mahoney highlights 
the RAF’s use of naval and army schools and courses to, ‘reinforce the argument that the Air 
 
65 Moretz, Thinking Wisely, Planning Boldly, p. 478; Grey, ‘The RAF Staff College,’ p. 26 and Mahoney, ‘The 
Forgotten Career,’ p. 272. 
66 Moretz, Thinking Wisely, Planning Boldly, p. 262-264. 
67 Ibid, p. 499. 
68 Ibid, pp. 129-131. 
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Ministry actively nurtured officers at appropriate points in their careers.’69 Ultimately, while 
exploring and comparing experiences across service cultures, they examine, from differing 
angles, the drivers of institutional change in a military context. In doing so, they demonstrate 
that whilst acknowledging a very real need for adaptation and reform of existing educational 
structures, as conservative institutions, all three services battled at a generational level to 
redefine what it meant to be an officer within individual service modes of thought and more 
broadly within the unique context of British defence requirements between 1919-1939. 
 
It is into this broader discussion of service cultures of education and training that this thesis 
links. As will be seen, the presence of virtually identical drivers and obstacles to change 
across the three services speaks to a broader process of institutional and organisational 
change. When combined and tied to a longer period of examination70 such studies begin to 
move away from earlier, sociological studies of organisational development in a military 
context71 and place them under the historical spotlight of tracking and examining change over 
time. By doing so, such studies build an important multi-disciplinary link between traditional 
military history studies of organisational change and the sociological drivers behind them. 
The resultant recognition that such discussions are highly complex and struggle to 
definitively fit into traditional, or indeed revisionist understandings of a nation’s military past 
and leads to a difficulty in establishing metrics for success or failure of the various reforms 
enacted. Despite this, the identification of similar themes acting on organisational change 
across the three services, firmly establishes a clear and cohesive historiography highlighting 
the transitional nature of this period, not just in terms of officer education and training, but 
also in the nature of military professionalism and the internal conflict which marks the 




As noted above, the primary purpose of this thesis is to fill this historiographical gap and 
provide the first in-depth study of attempted reforms to the structure of staff training in the 
 
69 Mahoney, ‘The Forgotten Career,’ p. 239. 
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71 Key works in this context include Sam C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military 
Professionalism (Elmsford [NY]: Pergamon, 1981), Huntington, The Soldier and the State; Janowitz, The 
Professional Soldier and Krystal K. Hachey, Tamir Libel & Waylon H. Dean (eds.), Rethinking Military 
Professionalism for the Changing Armed Forces (Cham: Springer, 2020).  
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British Army across the interwar period. In doing so it will answer the question of why the 
War Office failed to enact reforms to the system of staff training until 1938. It will establish 
how far the themes established by the existing historiography affected these reforms and 
argue that the Staff College should be seen, together with the lack of operational flexibility, 
failures in mechanisation and modernisation, as a victim of the parochialism which afflicted 
the War Office in the interwar period. By identifying the key reform attempts and examining 
them in light of the themes highlighted above, this thesis will argue that this failure to reform 
was primarily the result of a lack of direction in the War Office as to the scope of reform 
needed to correct the issues identified within staff training. It will be demonstrated that the 
War Office had identified the failings set out by the historiography early in the interwar 
period, but despite multiple discussions within the War Office, professional journals and 
army-wide conferences, senior generals continued to hold a diverse range of views on the 
reforms required leading to inaction in the face of continued calls for reform.   
 
These diverse views will be further examined to establish how they fit within our existing 
understanding of institutional attitudes towards education and reform in general. By doing so, 
this thesis will argue between 1919 and 1939, the British Army was riven by a generational 
divide in attitude towards formal training and education for staff and command. Those 
generally opposed to reform consisted of a number of key officers holding senior posts for 
much of the interwar period both within the War Office and in Home Commands who 
continued to hold onto attitudes and beliefs incompatible with the experiences of the First 
World War and the doctrine developed as a result. Such attitudes were compounded by 
competing priorities, principally the need to improve conditions of service within the army 
and to mitigate the growing shortfall in the recruitment of officers. Such competing priorities 
resulted in the skewed interpretation of individual proposals by senior War Office officials 
and demonstrated a marked lack of understanding over the desires of the newer generation of 
officers for their career in the army. Opposing these views were the generation of officers, 
most of whom had experienced the First World War as regimental officers and junior staff 
officers, alongside a few reformist senior commanders. Through the pages of professional 
journals, discussions at conferences and reform proposals, these officers recognised the need 
for continuous examination and reform of the army’s system of formal education. It will 
argue that with the changing of the guard at the War Office due to the reforms of Leslie 
Hore-Belisha in 1937 and the rapidly deteriorating strategic situation, these diverse attitudes 
disappeared. Instead, the War Office was able to commission a report, digest its conclusions 
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and enact significant structural reforms to staff training within a period of six months. Whilst 
these conclusions are not revolutionary by themselves, their applicability to the reform of 
staff training is new. Source material from Australian and Canadian archives further 
augments this. These sources will be used to argue that in contrast to the British system beset 
by the uncertainties highlighted above, by holding a single understanding of the requirements 
of staff training and the role of the staff, these dominions were able to reform their systems of 
staff training to reflect the requirements of modern, industrialised warfare.   
 
In addition, this thesis adds to the growing literature on organisational approaches to change. 
As will be noted throughout, there is a clear emphasis on the role played by individuals in 
proposing or opposing structural reforms to staff training in the British Army. This emphasis 
sits within the broader structure of the impact of military culture on reform and innovation.72 
Examinations of this issue highlight that cultural explanations of institutional behaviours and 
approaches to reform result in puzzling outcomes that defy rationalist analysis.73 Alongside 
this, the study of organisational change has highlighted that, for military organisations in 
particular, there is a strong organisational culture, which primarily serves as both a form of 
group identity for new recruits but also as a means of shaping action through the provision of 
mental structures and habits in defining and solving problems.74 Expanding on this, Andrew 
Hall highlights that such a strong military institutional culture can pose problems for those 
attempting to innovate within it. He suggests that where innovation appears to undermine or 
require substantial change to said culture, senior leaders in decision-making positions would 
seek to protect the prevailing organisational culture and resist innovation.75  
 
As will be seen throughout this thesis, the strongest reactions against the proposed reforms 
tended to centre around the belief that the best staff officer was a good regimental officer and 
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it was the long-held understanding of the characteristics of a good regimental officer which 
were perceived to be under attack by proponents of staff reform. Similarly, as part of attempts 
to ameliorate regimental suspicion of the staff and encourage the adding of more suitable 
officers to the list of those put forward for the Staff College examination, these characteristics 
were adopted by those seeking to improve the quality of officer attending to achieve their 
goals without undermining the existing organisational culture of the British Army. In 
highlighting these features, this study establishes that between 1919-1939, the British Army 
was going through a period of significant organizational and cultural change. Not only had 
the First World War changed the face of modern war and stimulated significant technological 
and operational developments, but ongoing social changes in Britain had led to a re-
evaluation of young men’s perceptions of careerism requiring the army to adapt to the 
changing career aims of new officers. 
 
These studies, provide a theoretical basis upon which to structure a new analytical framework 
within which to analyse attitudes towards proposals for the reform of staff training. This 
framework recognises that opposition to reform reflected not just personal opinion, but also a 
more pervasive problem of institutional culture and its gradual change over time in response 
to various stimuli. It is in this broader theoretical understanding that this thesis will provide a 
new analytical framework in which to examine critically the conclusions of the existing 
historiography and to establish a base of understanding over the development of staff training 
in this period. It will serve to build on existing studies by confirming that the key failings 
identified by historians, namely the inadequate number of officers being trained and the focus 
on training commanders in strategic subjects, were well known within the senior ranks of the 
British Army by the mid 1920s. Where it diverges from the existing historiography, it does 
not seek to dismiss, but rather to refine knowledge of the context of officer training and 
education, building on our existing understanding of the interwar British Army and the 
complexities surrounding the institution of reforms in this period. In this regard, as sub-
themes to the central argument set out above, this thesis will examine the idea that reforms 
were opposed by the political leadership and constrained by financial considerations. In doing 
so, it will argue that although obstructing many reforms attempted by the army in this period, 
educational and training reforms were not significantly affected. Indeed, as will be 
demonstrated, key reform proposals were instigated by the Secretary of State for War on the 
basis of reports dealing with problems of officer recruitment and retention and on only one 
occasion was a financial assessment prepared to assess the potential impact of the proposed 
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reforms. Similarly, whilst the existing historiography defines individuals as either reformist 
or conservative, this thesis argues that this broad classification is too simplistic. Instead, it 
will be demonstrated that officers who have been identified by historians as reformers, could 
be equally conservative in their attitudes towards staff training and officer education. 
Furthermore, it will highlight the existence of ongoing debates on officer education and 
training throughout the interwar period and the existence of a broadly generational divide in 
attitudes primarily based upon understandings of professionalism and the role of formal 
education and training within the British Army. As a result, not only does this thesis set out to 
fill a knowledge gap in our understanding of the development of attitudes to staff training 
beyond the First World War, but it highlights the existence on a more extensive examination 
of staff reform within the British Army than has generally been ascribed to this period. In 
doing so, this thesis opens up the debate on institutional attitudes towards formal education, 
training and professionalism within the British Army, suggesting that whilst many senior 
officers reverted to ideas reminiscent of the Victorian and Edwardian army, there was a 
groundswell of support for instituting a more formal structure of education and training and 
an appreciation of the need for a formal, progressive career structure for army officers.   
 
In support of these arguments, this thesis rests its analytical structure on a series of committee 
reports and War Office memoranda which form the spine of the argument. These are: the 
1919 Braithwaite committee, the 1923 Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) sub-committee 
on the Institution of a Joint Staff College, the 1925 Report on Higher Education for War, the 
1927-1931 memoranda relating to the allocation of vacancies to the Staff College and the 
1937 Massy Committee on the Education of the Officer. Between them, these committees 
and discussions undertook examinations into most aspects of training provided at the Staff 
College. The exception to this was its curriculum, which was under the control of the 
Commandant and largely followed the direction of official army doctrine as laid down in 
FSR. These reports and memoranda presented a number of potential reforms which would 
have done much to address the key criticisms levelled at staff training in this period. Together 
with the details contained within the proposals, the responses to these reports from the 
various senior officers consulted form the bedrock of the analysis of War Office attitudes and 
demonstrate the diverse range of attitudes held by those at the top of the army.  
 
These attitudes are further understood through the use of the personal papers, memoirs or 
biographies of those involved in the various reform attempts. The utility of these papers is 
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limited to an extent by the fact that some did not retain papers while others, for example 
General Walter Braithwaite, destroyed theirs. In virtually all cases, there is little mention of 
their time at the Staff College, or of their involvement in reforms covered by this thesis. 
However, an assessment of the topics excluded and included can yield as much information 
about an individual’s attitude towards certain issues as a wealth of information and 
references. These direct references to the various attempts to implement structural reforms to 
staff training provide direct evidence of the range of views offered up by senior officers in 
the interwar period. Furthermore, in laying out their responses, these sources highlight the 
confusion which existed at the highest levels over both the role of the Staff College in officer 
education and the scope of the reforms required. Ultimately, such confusion and disparate 
views stemmed from the nature of the British Army with its emphasis on regimental identity 
rather than corporate identity and the latitude available to senior commanders to interpret 
regulations and doctrine as they saw fit.76 Thus, whilst outwardly operating under the guiding 
principles of FSR, the British Army had as many interpretations of that doctrine as it did 
senior officers in command and staff roles. As a result, whilst ultimately the result of the 
individual actions and attitudes of the officers concerned, when placed within its broader 
context, we can lay part of the blame for the British failure to reform staff training in this 
period at the feet of the institutional structure of the army itself. 
 
This overarching structure is complemented by a wide range of source material providing a 
firm basis of support for the arguments set out in this thesis. Prime amongst this evidence are 
the reports of a series of conferences held between 1927 and 1933 at the Staff College, 
Camberley attended by p.s.c. qualified staff officers of all levels to discuss the key issues 
affecting the army. Taken together with the minutes of Army Council meetings across the 
interwar period, these sources provide this thesis with the broader context of both the issues 
affecting the British Army in this period and the priority being assigned to these issues in the 
minds of the political and military heads of the army. Alongside this, other committee reports 
examining issues such as officer recruitment, will be utilised in order to shed further light on 
the educational and training concerns of the army and identify that significant concerns 
existed regarding officer recruitment that ultimately underpinned certain reform attempts in 
this period. These sources will provide additional context as to the attitude of senior officers 
towards officer education and training in general, demonstrating that there was a general 
 
76 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, pp. 21-2, 46. 
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trend towards reform among many officers. Further to these reports, this thesis looks at the 
development of other courses run in the interwar period for the training of army officers, 
principally the course of instruction at the IDC (from 1927), but also that of the Senior 
Officers’ School. The former course in particular serves to demonstrate the extent to which 
interwar staff training was influenced by its pre-1914 antecedents and provides further 
support to the idea set out in this thesis of a confusion surrounding the purpose and scope of 
the Staff College. 
 
Additionally, this thesis utilises the extensive collection of Indian Army source material held 
by the British Library, alongside material viewed at the National Archives of Australia, the 
Australian War Memorial and the National Archives of Canada. These sources are utilised to 
provide an imperial perspective on the changes taking place in Britain. In addition, they serve 
to demonstrate further that the situation existing in Britain in the interwar period was the 
result of a lack of a single strategy for staff training. In the former case, these sources will 
examine the relationship between the British Army and the dominions regarding the 
education of imperial officers and the dominion perception of British staff training. Latterly, 
the Dominion examinations of their own provision of staff training will lend support to the 
idea that due to the more single-minded approach taken by the dominions, they were able to 
provide a structure of staff training that did not suffer from the same failings as staff training 
in the British Army. 
 
This evidence will be organised on a chronological basis in order to track the broader themes 
and developments within the structural reform of British staff training in this period. The one 
exception to this is the discussion of staff training in the dominions. Whilst referencing 
material from all dominions to be discussed throughout the thesis, the main body of analysis 
will take place in the final chapter of this thesis. This approach has been adopted for two 
reasons, the first of which is to avoid breaking up the analytical examination of Staff College 
reform in Britain. Whilst dominion officers were sent to Camberley throughout the interwar 
period, the discussion of reforms were limited to senior British officers at the War Office 
with no real consideration as to dominion staff courses or training needs. To discuss such 
issues within those chapters dealing with specific reform attempts would simply serve to 
muddy the waters. Secondly, separating the examination of reforms to dominion staff training 
from those of the British Army allows the full extent of the contrasting nature of staff reform 
between Britain and the dominions to be appreciated. In particular, the different military 
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structures of militia versus professional army, courses of a few weeks’ duration versus the 
two-year Camberley course and the belief in the need for large numbers of junior staff 
officers versus the continued confusion surrounding staff training policy. Beyond this, each 
chapter deals with a single proposed reform and those relevant events, doctrinal 
developments and shifts in the strategic and political landscape taking place 
contemporaneously. Based on the key reform proposals to be discussed, this has resulted in 
seven thematic chapters. 
 
As with all examinations of policy, be it military, political or social, it has been crucial to 
determine how to mesh these varied sources together in order to establish firm conclusions, 
particularly when examining an issue as subjective as attitudes towards education. The 
baseline attitudes have been determined by the responses returned to senior War Office 
officials regarding the individual reports examined as part of this thesis. Whilst accounting 
for the stated facts and statements made by these responses, the determination of individual 
attitude is not solely guided by them in an effort to avoid what E.H. Carr referred to as a 
‘fetishism of documents.’77 Alongside the responses themselves, with a number of the 
officers remaining in senior posts and involved in the process across a number of years and 
reform proposals, a long-term picture of individual views was established. In particular, the 
comments of Field Marshal George Milne, General Walter Braithwaite and Lieutenant-
Generals Archibald Cameron and Robert Whigham (all present in one form or another 
between 1918 and 1933), allowed attitudes to the reform of staff training to be tested against 
multiple proposals and memoranda in order to establish whether their responses were 
targeted at specific proposals or represented a general opposition to the reform of formal 
structures of staff training. As this thesis is primarily a study of both institutional and 
individual attitudes to reform, personal papers were then utilised to ascertain the degree to 
which such attitudes were held beyond the professional sphere. Beyond these central sources, 
the wider gamut of professional journal articles, staff conference discussions and 
examinations of other aspects of officership and the growing professionalism and career-
mindedness of generations of young British men served to establish the discussion within its 
broader institutional context. Whether helping to explain the underlying tensions between 
individual agency and long-held institutional attitudes or the relationship between a nations 
armed services and society in general, the approaches taken in the utilisation of the historical 
 
77 E.H. Carr, What is History, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p.10. 
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record aim to set the analysis of staff reform in its broader context, highlighting where 
negative responses are the result of competing institutional priorities or the result of 
individual agency. 
 
As has been noted above, for the purposes of examining and assessing the British Army’s 
efforts in this regard, this thesis has adopted the highly subjective examples of the short staff 
courses established between 1915-1917 and the reforms resulting from the 1938 Massy 
Report as metrics of success. This metric has been chosen based on several factors which 
emerge from a close study of the subject. The first of these is that both markers address key 
concerns identified within both the historiography and contemporary discussions of the issue 
at the time; namely they allow for a far greater number of officers to be trained than was 
possible with a two-year course of instruction, and by dividing the course into Junior and 
Senior elements separated by a term of years and assignments, they negate the perceived 
overfocus on higher level training and the provision of training far in advance of when an 
officer would be required to make use of it. Secondly, the broad structure outlined by both 
was the most consistently presented by advocates of reform, although varying in certain 
minor details. Therefore, they stand as representative of contemporary belief of best practice 
and representative of the type of reforms that those officers pressing for structural reform of 
staff training desired. Finally, with both presenting almost identical structures for training and 
education of officers and representing the starting and end points for British Army reforms to 
staff training based upon early twentieth century modes of warfare, they serve as pedagogical 
crutches around which to frame the examination of attitudes and beliefs towards the need for 




The first chapter will examine the development and reform of staff training up to the end of 
the First World War. It will establish that up to 1918, the British Army had undertaken 
reforms in the wake of the major conflicts of the period. It will suggest that what followed 
between 1918 and 1939 represents an anomaly of institutional attitudes, as many of the 
reforms enacted up to 1918 were developed in the face of resistance from senior political and 
military figures. Turning to staff training in the First World War, this chapter builds on recent 
studies of this subject and develops the recognition of the need for large numbers of junior 
staff officers and the measures introduced to supply them through the introduction of wartime 
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staff courses. Highlighting how these changes reflected the changed staff requirements of 
modern, industrial warfare, this chapter sets up the conflict between these wartime changes 
and the reassertion of pre-war institutional attitudes by officers holding senior War Office 
and command posts in the interwar period.  
 
The second chapter centres on the first post-war examination of staff training, the 1918 
Braithwaite committee report, and argues that the implications of these wartime 
developments were rapidly forgotten. Overall, this chapter will set up the confusion within 
the War Office over the role of the Staff College and establish the opinions of key figures 
including General Walter Braithwaite and Major-General Robert Whigham, who would play 
a key role in future discussions on the structural reform of staff training. Alongside this, it 
will highlight that in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, there was a recognition 
of the need for a ‘staff in being’ to command a future citizen army, whilst professional 
journals were keen to ensure that the lessons of war were not forgotten. Ultimately, this 
chapter serves to establish how the fundamental dichotomy between those who favoured 
reform and those who came to oppose it was established in the wake of the First World War.  
 
The third chapter moves away from a focussed examination of the British Army and 
examines the 1923 CID sub-committee on the institution of a Joint Staff College. Although 
discussing a successful reform which took place outside the auspices of the War Office and 
affecting all three services, this chapter sets the examination of this issue in the broader 
context of the return of the British Army to a broadly imperial policing role. It argues that 
when taken out of the single service context, there was broad agreement among the 
Commandants of all three service staff colleges as to their primary role as institutions 
focussed on training junior staff officers. The institution of an additional college for the 
education of senior commanders and staff officers represented a recognition of the need for 
clear demarcation of these two levels of staff training. This chapter will also examine the 
reaction to this report and its proposals within the War Office providing the first example of 
the widespread confusion and disparate views on the necessary reforms of staff training 
within it that would plague future discussions of reform. Alongside this, it will discuss the 
establishment of an organisational and administrative doctrine for the army in the shape of 
Field Service Regulations Volume I. It will be argued that the codification of such a doctrine 
for the first time posed a direct challenge to traditional institutional attitudes and firmed up 
the opposing camps ahead of future clashes over reform from the mid-1920s.  
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Building on these early reform proposals, the fourth chapter will examine the 1925 Report on 
Higher Education for War. Set in the wider context of a slew of reforms aimed at addressing 
the problem of encouraging young men to sign up as officers for the army, this chapter 
establishes the relative priority assigned to staff training in the mid-1920s. Initially an 
appendix to an earlier report, this chapter also establishes the positive influence the Secretary 
of State for War had on this and later reform efforts, going some way to diminish the anti-
military reputation of political figures within the War Office in this period. In its examination 
of the reforms proposed as part of this report, it establishes the continued influence of key 
conservative figures from earlier proposals and demonstrates the disparity in views held by 
senior officers at the War Office. The fifth chapter continues this theme through its 
examination of a series of discussions held within the War Office between 1927 and 1931 
regarding the allocation of vacancies at the Staff College. Tied closely to the staff 
conferences that took place in the same period, this chapter demonstrates that, despite 
recognising that there were significant problems with staff training, regimental ideologies in 
the minds of senior military figures led to the reinforcement of a system of allocation which 
ultimately prevented the best officers in the army gaining places at the Staff College. This 
analysis will be linked to the continued uncertainty over the role of the army and the primacy 
of its imperial policing role in explaining the emphasis on a combat arm dominated staff, in 
spite of the centrality of logistics and pre-planned operations on a European scale within the 
army’s doctrine. By highlighting the influence of retrograde, regimental thinking on the 
institution of reforms to the structure of staff training, this chapter further emphasises the 
confusion existing within the War Office over the structural reform of staff training. In doing 
so, it builds upon the conclusions of the existing historiography, arguing that rather than 
being part of the problem with the British Army in this period, staff training suffered the 
impact of these attitudes as heavily as the rest of the army.  
 
The penultimate sixth chapter examines the rapid transformation of attitudes in the War 
Office in the 1930s. Beginning with a summation of the lack of any examination of the issue 
for much of the 1930s, it argues that this was largely due to the publication of the 1932 Kirke 
committee report and subsequent examination of British operational capabilities and 
deficiencies. Highlighting the inclusion of staff training in the report’s terms of reference and 
its omission from the final report, this chapter highlights the centrality given to 
considerations of operational effectiveness from technological and organisational 
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perspectives, whilst overlooking the importance of education as an element of both. Also 
examining the structural reforms made to staff training in 1937-38, this chapter rests its 
examination of these changes on the significant personnel changes made at the War Office by 
the Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha. It argues that these changes resulted in a 
generational shift at the War Office and brought together a more cohesive body of thought as 
a result of Hore-Belisha’s desire to enact significant reforms within the army, including to the 
structure of staff training. Consequently, within the space of six months, the War Office 
undertook an examination into officer education and implemented recommendations, which 
were virtually identical to those proposed in 1925. These conclusions bring together the 
analysis presented in previous chapters and demonstrate that it was not the proposed reforms 
which were incompatible with the army’s doctrine, but the confused and disparate ideas held 
by those at the War Office which ultimately prevented reform of the structure of staff 
training. Standing as a comparative analysis, the final chapter sets out the development of 
staff training in Canada, Australia and India in the interwar period. The limitation of this 
chapter to an examination of these three is due to the fact that, in the case of the former two, 
they maintained the largest imperial armies in this period and maintained the strongest ties 
between professional officers and the British system of staff training. New Zealand and South 
Africa sent only nineteen officers through Camberley and Quetta compared to Australia and 
Canada’s total of one hundred and five, whilst South Africa’s distrust of all things British 
meant that it retained a far looser link with the British Army than other dominions.78 These 
two examples provide a solid basis on which to suggest definite conclusions. This chapter 
argues that despite being forces maintained for local defence, both dominions better 
assimilated the staff lessons of the First World War. Utilising the sources viewed in dominion 
archives, this chapter demonstrates that both recognised the need to train large numbers of 
officers for junior staff roles in light of the changed conditions of modern industrialised 
warfare. It argues that both established structures of staff training that best reflected their 
needs and in the case of Australia produced junior officers with a better understanding of 
modern staff work than British officers of the same level.  
 
Drawing together the various threads and examples examined over the course of the thesis, it 
will be demonstrated that, whilst the initial conclusions drawn by the historiography 
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regarding staff training in the interwar British Army is broadly correct, they do not present 
the deeper complexities of the topic. Indeed, whilst it cannot be doubted that the 
shortcomings of staff training led to operational problems for the army during the Second 
World War, to overlook the impact of the impact of institutional attitudes towards formal 
education and training alongside other interwar influences such as officer recruitment and 
retention on the reform of staff training leads to the belief that little effort was made to 
address these shortcomings. As this thesis will argue this was not the case. Senior officers 
within the War Office received five committee reports and assessments of the provision of 
staff training throughout the interwar period and a healthy debate was maintained by more 
junior officers in the pages of military journals. Alongside this, it will demonstrate that the 
Staff College and the system of staff training in the British Army were as much a victim of 
conservative thinking and the regimental system as those aspects of the British Army 
discussed in the historiography. These conclusions are highlighted by the fact that in the 
dominions of Australia and Canada, systems of staff training were reformed in light of the 
lessons of the First World War with the result that by 1939, both had systems of staff training 
which served to provide them with a solid basis for wartime expansion. Consequently, it was 
not simply that the Staff College and system of training failed the British Army, but that they 
were failed by the War Office in equal measure. 
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Chapter 1 – British Army Staff Training, 1799 to 1918. 
  
Whilst this thesis focuses on the War Office’s response to multiple proposals for the 
structural reform of staff training in the interwar period, it is important to set this within its 
wider context in order to understand fully why the War Office acted as it did. As has been set 
out in the introduction, there were a number of long-standing attitudes and assumptions about 
the purpose of staff training and the role of the staff and Staff College within the minds of 
senior officers which directly obstructed staff reform in the interwar period. These centred on 
the roles that the Staff College was to be training officers for, either staff or command, and 
the perceived superiority of regimental officers in command roles. As this chapter will show, 
such attitudes and confusion had a long pedigree and were not purely a function of the 
institutional mindset of the army in the interwar period. Instead, they were inculcated across 
the seventy years of development from the establishment of the Staff College at Camberley in 
1858, through to the end of the First World War. In addition, this chapter will argue that 
despite the presence of similar beliefs within the Victorian and Edwardian officer corps, staff 
training between 1832 and 1918 underwent a continual process of gradual reform which 
accelerated over the course of the First World War. As will be seen, the trend before 1914 
was more in favour of reform and change than obstructionism. By contrast, War Office 
reforming impulses in the interwar period were largely shut down by the myriad beliefs held 
by senior officers between 1918 and 1939 regarding the role of the Staff College, leading to 
the institutional malaise halting the progress of reform in this period. In order to understand 
British Army policies on staff training after 1919 requires us to understand what the trends 
were before the war and the foundation for the substance of this study on the interwar period. 
 
There were two key elements within the development of staff training prior to the First World 
War: firstly, the establishment of the Staff College with its elite status and potential for 
accelerated promotion and additional privileges and, secondly, the establishment of the 
General Staff in 1906. The former, whilst contributing greatly to the spread of 
professionalisation across the British Army, led to hostility from the champions of the 
regimental system and engendered long-term debates regarding the ultimate role and place of 
the Staff College in the British Army. The latter only served to exacerbate these tensions and 
further diversify attitudes towards staff training by formalising the split between the 
requirements of staff duties within formations and on the General Staff. It will be seen that 
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although not hampering the development of the Staff College, the dislocated system that this 
created and the multiple understandings of the purpose of the Staff College which this 
engendered in the minds of senior army officers, would have a profound impact on the 
responses to reforms examined in later chapters. Following these developments, this chapter 
will establish that the changes to the structure of staff training during the First World War not 
only represented a recognition of significant increase in the army’s requirements for staff 
officers, but also that pre-war training failed fully to appreciate the different training 
requirements for junior and senior staff roles. Recognising a need for increased numbers of 
junior staff officers, short wartime junior staff courses were established alongside similar 
courses providing training for senior staff officers and commanders. These courses set the 
precedent for the interwar period, whilst the recommendations of the 1925 Report on Higher 
Education for War and the adopted reforms of the 1938 Massy committee reflected in shape, 
if not in duration, the staff courses established during the First World War. Therefore, this 
chapter forms a significant element of this thesis by establishing the provenance of both the 
mentality which hampered significant structural reform of staff training and the form of 
training aimed at by those reformist officers examined in later chapters.   
      
The Reform of Staff Training up to 1914 
 
The Staff College had its origins in the Senior Division of the Royal Military College, 
established at High Wycombe in 1799. This early course was highly practical and focussed 
principally on the logistical, reconnaissance, transportation and supply arrangements of 
military forces. In this it was highly successful and has been cited as a key element in the 
success of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns.79 So successful 
were these early courses that in 1810 the Commissioners of Military Inquiry recommended 
the establishment of both the Senior Division and the Junior Division in new premises at 
Sandhurst. This was done on the basis that, ‘the College was becoming well known 
throughout the Army, and while the Senior Department was turning out officers who had 
received a more advanced training in Staff duties than had hitherto been available, the Junior 
Department was supplying regiments with well-educated ensigns.’80 How far this reflected 
the reality of officer training in the Edwardian Army in particular is open to debate with 
 
79 Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, pp. 31-37; Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff 
College, pp. 51-53; DeWitt, The Military Staff, pp 140-148. 
80 Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, p. 51. 
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recent historiography being highly critical of the cadet training provided at RMC Sandhurst 
in particular and noting the refusal of the Army Council to countenance the request of 
Colonel G.C. Kitson, Commandant 1903-1906 to ensure the removal of clearly 
underperforming cadets.81 The resultant lack of reform in the face of such vociferous 
criticism and widespread recognition that such shortcomings existed, form a key feature of 
this thesis and, as demonstrated by this chapter, interwar inaction on staff training stood in 
stark contrast to the experience of the pre-1914 British Army, which saw a marked trend 
towards reform. As noted in the introduction, the reasons for this shift in approach centred on 
a combination of traditional institutional and cultural beliefs around the required 
characteristics of the army officer and the role of the staff in war and peace rather than any 
ideological differences surrounding the practice and theory of staff work itself. 
 
As early as 1820, in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, the Senior Department began to lose 
its reputation due to a series of cuts, changes to its charter and the loss of key figures from its 
instructional staff.82 In addition to personnel changes and financial pressures, this period also 
witnessed prejudice towards staff training at the highest levels of the army. It was noted in a 
Governor’s Order from November 1832 that, ‘The Commander-in-Chief looks on time spent 
at the Senior Department, Royal Military College, as so much leave of absence under the 
most favoured circumstances, and will therefore not countenance the notion…that the 
completion of the course of study should be followed by the grant of further leave of 
absence.’83 This attitude reflected a mentality within the officer corps of the British Army 
which was to continue into the interwar period whereby some senior officers believed that 
any regimental officer seeking an appointment to the Staff College was somehow displaying 
a marked degree of disloyalty towards his regiment and looking to obtain a few years of 
leisure under cover of professional study.84 Such views were not limited to the Commander-
 
81 Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British 
Army, 1902-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 16-20. 
82 Indeed, both Goodwin-Austin and Bond have argued that the work of the Senior Division became overly 
scientific and far less practical. Despite describing him as ‘one of the finest characters,’ Goodwin-Austin 
establishes that under John Narrien (de-facto Commandant from 1824), the course of instruction at the Senior 
Division became less focussed on military subjects and far more on Mathematics and Science. Alongside this, 
the vote of money for the College was withdrawn and expenses were instead covered through annual payments 
from the students of the Senior Division. See Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, pp.76-77 & 
Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, pp. 55-56. 
83 Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, p. 76. 
84 French, Military Identities, p.153, W.N. Nicholson, Behind the Lines: An Account of Administrative Staff 
Work in the British Army (London: The Strong Oak Press, 1939), p. 168, and Beckett, A British Profession of 
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in-Chief. Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Adams, Professor of Military Science at Sandhurst, 
informed the Select Committee examining the institution that, ‘military education is but little 
valued by the greater part of the high military authorities. They consider after all, whether a 
man is professionally educated or not, it will make not the slightest difference with regard to 
his qualities as an officer.’85 This early wedge between the staff and the regiment will be 
shown to have a significant impact on the allocation of vacancies to the Staff College in the 
late 1920s.  This relative neglect of the Senior Division abated in the years leading up to the 
Crimean War (1853-1856), with the Secretary at War, Sidney Herbert, setting out the most 
strident support for improvements in army schools and officer training.86 Despite this, it was 
only the disastrous nature of the British Army’s performance in the Crimean War which 
raised awareness of how far behind its continental rivals Britain was in terms of its staff 
structure and training. Indeed, so unprepared were the British for this type of conflict that 
Goodwin-Austin noted that, ‘it is hardly an exaggeration to say that no soldier existed with a 
conception of the requirements of an overseas campaign on a large scale. None had any idea 
of the functions of the Staff.’87 Therefore, notwithstanding the good work done from the 
establishment of the Senior Division at the end of the eighteenth century, the British Army’s 
first major test of its modern, professional staff system had failed.  
 
After a series of examinations of the course and utility of professional training provided by 
the Royal Military College, alongside a continuation of Herbert’s campaign for 
improvements in army training, Prince Albert and the Duke of Cambridge urged the newly 
formed Council of Education to put forward proposals for the reform of the existing military 
college. These reforms included the establishment of the requirements of a staff officer which 
were laid down by the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge. These requirements 
included: ‘practical sketching…practical trigonometry and geometry…to read, write and 
speak at least one foreign language, to judge of ground and its proper occupation by all arms, 
to have perfect knowledge of castrametation and the principles of permanent fortification; 
and to be thoroughly acquainted with military geography and military history.’88 However, 
whilst the senior military leadership at the War Office and Horse Guards had established a set 
of practical requirements for staff officers, the initial examinations for entry continued to 
 
85 Quoted in Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 56. 
86 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 57. 
87 Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, pp. 88-9. 
88 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 71. 
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emphasise mathematics and technical duties.89 As a result, much like the early divisions 
between staff and regimental priorities, these represented a division in understanding around 
the role of the Staff College between the War Office and those officers directly involved in 
the provision of officer training. The first course echoed this technical and scientific 
prominence reflecting the historic role of staff officers as organisers of movement and 
logistics, rather than as advisors to the military commander which they had become.90 
Between the establishment of the college in 1858 and the Second South African War (1899-
1902), the Staff College and senior officers’ attitudes towards it underwent a continuous 
process of development. Although not leaping into existence as a fully formed ‘school of 
thought,’ the officers who served on its directing staff would become influential figures in the 
later formation of British Army doctrine.91 As the Staff College developed up to the 
beginning of the First World War, the idea of the Staff College as a ‘school of thought’ 
would reach its apogee during Brigadier-General Henry Wilson’s period as Commandant.92  
 
In a similar manner to the interwar period, the examination of the Staff College in the twenty 
years after the Crimean War highlighted the fact that it trained too few officers and that the 
course was unsuited to the conditions of modern war. Consequently, General Order 41 of 
April 1870 introduced significant reforms to the nascent Staff College. Firstly, it increased 
the number of officers admitted each year from thirty to forty and, secondly, resumed 
admission of Royal Engineer officers.93 Prior to this, Royal Engineer officers had been 
ineligible for Staff College vacancies on the basis of the (outdated) idea that, ‘Staff and 
technical duties were identical. The close association of the Royal Engineers with the so-
called Staff Corps was responsible for this tendency.’94 With the increased recognition of the 
importance of logistical, topographical and organisational requirements of the staff in the 
wake of the Crimean War, the admission of engineers to Camberley represented a significant 
advance in British Army attitudes towards officer training. Alongside this, General Order 41 
 
89 Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Young, The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 
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was also aimed at making the course of instruction at Camberley more professional, with less 
emphasis on mathematics.95 These alterations divided subjects into obligatory and voluntary 
with the former comprising practical military skills and the latter still retaining their scientific 
and theoretical bent. 
 
Table 1: Syllabus of the Staff College Camberley post General Order 41 (April 1870). 96 
Obligatory Subjects Voluntary Subjects 
Fortification & Field Engineering Either of the languages not selected 
Artillery Geology 
Military drawing, field sketching and 
surveying Experimental Sciences 
Reconnaissance  
Military Art, History and Geography  
Military Administration and Legislation  
Either French, German or Hindustani  
Military Telegraphy  
 
Much like earlier reforms, these changes were not achieved without a degree of resistance 
from senior officers, particularly the Duke of Cambridge (Commander-in-Chief), Lord de 
Ros (Deputy-Lieutenant of the Tower), Sir William Mansfield (Commander-in-Chief, India), 
Lord William Paulet (the Adjutant General), and Lord Strathnairn (Commander-in-Chief, 
Ireland).97 All but the Duke of Cambridge emphasised that the British staff had proven itself 
inferior to other European staffs and that no supporter of the college had ever held a senior 
command abroad. The Duke of Cambridge added to this by arguing that, ‘I am quite satisfied 
that the best staff officer is your regimental officer, and that the whole system of the Staff is 
entirely based upon the regimental principle.’98 The perceived superiority of the regimental 
officer was to prove key in the failure to enact staff reform in the interwar years and it is of 
interest to note that, despite the presence of similar attitudes amongst senior officers, when 
the Staff College was still struggling to assert its utility to the army in this earlier period, 
reforms were still enacted.  
 
95 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 109. 
96 Details taken from Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 109-110, Goodwin-Austin, The Staff 
and the Staff College, p. 160. 
97 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 104. 
98 Ibid, p. 105. 
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These changes took place within a transitional context in that, following the Crimean war 
extensive changes were taking place affecting education and training within the British Army 
as a whole. Perhaps more importantly, the implementation of the Cardwell-Childers reforms 
between 1868-1881 and the resultant formalisation of the British Army’s regimental structure 
led to a fragmented institutional structure of loyalty prioritising the regiment over the army 
and an intellectual environment more suited to preparation for peacetime management and 
leadership in small scale actions.99 Slow promotion and the principle of promotion by 
seniority did much to narrow an officers outlook and professionalism, however the amateur 
approach of British officers as suggested by some historians was far from universal.100 David 
French highlighted the exhortation to diligence and zeal of one commanding officer in the 
1870s and similarly highlighted the progressive nature of officer training and education in the 
late-Victorian British Army.101 Such measures included post-commissioning technical 
training depending on an officers branch of service and a continuous series of promotion 
examinations to ensure a baseline of competence and technical knowledge across the army. 
Moreover, secondments to colonial forces allowed junior officers a far higher degree of 
command responsibility than they could have achieved in their rank in Britain. There is still a 
debate to be had over the effectiveness of training and the extent to which promotion 
examinations and confidential reports represented a means to test the intellectual mettle of 
army officers and weed out those who failed to live up to expectations. Yet, it is clear that in 
the wake of the disaster of the Crimean War, the British Army was making efforts to enhance 
the provision of technical training and officer education.102  
 
Furthermore, it must be noted that whilst this thesis utilises a modern definition of military 
professionalism based on technical knowledge and expertise as its basis, the Victorian army 
did not. Although recognising the importance of military competence, there was a body of 
opinion within the officer corps that retained strong links to the professional ideals of the 
landed class from which the army drew many of its officers. Ian Beckett highlighted 
examples of this attitude, ranging from a lack of interest in military affairs to the assertion by 
a battalion commander in the Coldstream Guards that, ‘if you will go in for this sort of thing 
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[Staff College], you must expect to have to do with people who don’t understand the ordinary 
pursuits of a gentleman.’103 Despite this, there are significant indicators which demonstrate 
the extent to which professional interest developed in the final years of the Victorian era. 
Beckett highlights the presence of ambition, a desire for financial remuneration and the desire 
for honours and awards as hallmarks of professionalism in this period.104 Whilst, on the 
surface at least, resembling a desire for personal gratification rather than professional 
development, the achievement and fulfilment of any of these markers required an officer to 
demonstrate not only professional competence, but also to clearly justify their qualification 
through outstanding achievements and success on the battlefield. As will be noted below and 
through the following chapters of this thesis, the British Army’s definition of professionalism 
would undergo considerable evolution between 1900 and 1939, becoming more grounded in 
those definitions of military professionalism recognised in the literature surrounding military 
professional culture. 
 
In spite of the advances made over the course of the nineteenth century in terms of the 
development of staff training, the Second South African War, exposed significant failings 
within the system.  In its immediate aftermath, the British Army came in for much criticism 
about its general performance, but specifically the poor handling of the army by British staff 
officers.105 As a response to this, the Elgin Commission was established to look into the 
failings of the army in the recent conflict. Whilst primarily concerned with the conduct of the 
war, the Staff College, Camberley and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMA) did not 
escape criticism. Indeed, as with other long-standing failings within the system of staff 
training, the commissioners identified that the force sent to South Africa was drastically 
under strength as regards staff officers due to the fact that no-one had anticipated the need to 
send so many troops into the theatre.106 An interdepartmental committee of enquiry which 
produced the Report of Committee of Military Education noted of the Staff College 
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examinations, ‘Principles have been lost sight of in a mass of detail, and the minds of cadets 
have been wearied with accumulations of useless formulae and dreary unpractical 
exercises.’107 As with other examples in this chapter, this criticism of staff training in the 
wake of the Second South African War stands in contrast to the British analysis in the 
immediate aftermath of the First World War. Indeed, as the following chapter will show, the 
1919 Braithwaite committee would completely ignore wartime educational developments and 
would instead reinforce pre-war methods of training despite the clear failure of pre-war 
methods as identified later in this chapter. Whilst the resultant reforms did much to 
revolutionise the curriculum of the staff courses at Camberley, to blame staff failings during 
the Second South African War solely on poor training would be to miss the influence of 
patronage on the composition of army staffs in this period. Eric Shepherd argued that in the 
early years of the Staff College, senior officers continued to build staffs which were largely 
comprised of friends or relatives with little merit attached to their capabilities as staff 
officers.108 Recent research has largely dismissed the notion that patronage removed the 
requirement for an officer to professional knowledge and expertise. Indeed, it clearly shows 
that those officers acting as patrons were perfectly ready to remove their support from an 
individual in the event of professional incompetence.109 However, prior to the Second South 
African War, only fifty-six percent of officers graduating from Camberley between 1858 and 
1868 made their way into staff posts.110 The reforms undertaken in the wake of the Second 
South African War thus served to identify and assimilate the lessons of that war in a manner 
which would not be achieved before 1938. 
 
Together with the reforms to its curriculum, the role of the Staff College underwent a re-
examination after 1902. Leo Amery, in The Times, gave evidence to the Elgin Commission 
into the conduct of the Second South African War in which he lamented the lack of esprit de 
corps among staff officers, evidence which was utilised later by Lord Esher to aid his plan for 
the formation of a General Staff.111 The most significant aspect of the formation of the 
Imperial General Staff for this thesis, was that it established a more formal path of 
progression and it gave important peacetime roles for those officers passing through 
Camberley. As will be shown in later chapters, the need to provide officers with clear career 
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progression and opportunities for advancement and continued professional development 
would prove influential over the course of future reform efforts. Furthermore, it gave the 
Staff College a newfound direction in ensuring that all graduates, ‘appreciated…the reasons 
underlying the formation of a real Imperial General Staff, and on fitting students to occupy 
any position on it when they left.’112 This period also witnessed the increasing emphasis of 
professional training and intellect in the British Army, due to changes in public opinion and 
political involvement in the appointment of senior officers.113 The result of this was the 
recognition that the Staff College, Camberley was the central school of staff thought and 
education for the army.114 Indeed, one of the key features of this period was that the Staff 
College, ‘refracted debates going on around it…then influenced the future direction of these 
discussions as its graduates assumed the highest commands in the army.’115 However, such 
praise was not universal, with recent historiography suggesting that, ‘historians writing about 
the Staff College in the Edwardian period have tended to be rather generous in their 
assessment of the teaching provided…and to have overestimated its importance to the 
army.’116 With such criticism of the course of instruction having been highlighted in 
contemporary sources,117 it is clear that such trends were not unique or confined to one 
particular era. As will be noted throughout this thesis, identification of problems within the 
system of army officer training did not necessarily lead to the necessary reforms being 
enacted.   
 
In a similar manner to those reforms and developments prior to the outbreak of war in South 
Africa in 1899, the examination of the role of the Staff College in the Edwardian era took place 
within a broader framework of examination of the education and training of officers in the British 
Army and the consequent problems with ideas and understanding of professionalism and the 
British military culture. Whilst significant alterations were made to the curriculum of the Staff 
College in the wake of the South African War, wider examinations of officer education and 
training yielded far more patchy results. The 1902 Committee on the Education and Training of 
Officers (Ackers-Douglas Report) highlighted not only the discrepancy in quality of training 
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between RMA Woolwich and RMC Sandhurst, but also that between the various methods of 
entry for officers to the army.118 Such an extensive examination would not be undertaken again 
until the Massy committee of 1938, although individual issues of education, recruitment and 
retention would continue to be extensively debated by individual committees between 1919 and 
1938. Whilst many of the recommendations of the Douglas-Ackers committee related to the 
RMC were not adopted by the army, the period following the Second South African War was 
marked by an increased professionalism based on education, training and the development of 
doctrine and the establishment of the General Staff. Such professionalism was reflected in the 
proliferation of professional publications, the introduction of distinctive dress for staff officers 
and the increased use of accelerated promotion for staff officers.119 Whilst it is impossible to 
know how far such publications were read by regimental officers, the Edwardian army was 
focussed on learning from its experiences in South Africa and ensuring that it attempted to 
remain at the forefront of military developments. Furthermore, it is evident that whilst accepting 
of the need for reform based on tactical lessons, there was reticence to fully engage with 
organisational and operational lessons due to the army’s primary role as a colonial force.120 This 
process of attempting to balance the intellectual and organisational changes required of a mass 
army to fulfil British commitments on the continent with its traditional role as police force to the 
British Empire serves as an underlying theme of this thesis, alongside the continuing 
development of definitions of military professionalism within the cultural development of the 
British Army.    
 
As a result, in the period from its establishment in 1858, through to the outbreak of war in 
1914, the Staff College underwent a continual process of reform and development. Whilst not 
universally supported, by 1914 it had begun to gain recognition as a key component, not only 
in the training of officers in staff duties, but also as the incubator of British military thought. 
Over the course of the First World War, staff training in the British Army would undergo 
further significant reforms to its structure, reflecting the changing requirements of a modern, 
industrial, continental war. In this, despite the significance of the opposition to the 
development and reform of staff training from a number of senior officers, we can establish a 
 
118 Bowman & Connelly, The Edwardian Army, pp. 7-41. 
119 For examples of the proliferation of professional studies see Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army 
(London: Constable & Co., 1895); Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, The Science of War: A Collection of Essays and 
Lectures 1891-1903 (London: Longmans, 1912); C.M. DeGruyther, Tactics for Beginners, 3rd edn. (Aldershot: 
Gale & Polden, 1903); Field Service Regulations, Part I (London: HMSO, 1912). See also Anthony Clayton, 
The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to the Present (London: Pearson, 2007), pp. 146-161. 
 
 52 
narrative of gradual reform and change which was not seen in staff training in the interwar 
period. Additionally, in the course of influencing the debates and direction of the British 
Army prior to 1914, the British Army was to develop its own doctrinal approach to staff work 
which was to guide the direction of army staff developments into the interwar period. It will 
be established that within the area of staff training, the British experience between 1919 and 
1939 was as much about continuity of pre-established institutional understanding, as 
recognition of the need for change. This continuity was based upon the lessons the Crimean 
and Second South African War and failed to adequately take into consideration the drastically 
changed nature of modern, industrial war in the wake of the experiences of the British Army 
between 1914 and 1918. Ultimately, such beliefs would allow the recognition of failings 
within the system, but fail to identify the utility and suitability of proposed reforms thus 
retarding the progress of reform.  
 
At the same time as these developments were taking place in Britain, the Indian Army, under 
the leadership of Field Marshal Lord Kitchener from 1902, began its own process of 
developing an educational system for the officers of the Indian General Staff. Charges by 
General Sir Neville Lyttleton and Major-General Sir Herbert Plumer121 to the contrary, an 
examination of the Indian General Staff in 1906 reveals that the two staff divisions were sub-
divided in a remarkably similar fashion to the General Staff in Whitehall. ‘It [the ‘Art of 
War’ section] was divided into two sections: Military Operations and Training and Staff 
Duties.’122 The former was directed to look after intelligence, mobilisation and strategy, 
while the latter was responsible for higher training and education, inter-arm co-operation, 
manoeuvres, staff organisation and training and the Staff College among others. 
Consequently, although at variance with the British General Staff in terms of nomenclature, 
the division of duties remained much the same. However, such similarities did not prevent 
senior figures in Britain taking a dim view of Kitchener’s attempts to introduce professional 
staff training to the Indian establishment. Such a desire was the result of the presence of very 
few Camberley trained British staff officers in India who had qualified in Hindustani or 
Camberley graduates who were members of the Indian Staff Corps.123 In this context, the 
growing professionalisation of armies and the increasing prevalence of qualified staff officers 
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in key posts, alongside India’s place in the structure of the British Empire, made Kitchener’s 
move eminently appropriate to the strategic conditions of the day. However, despite 
assurances to the contrary, many in Britain believed that such an institution would result in 
the divergence of military thought between the British and Indian armies.124  
 
To overcome this fear of the establishment of two schools of thought within the British Army 
(in spite of the fact that there was arguably no unified school of thought yet developed in 
Britain), the Army Council sanctioned the establishment of an Indian College subject to 
certain restrictions. These included requirements that, ‘the syllabus of both Colleges was to 
be drawn up at the War Office, examinations were to be set and marked by the same officers, 
staff duties in India were to be identical to those in Britain, and p.s.c. certificates were to be 
issued for both Colleges by the Chief of the General Staff.’125 Once Kitchener had conceded 
to these, the Indian college opened, initially at Deolali in 1905, before relocating to its 
location at Quetta in April 1907. Any potential issues surrounding the development of an 
alternative school of thought were ameliorated through the interchange of instructors between 
the two colleges.126 Indeed, so close was the relationship between them, that General Sir 
Walter Braithwaite stated that, ‘The Staff College Quetta, models itself on the mother college 
at Camberley. Different climatic conditions impose certain modifications, but, apart from 
these, the underlying principles of Staff College work, and of Staff College spirit…differ in 
no particular.’127 
 
Whilst these developments in staff training were taking place, the British Army was 
simultaneously beginning to inculcate the development of formal doctrine to guide both 
operational and organisational requirements. This doctrine was guided by two key 
publications in the period leading up to the First World War: Field Service Regulations (FSR) 
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1909 and the 1912 Staff Manual War: Provisional. The second of these documents, published 
as an addition to the Field Service Regulations, represented a separate manual for the staff. 
This document was, ‘based on the principles stated in the FSR, and…issued by Command of 
the Army Council for the guidance of officers of the General Staff, Adjutant-General’s and 
Quartermaster-General’s branches of the Staff of Commands in War.’128 As with later 
volumes of FSR emphasising organisation and administration, the Staff Manual was not 
intended to supplant the operational volume of FSR, but to supplement it with instruction 
specific to staff officers. A key feature of this manual and British staff doctrine in general 
was the understanding that the staff was subordinate in all matters to the commander.129 
Indeed, it was explicitly stated that, ‘it is the duty of the Staff to offer advice to the 
commanders…when it appears likely that it may be of use. If the advice is declined, the 
commander’s decision must be accepted without demur.’130 As will be shown below, such an 
attitude stood in contrast to the German staff which was, in theory at least, better integrated 
into a command and control system at all levels of the staff.131 This in-built subordination of 
the British staff system, although broadly mirrored in the French Army and equally with the 
British staff in the Peninsular War, was to complicate the process of the reform of the staff in 
the interwar period. As will be seen throughout the later chapters of this thesis, many of the 
officers opposing changes to the system of staff training cited a preference for regimental 
officers in command roles, whilst well into the 1930s, some regimental commanders saw 
service on the staff as disloyalty to the regiment.132 Alongside the doctrinal subordination of 
the staff enshrined in both FSR and the Staff Manual, these ideas would become the core 
beliefs underpinning the reaction against staff reform in the interwar period. However, whilst 
unintentionally creating mental barriers to future reforms, the overall result of the manual 
was the codification of sixty years of staff experience and the formalisation of staff doctrine 
in the British Army. Paul Harris’ study of the staff in the First World War has done much to 
establish the connections between these pre-war volumes and their application to the 
structure and training of the staff in this period.133   
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In addition to this, Harris has established that there was a significant disparity of views about 
the Staff College present within the British Army in the run-up to the First World War. He 
noted that the developing General Staff and the Staff College had much support, including 
from the future commander of British Forces on the Western Front, the Director of Military 
Training (DMT) Major-General Sir Douglas Haig.134 However, alongside the support 
received from such quarters, the Staff College was equally subjected to vitriol from other 
quarters. One such criticism came from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Cuthbert Headlam (a staff 
officer who had not passed through the college at Camberley) who stated that, ‘I cannot think 
what all these men were taught at the Staff College. Soldiering on the Staff is very largely 
office work-and not one Staff Officer per cent [sic.] out of those I have met has the vaguest 
idea of how an office ought to be run.’135 In many ways, Headlam’s comment as to the 
training received by Staff College graduates cuts to the core of the mentality of some senior 
officers at the War Office in the interwar period. As has been shown, the Staff College was 
primarily developed as a training institution in the practical aspects of army staff work in 
response to serious organisational and logistical failures in both the Crimean and Second 
South African wars. However, with the genesis of the British General Staff and the 
promulgation of more formal doctrine, the Staff College began to struggle to identify its role. 
Much of this was related to the fact that, ‘The Staff College is very sensitive to the 
personality of its Commandant.’136 As a result, between 1907 and 1910, Camberley began to 
take on the mantle of a ‘school of thought,’ better suited to posts at the War Office than on 
the staff of formations, when under the more cerebral leadership of its commandant General 
Sir Henry Wilson.137 By 1914 the Staff College found itself caught in a paradox whereby it 
primarily existed to provide staff officers trained in the practical requirements of staff work, 
whilst also being required to provide planners and organisers capable of staffing the more 
theoretically minded departments at the War Office. This paradox informed much of the 
debate surrounding proposed reforms in the interwar period and was central to the British 
Army’s failure to reform staff training in this period. 
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 Wartime Staff Training 1914-1918 
 
As with the Second South African War, the Staff College closed its doors in 1914 with its 
directing staff and students being posted to staff roles at the War Office and throughout the 
British Army. Indeed, on the outbreak of war in August 1914 there was, ‘little attempt to 
restrain the instinctive impulse of every senior officer fit for active service – and many who 
were not – to dash off to France with the Expeditionary Force.’138 This rush of officers to the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was in part due to the enthusiasm for war and a desire to 
see action before the war was over, but equally related to organisational unpreparedness for 
war. In the run-up to war, the British Army had persisted in its practice of retaining no 
permanent staff organisation beyond the division other than I Corps at Aldershot. As a result, 
with the rapid expansion of the British Army in the autumn of 1914, staffs had to be largely 
improvised and drew on all available staff officers.139 Together with the organisational 
problems associated with the transfer of large numbers of experienced, trained staff officers 
from their administrative and organisational roles at the War Office, a number of these 
officers were killed in the early campaigns of the war.140 The impact of these losses were 
clearly felt by those commanding formations, with Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell 
writing to Major-General Sir Charles Callwell in November 1915 that, ‘As regards officers, 
we are down to the bedrock, and particularly as regards staff officers; we simply have no one 
to replace the present lot if any casualties occur.’141 Similarly the Brigadier General, General 
Staff, British Salonika Force, Major-General Philip Howell, noted in March 1916 that, ‘The 
proportion of staff officers with staff college, or special staff, training is rapidly decreasing 
and measures are essential to increase and improve the supply.’142 Consequently, the BEF 
found itself required to improvise and appoint untrained regimental officers to junior staff 
posts in order to make up the shortfall. This issue was further compounded by the transition 
to static trench warfare at the beginning of 1915 and the increased complexity of logistical 
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requirements which followed.143 Indeed, prior to the Somme campaign in July 1916, the BEF 
had been relying on an essentially ad-hoc system, which finally collapsed due to the 
experience at the Somme.144 To this point, the shortage of trained staff officers within 
formations had been partially mitigated by the use of ‘staff learners’, regimental officers 
appointed to shadow existing staff officers in order to gain enough knowledge to serve as 
junior staff officers, and the appointment of seemingly capable officers to the staff without 
formal training.145 As a result, by 1916, the British Army had effectively turned its back on 
the previous fifty years of formalised staff training and returned to a form of ‘on the job’ 
education reminiscent of the Napoleonic Wars, with officers appointed to important, albeit 
junior staff roles on the basis of their commanders’ opinion of their abilities, rather than any 
recognised formal training in staff duties. However, whilst the interwar period would see the 
British Army recognising the shortcomings in its system of staff training but failing to act 
upon them, the British Army in the First World War implemented new systems of training to 
address the lack of formally trained staff officers. 
 
To tackle this issue, a staff school was set up, initially at Hesdin, France, in November 1916 
under the command of Brigadier Charles Bonham-Carter.146 In a letter to his father, Bonham-
Carter set out the idea for this school as being, ‘to take two or three courses for 20 men each, 
lasting about six weeks. There is also a Junior Staff School which is to train promising 
regimental soldiers for junior staff appointments.’147 It is of interest to note that the school’s 
first commander, Lieutenant-Colonel John Burnett-Stuart turned down a request to stay at the 
school beyond its first cycle, expressing a desire to return to active service. This seeming 
dismissal of the importance of officer education and training would re-emerge during his time 
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as Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I) at the War Office and would 
prove key in the failure of reform during his tenure. The curriculum for these courses aimed 
at providing training in the duties of the staff alongside management and administration: 
effectively a condensed version of the two-year course offered at Camberley before the 
war.148 These courses fell under the auspices of GHQ and consequently represented the direct 
implementation of lessons learned over the course of the war. Following this, after initial 
success at Hesdin, a further staff school was opened at Mena House, Cairo for officers of the 
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.149 Together with their short duration, the separation of these 
courses into a junior and senior element represented a sharp break with the traditional 
structure of staff training established in the 1850s. As will be seen through the following 
chapters, immediately following the war, this system of training was rejected and the pre-
1914 system reinstated. Ultimately, this wartime system was marginally less ad hoc than the 
system of learners that had been in place, although the two schools were closed in March and 
June 1917 respectively. They reopened in October 1917 at Cambridge University, retaining 
the Junior and Senior elements. With this transfer back to Britain, the Army Council 
established more stringent conditions for appointment to a staff post: 
 
For Appointment to a 3rd Grade Staff Appointment 
Satisfactory attachment to a Headquarters as ‘learner.’ 
 
For Appointment as General Staff Officers, 1st and 2nd Grade 
Possession of a certificate showing satisfactory progress at a Senior or Junior Staff 
Course.150 
 
This approach formalised the various methods developed at local level and by GHQ over the 
previous three years of war and provided qualifications recognised by the War Office and the 
Army Council. Much like the p.s.c. awarded to officers attending Camberley, those officers 
passing the junior course were distinguished by the letters s.c. in the Army List, while those 
passing the senior course obtained S.C. For this reason, it was clearly felt that although a 
wartime expedient, the courses provided at Cambridge represented a legitimate expression of 
staff thought and imparted skills useful to officers beyond the narrow limits of a wartime staff 
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role. This approach proved highly successful, with staff courses taught at Cambridge until the 
end of the war. Additionally, Harris shows that from 1916 the number of officers joining the 
staff with a p.s.c. was only sixteen percent and this fell to nought percent in 1918.151 Whilst 
these figures do not show whether these officers had passed through one of the short staff 
courses, the Army Council order cited above makes it safe to assume that the majority of 
officers joining the staff without a p.s.c. had done so. Despite this success, it will be seen that 
as soon as the war ended, senior elements within the British Army either forgot or 
deliberately disregarded the lessons of the First World War and returned to a system of staff 
education predicated on the structure and ideology of the pre-war era. That these 
developments in officer training and education over the course of the First World War had an 
impact on operational performance is beyond doubt.152 Whilst it would be both inaccurate 
and short-sighted to suggest that wartime staff training was the sole factor in the improved 
performance of the British Army in the final two years of the War, to ignore it as a factor 
would be equally short-sighted. Indeed, whilst acknowledging the importance of 
technological, operational and tactical developments over the course of the war, recent 
historiography has begun to recognise the crucial role played by developments in staff work 
in the improvement of British operational performances.153 
 
Ultimately, given the history of gradual but consistent reform of staff training from the 
formal establishment of the Staff College in 1858, the period covered by this thesis stands as 
an aberration. The following chapters will show that between 1919 and 1939, various senior 
officers missed or wilfully obstructed multiple opportunities significantly to reform the 
structure of staff training in light of wartime experiences. Key features of interwar failure to 
reform, notably the role of staff training, the role of the staff and rivalry with the regimental 
system, were all present in some form during the Staff College’s formative period between 
1858 and 1914. The institutional divide between regimental and staff officers, which holds a 
central place in this examination, was in part the result of debates surrounding the origins of 
the General Staff between 1890-1906, the subject of the next part to this chapter.  
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The Formation of the General Staff 
 
The General Staff and its origins served to influence the development of the Staff College in 
the formative period prior to the First World War. As will be seen through the remainder of 
this thesis, it was the disconnect in attitudes between senior officers at the War Office and 
those with more recent experience of the Staff College which directly led to the stifling of 
reform in staff training across the interwar period. These attitudes were born of the manner in 
which the General Staff developed in this period and the relative isolation of the Staff 
College from the structure adopted. 
 
Much like the development of the Staff College at Camberley, the origins of the General 
Staff lay in British military defeat, although rather than the disaster in the Crimea, the 
General Staff had its origins in the wake of the Second South African War. Lord Roberts 
(Commander of British Forces in South Africa and, from 1901, Commander-in-Chief) stated, 
‘It seems clear that the entire staff should be thoroughly trained; that a definite system of staff 
duties should be laid down.’154 This was followed by Leo Amery arguing in The Times that, 
‘what you want is a general staff where future campaigns are worked out and discussed.’155 
This reaction was in part due to the belief that the War Office embarked upon war in South 
Africa in 1899 in its highest state of efficiency since the end of the Napoleonic wars.156 The 
underestimation of Boer forces by the British Army, alongside the disasters of ‘Black Week,’ 
firmly established in the minds of many senior military and political figures that reform of the 
army’s higher command and control was essential.157 Ultimately this was the aim of the War 
Office (Reconstitution) Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Esher and including the 
reformist Admiral Jackie Fisher. As its title suggests, this committee was primarily concerned 
with the highest administrative organisation of the army.  
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With a number of other recommendations, including the subordination of the new General 
Staff to the Committee of Imperial Defence, 158 the Esher committee argued that what was 
required was, ‘a scientific body of expert opinion, highly trained to deal with all the problems 
of war, suitable to her Imperial requirements and necessary for her safety.’159 However, this 
desire created a fundamental break between the role of the staff at formation level and that of 
the General Staff, primarily because the officers of the General Staff were appointed from 
those trained at the Staff College.160 As shown above, aside from the interlude of Henry 
Wilson’s tenure as Commandant, staff training at the college, from its establishment through 
to 1914, focussed primarily on the imparting of the practical skills required of staff officers 
and formation commanders. It can be seen that with the establishment of the General Staff as 
the brain of the army, a fundamental disconnect between the Staff College, staffs of 
formations and the General Staff was enshrined in the structure of the British Army. Indeed, 
this disconnect was set out in the Army Order establishing the General Staff in 1906 and is 
worth quoting in full: 
 
1. The General Staff of the Army falls into two principal divisions viz.:- 
a. The General Staff at Army Headquarters. 
b. The General Staff in commands and districts. 
2. The functions of the former are to advise on the strategical distribution of the Army, 
to supervise the education of officers and the training of the Army for war, to study 
military schemes, to collect and collate military intelligence, to direct the general 
policy in Army matters, and to secure continuity of action in the execution of that 
policy. 
3. The functions of the latter are to assist the officers on whose staffs they are serving, in 
promoting military efficiency, especially in regard to the education of officers and the 
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training of the troops, and to aid them in carrying out the policy prescribed by Army 
Headquarters.161 
 
This divide essentially required the Staff College to train three distinct classes of officer over 
a two-year course. Firstly, junior staff officers possessing understanding and knowledge of 
practical staff duties; secondly, officers capable of exercising command over combined-arms 
forces of various size, composition and operational role; and thirdly officers capable of 
outside the box thinking to work at the War Office on the planning and preparation for wars 
of different magnitudes in different areas of the world. Throughout the period under 
examination, the Staff College is widely acknowledged to have focussed on the first two 
requirements, with many officers believing it should focus on the training of commanders. 
This gap between Staff College capabilities and British Army requirements became more 
pronounced in discussing proposed reforms as the interwar period progressed, primarily due 
to the increasing percentage of Staff College graduates appointed to senior staff roles. Whilst 
between 1919 and 1922, only 47.4 percent of senior appointments held a p.s.c., by 1936, 100 
percent of senior appointments went to Staff College graduates.162 In this context, officers 
whose training was intended to fit them for field commands or operational staff roles were 
given positions within the War Office requiring a theoretical approach to operational 
planning and the ability to utilise outside the box thinking to plan for potential, rather than 
definite scenarios, in a manner not encouraged by the curriculum of the Staff College.163 
Consequently, during the interwar period all three requirements of the Staff College became 
equally important to the army. As will be seen in chapter three, the issue of the provision of 
strategic level training was partially resolved in 1923 with the decision to establish the 
Imperial Defence College (IDC) as an institution to provide officers with training in the 
higher art of war.164 Although representing a degree of progressive thinking within the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, it will be seen that such thinking did not extend far beyond 
the army’s representative on this committee. Whilst going some way to resolve the practical 
problem, the mental divide established in the minds of officers receiving their staff training 
prior to the First World War was harder to overcome. This divide would come to underpin 
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the clash of mentalities seen during discussions of reform proposals in this period resulting in 
the failure to reform the system of staff training in the British Army. 
 
Such a division between the General Staff of an army and its operational equivalent was 
unusual in European armies of the time, particularly those of France and Germany. In part 
such a departure from accepted staff thought was a deliberate attempt to establish a system 
which was, ‘essentially a fusion of British and Prussian thought.’165 This was due to the 
supposedly unique nature of Britain’s requirements as an imperial power.166 In purely 
structural terms, the British General Staff undertook a functional division of duties defined 
under operations, intelligence, war theory and mapping under the General Staff with the 
administrative and supply functions separated.167 By contrast, the German Great General 
Staff was divided into regional departments with training, appointment of field commanders 
and compiling regulations under the purview of the Ministry of War.168 Furthermore, unlike 
Britain, the Prussian Minister of War was generally a former senior officer whilst the British 
Secretary of State for War was a career politician resulting in tensions between the officers of 
the army and the army’s political leadership. In large part this tension came from the primacy 
given to civilian personal within the new military administration. With the Secretary of State 
for War overseeing the deliberations of the Army Council on matters of national policy and 
civilian representatives from the Treasury, from the professional military officer’s viewpoint, 
deciding which military expenses where acceptable, a palpable conflict of interests appeared 
to exist.169 This political-military divide, although well-marked in the historiography, will be 
seen to be absent in discussions of staff training reform. Whilst both Sir Laming 
Worthington-Evans in 1925 and Leslie Hore-Belisha in 1938 would institute discussion of 
individual reform proposals through the Army Council, the discussion of these reforms and 
the ultimate decision on their implementation, as issues not affecting broader British defence 
policy, remained firmly in the hands of professional officers. Nicolas D’Ombrain noted that, 
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‘Many of the new professionals entertained a military contempt for the politician and for 
civilian control…The politicians had, of course, no greater regard for the soldiers.’170 
Alongside the growing diversity of thought among senior officers over the role of the Staff 
College noted above, the influence of a number of Secretaries of State for War, each with 
their own agenda and belief in the role of the army, further contributed to the confusion 
plaguing the army in the interwar period.171 
 
Together with these structural and functional differences between the two General Staffs, 
they also developed contrasting methods of how staff training was integrated into the wider 
army. For German officers, ‘training that lasted three years…At the end of their time at the 
War Academy, candidates undertook a three week staff ride…Officers spent a probationary 
period of one to three years on the Great General Staff…only about ten candidates per intake 
would finally end up as General Staff officers.’172 In this context, the German War Academy 
directly fed the General Staff and integrated the various staff functions to the point that, by 
Moltke the Younger’s time, the commander’s involvement was removed to the point where 
he was able to separate the major and minor issues arising, and utilise his staff to maintain 
control of formations under his command.173 This system led to the devolution of power, 
leading to examples of relatively junior General Staff officers exercising significant 
command functions.174 In contrast, the British Staff College initially existed to provide staff 
officers and commanders for Brigade, Division and Corps level staffs and not the General 
Staff in London. Whilst the Esher committee laid down that main source of officers for the 
General Staff should be the Staff College, this policy overlooked the primary role of the 
college.175 As a result, unlike its German counterpart, Camberley, although preceding the 
development of the General Staff, was never fully integrated into it. Ultimately, the 
 
170 D’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, p. 151. 
171 Overviews of the various reforming efforts of British Secretary of States for War are numerous. Some good 
overviews include; Lowell J. Satre, ‘St. John Brodrick and Army Reform, 1901-1903,’ Journal of British 
Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, (Spring 1976), pp. 117-139; Edward M. Spears, ‘Haldane’s Reform of the Regular Army: 
Scope for Revision,’ British Journal of International Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, (April 1980), pp. 69-81; Albert 
Tucker, ‘The Issue of Army Reform in the Unionist Government, 1903-1905,’ The Historical Journal, Vol. 9, 
No. 1 (1966), pp. 90-100; Andrew Vincent, ‘German Philosophy and British Public Opinion: Richard Burdon 
Haldane in Theory and Practice,’ Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 68, no. 1, (Jan. 2007), pp. 157-169; Col. 
W. T. Dooner, The Infantry of Our Army and Mr Arnold-Foster’s Proposals, (Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, 
Kent & Co.: London, 1905).  
172 Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke, p. 37. For a full description of training and areas of instruction see pp. 37- 
38. 
173 DeWitt, The Military Staff, p. 78. 
174 DeWitt notes the example of Lt. Col. Hentsch who ordered von Bulow’s army to withdraw during the Battle 
of the Marne based on his own appreciation of the military situation and Bulow’s pessimistic report. 
175 Gooch, The Plans of War, pp. 55-6. 
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conceptual basis for the Staff College became confused in the minds of senior officers. For 
the period examined in this thesis, this confusion fed into the responses to the reforms 
proposed.   
 
Therefore, although the German Great General Staff and the German War Academy were 
tightly bound together, the links within the British system were looser. Whilst Henry Wilson 
may have believed that the Staff College could become a British school of thought feeding 
into the planning auspices of the General Staff, it is clear that both the senior ranks of the 
army and its political leadership did not. This was shown by the wording of the Army Order 
formally establishing the General Staff in 1906 essentially enshrining the fundamental 
division of British staff work. In doing so, Army Order 233 established a conceptual division 
within the British Army regarding the role of the Staff College which was to plague the army 
throughout the interwar period. These looser links were in large part the result of the strategic 
situation facing the British Army requiring it to balance both a continental role and the 
garrisoning of extensive imperial outposts. As a result, whilst the development of a staff 
system in the British Army owed much to continental developments, it did so in a uniquely 
British context.176 In this context, there was a clear divide between the Staff College’s role in 
providing technical staff training and the German War Academy’s role as the nursery for 




This chapter has demonstrated that despite a steady series of reforms, the fundamental break 
between the requirements of the British Army and its provision of staff training which would 
affect the army during the interwar period had its genesis in the earliest days of both the Staff 
College and the General Staff. From its establishment in 1856, Camberley had faced 
opposition from senior officers, notably the Commander in Chief, but equally from 
regimental commanders perceiving those applying to the Staff College as disloyal to the 
regiment. As will be shown in later chapters, although this attitude remained limited to 
regimental commanders in the interwar period, the influence of the regimental system exerted 
a powerful influence over senior officers’ responses to proposed reforms. Moreover, the 
generational divide between those advocating for the Staff College and those in opposition 
 
176 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 217 and Gooch, The Plans of War, p. 51. 
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mirrors that experienced across the period covered by this thesis. As will be seen, it was 
primarily the most senior officers, far removed from the experiences of junior regimental and 
staff officers during the First World War, who provided the most strident opposition. In 
contrast, the more junior commanders and staff officers with more recent experience of 
conditions at the sharp end of war perceived the need for continued improvements in the 
provision of staff training. The key difference between the formative years of the Staff 
College and the interwar period was that despite this opposition, between 1858 and 1914, the 
college underwent a continuous period of reform, albeit largely centred on the curriculum. 
 
Additionally, it has been shown that the establishment of the General Staff muddied the 
waters surrounding the role of the Staff College in the minds of senior officers. As initially 
conceived, it served to give the army a means of providing the practical staff training 
required in modern war and for many, it quickly became the route to higher command. With 
the formation of the General Staff, the Staff College gained the additional purpose of training 
officers in the more theoretical aspects of operational and strategic planning alongside the 
purely technical staff duties required within lower formations. This fundamental lack of 
clarity over the role of the Staff College was best exemplified by the final three pre-war 
commandants who vacillated between a purely technical training school and Henry Wilson’s 
school of thought. In the interwar period, this lack of clarity was largely expressed via the 
debate over whether the Staff College was to be a school for the training of staff officers or 
commanders but was fundamentally a continuation of this broader issue. 
 
Finally, the experience of the First World War clearly demonstrated that the system of staff 
training developed between 1856 and 1914 was not capable of supporting the British Army in 
the context of a modern large-scale war. The provision of short courses split between lower 
and higher level of staff duties recognised the essential differences and requirements of staff 
work, whilst also recognising the need for training greater numbers of staff officers than had 
been possible before the war. Their eventual formalisation by the War Office, relocation to 
Cambridge and the establishment of identical courses in the Middle East demonstrate the 
fundamental soundness of these wartime expedients and by extension highlight the failings of 
the pre-war system. These failings would be recognised and commented upon multiple times 
through the interwar period; however, as this thesis argues, this recognition did not lead to 
positive action. Ultimately, this chapter has established that the key ideas and themes acting 
on the reform of staff training in the interwar period were not the result of the British Army’s 
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experience of the First World War. Instead, they were the result of longer-term trends and 
mentalities inherent in the structure of the British Army’s officer corps. It is within this 
context, alongside the particular circumstances of the interwar period that the reform 
proposals examined as part of this thesis will be tested. 
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Chapter 2 – The 1919 Braithwaite Committee and Staff Training to 1923. 
 
 
As the previous chapter has shown, between the establishment of the Staff College, 
Camberley in 1858 and the conclusion of the First World War in 1918, British Army staff 
training had undergone a process of continued, and indeed radical, reform. Whilst largely 
focussed on changes to the curriculum prior to 1914 and accompanied by significant wartime 
changes during the First World War, the alterations made demonstrated a commitment to 
recognising and applying the lessons of war and the growing importance of the role of the 
staff to the British Army. As this chapter will show, this reformist bent towards staff training 
did not survive the First World War, despite the continued presence of key wartime personnel 
in senior posts.177 As the remaining chapters in this thesis will demonstrate, from these 
promising beginnings, the interwar period saw a succession of missed opportunities to 
undertake significant structural reforms to staff training in the British Army, regardless of the 
continued recognition of the problems it faced.  
 
Whilst a number of factors will be highlighted and examined over the course of this thesis, it 
is the attitudes and beliefs established in the minds of senior officers largely as a result of the 
report examined in this chapter which ultimately informed and influenced responses to 
proposals for staff reform in the interwar period. In doing so, this thesis will establish the 
long-term involvement in the evolution of staff training of a number of officers. These 
officers, particularly General Sir Walter Braithwaite, Lieutenant-General Sir John Burnett-
Stuart, Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Whigham and the future Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, Field Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, would come to play key roles 
in future attempts to reform the structure of staff training.178 As this chapter will demonstrate 
through their early interactions with the reform process, many of the attitudes and 
assumptions they continued to hold about the place and purpose of staff training within the 
 
177 In this, General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter is the most prominent. Having been the first Commandant of the 
wartime staff school at Hesdin, Bonham-Carter was appointed Brigadier General Staff (Training) at GHQ and in 
1927 became Director of Staff Duties at the War Office. 
178 Across the period covered by this thesis Braithwaite’s influence would be felt during his time as Commander 
of XII Corps (1918-1919), General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command and Adjutant General to 
the Forces (1926-1928). In a similar manner, Burnett-Stuart’s contribution would be made during his time as 
Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office (1923-1926), Whigham when he was General 
Officer Commanding 3rd Division (1919) and Adjutant-General and General Officer Commanding-in-Chief 
Eastern Command (1923-1931). Montgomery Massingberd’s contributions would be made during his time as 
General Officer Commanding 1st Infantry Division (1923-1926). 
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British Army well into the interwar period can be discerned as early as 1918. Alongside this, 
this thesis identifies the lack of uniform views on the subject of staff training within the upper 
echelons of the British Army. In the responses to the committee examined in this chapter, it 
becomes clear that as early as 1918 the War Office would have difficulties in establishing a 
single doctrine for the structure and course of staff training in the interwar army. Finally, this 
chapter will establish that the base upon which future reform attempts were seeking to build 
was conservative in nature, retaining a largely Victorian attitude towards the staff and staff 
training, particularly the role to be played by technical officers in the future development of 
the staff.   
 
As shown in the previous chapter, over the course of the First World War the British Army 
instituted a series of innovations in staff training, culminating in the establishment of a series 
of short staff courses providing training in both junior and senior staff roles in the UK. In the 
immediate aftermath of the First World War, it is clear that, whilst seemingly seeking a return 
to ‘real soldiering’ in the form of significantly increased imperial commitments,179 there was 
a broad recognition that the system of training in place since 1858 had been tested by the 
conditions of modern, industrial war and found wanting. Whilst the 1919 Braithwaite 
committee report would ultimately reinforce an institutional mentality based upon the 
suitability of pre-war staff training, others would recognise that this system was no longer 
suitable for the British Army. Although such acknowledgement did not result in any changes 
to staff training in the immediate wake of the war, these competing assertions surrounding the 
need for reform of staff training would continue to come before the War Office until the 
eventual implementation of the recommendations of the Massy committee report in 1938. In 
some cases the expression of this need for change was vehement. Sir Philip Gibbs, one of 
five official war correspondents on the Western Front, commented that, ‘Our Staff College 
had been hopelessly inefficient in its system of training, if I am justified in forming such an 
opinion from specimens produced by it, who had the brains of canaries and the manners of 
Potsdam.’180 Similarly, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Maude, Commander of III Indian 
Army Corps in Mesopotamia, wrote in 1916 that, ‘Staff work has been a shortcoming 
throughout this war. Our number of trained Staff Officers was even at first scarcely adequate, 
 
179 Bond, British Military Policy, pp. 10 – 34, Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, p. 172 and C.M. Bowra, 
Memories 1898-1939 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), p. 87. 
180 Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, p. 266. 
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but now, with our large army, it is dreadful…It is one of the chief points towards which we 
shall have to turn our attention at the end of the war, this training of the staff.’181  
 
Whilst the Braithwaite committee represented the most in-depth examination of staff training 
in the immediate post-war years and established many of the mentalities which would serve 
to prevent the reform of staff training, the issue of the establishment of the staff in peace was 
first examined in a memorandum dealing with the post-war re-organisation of the British 
Army.182 This paper sought to establish more broadly the basis of the British Army as a cadre 
force primarily designed for garrisoning overseas possessions, providing small expeditionary 
forces for imperial conflicts and providing a broader framework within which to mobilise the 
whole manpower of the nation.183 Although only listed third, it was the expansion of the army 
from cadre to fully mobilised national army which formed the prime focus of this report and 
in doing so suggested a potentially firmer basis from which to examine the reform of staff 
training. Although establishing the largest peacetime formation as the division, with future 
corps commanders taking up roles as inspectors of training within commands, the report 
argued that with Territorial Force (TF) cadres forming the bulk of an expanded wartime 
army, ‘it will be necessary to keep in peace time the 15 Divisional Commanders 
required…with their nucleus Staffs [sic.], who should of course all be Regulars on whole 
time employment.’184 The implication here is that although TF (and indeed many regular 
formations) would be maintained at cadre strength during peace, their wartime staffs should 
be in place and working together to ensure efficiency in the event of war, a conclusion 
supported by the appendices breakdown of war and peace complements.185  
 
On this basis, it was clearly recognised that the maintenance of staffs for nucleus formations 
was important to the British Army’s future operational success and that such staffs could not 
be cobbled together in the early stages of a large-scale war as they had been in 1914. 
Notwithstanding this early recognition, in 1939, the British Army would find itself forced to 
improvise and continually expand staffs across the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) with 
 
181 Goodwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, p. 268. 
182 Interim and Post Bellum Army, 8th December 1918. The National Archives, Kew (TNA) WO 32/11356. 
183 Ibid, p. 1. 
184 Ibid, p. 6. 
185 These show that in war a Divisional Headquarters would consist of 1 General Officer Commanding, 1 GSO2, 
1 D.A.A and 1 Q.M.G and Brigade Commands of 1 Brigade Commander and 3 Staff Captains. In peace, 
although not broken down by role, it is shown that there should be four officers in a Divisional Headquarters 
and two officers at Brigade level. Appendix O, Interim and Post Bellum Army, TNA WO 32/11356. 
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consequent impact on its operational performance.186 As will be seen, the conclusions of this 
report was supported by a number of articles published in professional journals between 1919 
and 1922 which recognised the importance of a professional, established staff and the need 
for change in the existing system.187 Despite this, the mentality developed among senior 
officers owed more to pre-war ideologies than this analysis of the staff in war. 
 
The Braithwaite Committee Report and the Re-Assertion of Pre-War Mentalities. 
 
Whilst the myriad changes in staff training since the establishment of the Staff College in 
1858 and in particular over the course of the First World War were mirrored in many of the 
responses to the First World War, the results of War Office analysis through the report of the 
Braithwaite committee represented a sharp break with these early ideas of reform and 
development. This break established a far more divisive mentality within the British Army 
surrounding staff training and its reform. Whilst pre-1914 reforms had faced opposition from 
senior officers, much of this did not come from officers in posts crucial to the development of 
staff training.188 In contrast, the Braithwaite committee reflected many senior officers 
scepticism, or indeed outright hostility, to the reform of staff training  and in posts from 
which they were able to influence its direction until well into the 1930s. The committee itself 
reflected the transformation which had taken place, not just in staff work, but also in warfare 
itself over the course of the First World War.189 Established by Field Marshal Sir Douglas 
Haig at the urging of the War Office, its purpose was to, ‘consider the present organization of 
the Staff as tested by the experience of the war, and the advisability or otherwise of any 
change; in the latter case, recommendations to be submitted.’190 These terms of reference 
were further delineated in the questionnaire sent out to all staff officers in the Western Front 
armies and the commanders of other expeditionary forces:  
The particular points on which your opinions are required are: - 
 
186 Edward Smalley, The British Expeditionary Force, p. 177, 206-209, David French, Raising Churchill’s 
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188 See Chapter One, pp. 37-42. 
189 Aimée Fox-Godden, “Hopeless Inefficiency”? The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade 
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1) Is the present system of three branches, i.e. General Staff, Adjutant General’s Staff 
and Quartermaster General’s Staff branches the most suitable? 
2) If this is so, is the present distribution of duties between those branches satisfactory 
or do you recommend any change? 
3)  Or would it be preferable in your opinion to have one staff only, which would deal 
with questions of Operations, Intelligence, Staff Duties, Orders and arrangements as 
to Movements; questions as to Personal Services, discipline, Police measures, Supply 
Services and Transportation, etc. being dealt with by Administrative Services and 
Departments. 
4) What should be the sub-division of duties and responsibilities between the staff (as 
defined in Field Service Regulations Part II Section 22)? 
5) Is the sub-division of responsibility between the Quartermaster General, Director 
General of Transportation, Engineer-in-Chief and Inspector General of 
Communications is laid down in Addendum to Field Service Regulations Part II 
issued 1st January 1917 satisfactory? If not have you any further proposals? 
6) Can the size of the present staffs, especially General Headquarters be reduced, part of 
the work of the Adjutant General’s branch especially being undertaken by the War 
Office and Record Offices in England? 
a. I am to say that the above should be considered as affecting not only General 
Headquarters but the staffs of Armies, Corps and Divisions.191 
 
It is evident that at no point do the terms of reference as established suggest that the 
committee would be called to comment on the training that underpinned this organisation. 
However, it is unclear whether this committee was to serve as a springboard for additional 
studies of training. As will be shown below, despite this, both the responses from a number of 
senior officers and the committee’s final report present conclusions regarding the training of 
staff officers which would go on to form the bedrock of much of the institutional resistance to 
reform experienced across the following twenty years. 
 
The committee itself was composed of Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Braithwaite as 
president and Major-Generals Sir Robert Whigham and Percy Hambro serving as its 
members. All three had longstanding links to Haig reaching as far back as the Sudan 
 
191 Letter from War Office to Theatre Commanders, 30 December 1918. TNA WO 32/5153 
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campaign of the 1890s and all held senior posts in the BEF at the time of the committee. 
Braithwaite was serving as the Corps commander of 9th British Corps and had previously 
served as Chief of Staff for the Mediterranean expedition in 1915 under Sir Ian Hamilton. 
Prior to that he had served in various capacities at the Staff College, Camberley before being 
appointed Commandant at Quetta in 1911 during Haig’s tenure as Chief of the General Staff 
in India. Further links between the two appear from their respective service during the 
Second South African War where, whilst Haig served as Chief of Staff to Lord Kitchener, 
Braithwaite was Deputy Assistant Adjutant General (DAAG) after a period of service as a 
Brigade Major.192  
 
Similarly, Whigham had strong links to both Braithwaite and Haig through service in the 
Sudan between December 1897 and December 1898, followed by service in South Africa as 
Aide de Camp of an Infantry Brigade Commander, before serving as DAAG during the same 
period as Braithwaite (December 1900 to October 1902) and then following Braithwaite into 
the staff of II Corps after the Second South African War. Whigham saw less action than 
Braithwaite during the First World War, spending much of the war at the War Office and 
rising to divisional command of 59th (2nd North Midland) Division in January 1918 before 
replacing Braithwaite in command of the 62nd (2nd West Riding) Division in August 1918 
when Braithwaite succeeded to command of 7th Army Corps, where Whigham was still 
serving at the time of the committee.193 Of the three members of the committee, Hambro was 
the least experienced. A cavalryman, like Haig, he had started his military career with the 15th 
Lancers before moving into staff roles at army headquarters in India (coinciding with 
Whigham, Braithwaite and Haig’s service) between July 1908 and June 1912. His First 
World War service was dominated by staff roles, first as General Staff Officer 2nd Grade 
(GSO2) to Allenby’s 1st Cavalry Division, before becoming Deputy Adjutant and 
Quartermaster General (DAQG) for 3rd Army Corps, later to join both Braithwaite and 
Whigham in II Corps.194 
 
All had attended the Staff College, Camberley and had amassed experience of staff work both 
before and during the First World War, with Braithwaite having served on the Directing Staff 
at Camberley and later as Commandant of Quetta, whilst Whigham had served on the 
 
192 Information taken from the Quarterly Army List, April 1922 (London: HMSO, 1922). 
193 Quarterly Army List April 1922 (HMSO), p. 26. 
194 Ibid, p. 102. 
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Directing Staff at Camberley. In many ways, the appointment of these three officers to a 
committee on the working of the staff in war reflected the return of the British Army to pre-
war mentalities around the officer corps. All had been intimately involved with Haig 
throughout their careers, yet despite their extensive experience of wartime staff work, none 
had been involved in the reforms of staff training or staff structure which had taken place 
between 1914 and 1918. The exclusion from this committee of officers who had played a far 
more direct role in the wartime development of the staff such as Charles Bonham-Carter, 
John Burnett-Stuart, Arthur Currie and Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd and the 
inclusion of those officers well known to Haig was highly reminiscent of circles of patronage 
and influence knows as the ‘Rings’ which had existed within the British Army at the end of 
the nineteenth century.195 However, whilst the selection of the committee membership 
represented a reversion to pre-war norms, the number of respondents demonstrated a desire to 
understand the full scope of experiences in war, although the overwhelming focus of 
information gathering was on France. In all, eighty-four commanders and senior staff officers 
were asked to provide evidence to the committee. When broken down, this amounted to; 
three Generals, thirteen Lieutenant-Generals, thirty-five Major-Generals, twenty-one 
Brigadier-Generals, two Colonels, ten Lieutenant-Colonels and one Major.196 Among those 
were three of the five army commanders; Generals Sir Julian Byng (Third), Sir Henry Horne 
(First) and  Sir Henry Rawlinson (Fourth). Also examined were a number of officers who 
would eventually rise to high command. These included, Major-General Claude Deverall 
(who would become CIGS in 1936) and Brigadier-General John Dill (CIGS from May 1940 
to December 1941). Of these, twenty-three were army, corps, division or base commanders, 
whilst the remainder were in various staff roles at divisional level or above. Alongside this, 
reports were received from the Commanders-in-Chief of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary 
Force (Lieutenant-General Alexander Cobbe), British Salonika Force (General Sir George 
Milne), Egyptian Expeditionary Force (General Edmund Allenby) and British Forces in Italy 
(Lieutenant-General Lord Cavan).197 Of this later group, the response of Milne is of greatest 
interest to this thesis due to his involvement as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in two key 
War Office discussions of staff reform.198  
 
195 See Beckett, A British Profession of Arms, pp. 74-109. 
196 List [of] Witnesses Examined. TNA WO 32/5153. 
197 Report of the Committee on Staff Organisation. Ibid. 
198 These being the 1925 Report on Higher Education for War examined in Chapter Four and the discussions 
over the allocation of vacancies at the Staff College between 1927 and 1931 as examined in Chapter Five.   
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The Report of the Committee on Staff Organisation (Braithwaite Committee). 
 
The Report itself unsurprisingly reported on a range of issues beyond the relatively limited 
scope of the questionnaire sent to the various expeditionary forces beyond the Western Front. 
In doing so, it established the foundations of British staff structure for the interwar period, but 
failed to address fully shortcomings in staff training, instead asserting that, ‘The outstanding 
feature of the evidence brought before us has been the success of the work of the Staff 
throughout the war. This points indubitably to the soundness of the general principles on 
which the Staff is organized and was trained before the war.’199 As has been demonstrated 
both in the previous chapter and within the historiography on the First World War, the British 
staff experience during the First World War did anything but demonstrate the soundness of 
pre-war principles. Indeed, it has already been observed that within a few months of the war 
commencing, the supply of pre-war trained staff officers was found to be totally inadequate 
for the requirements of a significantly expanded British Army.200 This situation was then 
exacerbated from 1915 with the establishment of the New Army formations by Lord 
Kitchener and was not really resolved until 1916 when the wartime staff training schemes 
began to turn out large numbers of trained junior staff officers.201 In addition, the sheer scale 
of changes implemented over the course of the war202 all suggest a pre-war system of staff 
training which was far from ideally suited to the conditions faced. Equally, pointing to the 
success of the staff in war was itself contentious with Harris noting that, ‘Some superlative 
staff work was evidenced, countered by some fundamental errors. The army was not blind to 
the issues.’203 Consequently the army itself had recognised significant problems, not just with 
the quality of staff work in the early years of the war, but also with its ability to provide 
qualified officers from its pre-war pool. For the Braithwaite committee to dismiss this 
experience so readily, regardless of the likelihood of a similarly sized conflict breaking out in 
the future, represents a remarkable departure from the previously established pattern which 
had seen significant conflicts leading to adjustments in staff training to reflect the lessons 
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learned. Not only did the report of the Braithwaite committee dismiss the wartime changes 
made to staff training, but it also effectively dismissed the knowledge and capabilities of 
those officers who passed through these wartime courses. In noting occasions where errors in 
staff work occurred, the committee concluded that, ‘where difficulties or frictions have 
arisen, they are mainly attributable to a departure from the spirit of the regulations…through 
their ignorance.’204 On its own this statement does not necessarily reflect a dismissal of the 
experiences and knowledge of officers attending wartime staff courses. However, in the 
broader context of the assertion that pre-war staff training had been proven sound, this would 
suggest that such a comment was a reflection on wartime training.  
 
Despite this, it is important not to dismiss the report of the Braithwaite committee as a 
completely conservative and reactionary tome. Whilst the initial conclusions would come to 
haunt the process of the reform of staff training across the period, the report at least 
recognised a number of key issues for future consideration by the War Office. Firstly, it 
recognised the importance of ensuring that staff officers had a good knowledge of all areas of 
the army and proposed the interchange of officers between various levels of command in 
both peace and war.205 Together with this, it recognised the importance of engineer and 
artillery officers on the staff, noting that interchange between these officers and the General 
Staff would prevent their services being lost to the army down the ‘blind alley’ of technical 
staff duties, leading to calls for the Staff College to be opened up to these officers.206 The 
report similarly called for more attention to be paid to administrative staff work in training, a 
call which replicated that following the Second South African War.207 Perhaps most 
importantly, alongside the recognition that the Staff College should remain open during war, 
the report closed with the suggestion that the system of staff learners instituted during the war 
should be continued in peacetime, both to keep staffs at their wartime establishment and to 
allow commanders to test the capabilities of candidates for the Staff College. In addition, the 
report noted that, ‘Our evidence shows that the failure to train junior Staff Officers has been a 
cause of centralisation on the part of officers who have thought it less trouble to do the work 
themselves.’208 Although equally dismissive of the capabilities of wartime-trained staff 
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officers, this statement demonstrates a recognition among many British officers that there 
was a requirement to prioritise the future training of large numbers of junior staff officers.  
 
Although opening with the suggestion that the pre-war system of staff training was eminently 
suitable for the future training of British staff officers, the report did recognise most, if not 
all, of the key issues with the system of staff training which would be debated in the various 
reform proposals of the following twenty years. In both the evidence provided to the 
committee and the response to the report from senior officers at the War Office, it is clear 
that there was a wide range of views held as to the efficaciousness of staff work and training 
over the course of the First World War. This range of opinions and attitudes is reflective of 
broader trends of thought within the British Army as regards the role and purpose of staff 
training examined by this thesis. As will be demonstrated below, not only did these final 
conclusions ignore significant opinions from senior officers in the field, but the response 
from the War Office further trivialised the experience of the First World War. These 
responses ultimately served to establish in the minds of senior officers the dogmatic attitudes 
towards staff reform which plagued the proposals set out in the following chapters. 
 
In assessing how far the final report reflected the broader thinking of the British officer corps, 
it is important to note that despite consulting a total of eighty-four officers across the five 
British armies in France,209 it is only the responses from army commanders in other theatres 
which appear in the surviving documentation.210 Notwithstanding this, the responses 
provided do much to establish the attitudes held by a number of officers who would play key 
roles in the rejection of future proposals to reform the system of staff training. On the basis 
that similar, if not identical questions, were asked of the eighty-four officers questioned in 
France, it is therefore suggested that the conclusions and statements of the final report 
regarding the suitability of pre-war staff training were representative of the three committee 
members (Braithwaite, Whigham and Hambro), rather than the distilled opinion of the British 
officer corps.211 Indeed, this conclusion is given substance by the responses of both 
Braithwaite and Whigham to later proposals.212 Furthermore, of the army commanders who 
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responded to the War Office, only Cavan commanding British forces in Italy and Major-
General Louis Bols, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force 
(EEF), replied prior to the publication of the Braithwaite committee report on the 6th March 
1919. On this basis, the conclusions of the committee were based not on the considered 
experience of the British Army across all theatres of war, but primarily on the more limited 
experience of the British Army on the Western Front. 
 
Although not speaking to issues outside the remit of the questions asked by the War Office 
and therefore of limited value in assessing attitudes towards post-war staff training, the 
responses of the various army commanders are of interest for the broader insight they offer 
into attitudes towards the staff as a whole. For example, whilst between 1927 and 1931, Field 
Marshal Milne failed to disabuse the idea that technical officers of the Royal Engineers and 
the Royal Army Service Corps were unsuited for command and staff roles due to their lack of 
regimental experience,213 in 1919 he railed against the fact that, ‘there is a tendency among 
some officers…to imagine that an administrative staff officer may be of a lower grade of 
training…a view to which I am totally opposed.’214  Similarly he advocated a separate 
disciplinary service on the staff, ‘recruited from regimental officers who have been in close 
touch with men.’215 As a result, in 1919 Milne believed that all staff officers were of equal 
capabilities and that the only benefits of regimental officers in staff roles was for their 
experience of disciplining troops. As will be seen in his responses to later reform proposals 
during his tenure as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Milne’s attitude shifted drastically, 
serving to demonstrate further the various attitudes and element of uncertainty over the role 
of the Staff College in the minds of senior British officers. 
 
Beyond Milne’s display of attitude towards the status of administrative versus general staff 
officers, the remainder of responses from the army commanders consulted focussed on the 
debate around the value of instituting a Chief of Staff on the French and German model, 
whether to maintain the G(eneral), A(dministrative), Q(uartermaster) division of the staff, 
distribution of duties and the possibility of reducing staff size. Although not directly affecting 
the future course of reforms to staff training, much like the future discussions held, the views 
presented serve to demonstrate the lack of cohesive thought in senior ranks which would 
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permeate future discussions. Indeed, the most divisive issue appeared to be that of the 
possibility of a formal Chief of Staff to oversee the work of all staff departments within a 
formation. Of the responses received there was a fifty-fifty split in favour of a change in 
structure and the appointment of a Chief of Staff. Whilst Bols simply noted that the system 
should remain unchanged,216 Cobbe argued that, ‘the duties of Chief of Staff would be too 
heavy for one man.’217 Against these views Milne suggested that without a Chief of Staff, 
‘there is no one on the staff at present to whom the Commander of a formation can give an 
order and know that that order will be carried out.’218 Less pessimistically, Cavan argued that 
a Chief of Staff relieved the commander of his oversight function within the staff, but that 
department heads should not be denied direct access if required. 219 
  
One area in which there was relative agreement was in the relationship between officers of 
supporting arms, principally officers from the Royal Artillery (RA) and Royal Engineers 
(RE) and the staff.220 Over the course of the First World War, with the increasing importance 
of artillery in operational doctrine and field works, officers of both corps had been added to 
the staff at both Army and Corps level.221 At the time this inclusion had caused some friction 
between these officers and those from the G branch, friction which seemingly reflected the 
regimental attitudes towards these officers which would emerge again in the late 1920s.222 
These mentalities and friction between the traditional staff and technical interlopers was 
reflected in the responses to the Braithwaite committee. Indeed, Cobbe referenced the tension 
between arms directly and strongly emphasised that the role of technical officers attached to 
staffs was to command the units of their arm and that, ‘they are neither staff officers nor 
Directors [sic.] and there is consequently a possibility of friction.’223 In contrast, Cavan, 
whilst agreeing with the potential for friction, added the issuing of divergent orders as a 
consequence of their command status and proposed the reversion of RA officers to an 
advisory role in higher formations.224 Such differences of opinion were not simply limited to 
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the highest echelons of army command. In framing his response, Milne noted that, ‘I have 
had the subject… carefully considered not only by members of the staff at General 
Headquarters but by Division Commanders, three of whom are trained staff officers…The 
results arrived at are disappointing as I am unable to find any uniformity of result. I therefore 
prefer in this report to confine myself to my own opinion.’225 With the senior leadership of 
the British Army in the interwar period primarily coming from this group of officers, the 
continued lack of uniformity of opinion reflected throughout this thesis is unsurprising. 
Equally, in both the final report of the committee and the responses from senior officers 
examined above, it is clear that there was also a range of retrenched views on display in 
relation to not just pre-war training but of a ‘cap badge mentality’ against certain arms.226  
 
Nowhere were these traits more evident than within the most senior ranks of General 
Headquarters (GHQ) in France and at the War Office. In the former case, Field Marshal Sir 
Douglas Haig’s response is representative of the blinkered approach taken by the committee. 
Despite the clear lack of uniformity of thought within the British officer corps and the rapid 
development of new systems of staff training, Haig’s covering letter to the Secretary of State 
does little more than parrot the belief that pre-war staff training had been validated by the 
war. He noted that, ‘I am in agreement with the conclusions arrived at that the work of the 
Staff during the war has been accomplished with remarkable success and is strong evidence 
of the soundness of the doctrine taught in the antecedent period.’227 There has been much 
debate about whether Haig was a reformist or reactionary when it came to matters of military 
reform and, whilst it has been noted that he was a champion of military training, his 
statement regarding the lessons of the First World War is unambiguous.228 Much like the 
authors of the report, Haig’s covering memorandum sweeps aside the recognition of failings 
with pre-war staff training and the significant wartime changes they set in motion, in favour 
of a glib assertion that all was well in British Army staff training. As will be demonstrated in 
later chapters, Haig was not the only figure sometimes seen as a visionary to take a somewhat 
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Victorian attitude towards staff training.229 Similar responses were provided by other senior 
officers at the War Office with both Lieutenant-General Sir William Napier, Director of 
Artillery and Lieutenant-General Sir William Furse, the Master General of the Ordinance 
(MGO) disparaging the need for change in light of the conclusion that the pre-war system and 
training were suitable.230 Indeed, the only dissenting voice was that of the Military Secretary 
who desired greater attention to administrative duties at the Staff College and the opening of 
the college to Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer officers in light of their increased role on 
the staff.231 Despite this general agreement as to the validity of pre-war structures and 
training, many of the responses from senior officers engaged in a point by point examination 
of the Braithwaite committee’s report dealing with issues relating to nomenclature, seniority 
of individual branches, the role of technical officers on the staff and the distribution of certain 
duties between branches.232 In doing so, these memoranda recognise the changes made over 
the course of the war in terms of the increased range of duties undertaken by the staff and the 
re-organisation necessary in order to accommodate them.  
 
However, much like the Braithwaite committee report itself, the lessons centred on the 
changes required in the structure of staff training were not recognised. By doing so, the 
Braithwaite committee report should be recognised as a key missed opportunity in the 
development of the British system of staff training which had begun with the establishment 
of the early courses at High Wycombe in 1799 and led to the opening of Camberley in 1858 
and Quetta in 1905. Rather than take the opportunity to continue the reformist attitude of pre-
1914 thought towards the Staff College as highlighted in the previous chapter, the 
Braithwaite committee served instead as a sharp break, establishing a mentality that although 
coming to recognise the problems with the structure of staff training failed to see a way 
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The Reopening of the Staff College and Reformist Trends in Thought. 
 
Similarly, with the re-opening of the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta, 
communications between the Viceroy’s department and the War Office in London between 
November 1918 and January 1919 support the suggestion of a rapid dismissal of the staff 
training lessons of the First World War. The early courses held between 1919 and 1921 
generally sought to take advantage of the experience and knowledge obtained by the staff in 
war, with the Army Council ordering that officers should be selected based upon meritorious 
wartime service on the staff or attendance at one of the wartime staff schools.233 The benefits 
of this utilisation of experience was that it allowed the Commandant, Major-General Hastings 
Anderson, ‘to analyse the circumstances in which innovations had proved effective.’234 
However, for the War Office, it is clear that the primary purposes of the shorter nominated 
courses between 1919 and 1921 were to clear a backlog of officers who would have attended 
Staff College in the ordinary course of events and also top up the experience gained through 
wartime staff courses. It is clear that the decision to nominate officers who had already 
attended a wartime staff course reflected a lack of faith in the quality of those courses. A War 
Office memorandum noted that the nominated courses were, ‘designed to produce officers as 
General Staff Officers 2nd Grade, Brigade Majors and equivalent appointments on the 
Administrative Staff.’235 Given that the wartime junior staff course was designed primarily to 
address the shortfall in these very grades of staff officer, the desire of the War Office to pass 
wartime qualified officers through a post-war course is suggestive of a lack of collective faith 
in the wartime course, despite its success in mitigating the shortfall in qualified junior staff 
officers by 1917. Indeed, it is clear that this re-training of officers was to have precedence 
over the training of officers without wartime staff experience.  
 
An additional problem posed by this desire was the need to ensure that British officers 
returning with their units to various corners of the empire in the aftermath of the war did not 
lose out, noting that, ‘it would be a loss to the Country if [British Service] officers from other 
theatres of war with previous Staff experience were debarred.’236 However, with Camberley 
prioritising the large number of British officers returned from France resulting in only three 
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Indian Army places allocated at Camberley in 1920, the Chief of the Indian General Staff 
proposed a similar allocation for British Service officers at Quetta in essence refusing to 
allow it to become the overflow Staff College.237 That this was carried through without 
demure from the War Office suggests that the War Office was far more concerned with 
formalising wartime training along pre-war lines than with building on the lessons learned.  
 
Even War Office policy on the length of the first post-war courses at the Staff Colleges was 
as uncertain. In a telegram to the Military Department of the India Office, the War Office 
noted that, ‘the probable duration of the 1st course will, for the present, be 1 year [italics 
added].’238 When taken in conjunction with diverse opinions reflected in the discussions 
surrounding the Braithwaite committee report, it is clear that although wartime developments 
in staff training had been clear in their objective, such clarity was not reflected in the initial 
post-war reorganisation of staff training in the British Army. This lack of initial clarity will 
be shown to have been compounded across the following years to the point that it required 
the wholesale replacement of senior officers at the War Office and the imminent threat of a 
new European war to create an atmosphere in which changes in training reflecting the lessons 
of the First World War could be instituted.   
 
As later chapters will show, throughout the interwar period, one of the societal factors 
affecting the War Office’s response to proposed reforms was the problem of recruiting army 
officers. This was at a time when both the other services and civilian careers offered better 
opportunities for young men and a number of junior officers were leaving the army to pursue 
more lucrative options due to the unfavourable conditions existing in the British Army.239 
This factor is evident as early as 1920 when the re-establishment of the entrance examination 
for the Staff College was discussed. As part of this, it was suggested by Winston Churchill, 
then Secretary of State for War, that to spread the best brains of the army between the two 
colleges, successful candidates should be alternately allocated between Camberley and 
Quetta.240 In response to this, Major-General Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, then 
Deputy Chief of the General Staff, India, suggested that such a policy would, ‘tend to choke 
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off a number of good men from going up for the Staff College at all, owing to the personal 
inconvenience and expense (especially to married officers) that would be involved if a man, 
after working hard to get into Camberley, suddenly found himself switched off for a couple 
of years to India, or vice versa.’241 Similar objections were to be raised concerning the 
proposals put forward in 1925 by Major-General Edmund Ironside and indeed, the concern 
expressed in Staff Conferences and the various interwar committees dealing with officer 
promotion and conditions of service in the army.242 Ultimately the War Office’s idea was not 
put into practice and the India Army Order regarding the 1921 Staff College entrance 
examination stated that, ‘Officers will be required to state definitely on their application the 
Staff College i.e., Camberley or Quetta, for which they desire to compete.’243 Consequently, 
along with the assertion of the suitability of pre-war staff training, between 1919 and 1921, 
War Office policy towards the Staff College was uncertain and influenced by societal rather 
than military factors. These factors would persist throughout the period examined by this 
thesis and although expressed in different terms represented the key obstacles to structural 
staff reform and demonstrate why significant opportunities for reform were missed.       
 
In contrast to this, there is much evidence to show that below the level of the War Office, 
principally amongst junior staff officers and those directly responsible for the training of staff 
officers, there was a clear trend towards continued examination and reform of the structure of 
staff training in the British Army. As will be clearly demonstrated across later chapters, this 
was a trend not limited to the immediate post-war period but would establish itself as a sub-
culture of reformist thought below the War Office between 1919 and 1939. This, coupled 
with the divergence in attitudes within the War Office to officer training at the Staff College 
and that of Other Ranks as exemplified by the development and growth of the Army 
Education Corps (AEC), demonstrate that whilst the War Office was not a wholly reactionary 
body, when it came to staff training, it reverted to long-held beliefs and attitudes towards the 
inherently held nature of the characteristics of the British Army officer.  
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This sub-culture of reform was primarily expressed through the pages of professional 
journals, notably the Army Quarterly and the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 
(JRUSI). Although articles discussing the staff and staff training were less prevalent in the 
period 1919-22 than in the later part of the interwar period, those published reflected an 
interest in and recognition that there were lessons to be learned from the training and work of 
the staff in the First World War. Those articles published between 1918 and 1922 dealing 
with staff considerations appeared exclusively in Army Quarterly and dealt with the role of 
technical officers on the staff, the staff as the mind of the army, and early discussion of the 
potential for a combined staff or combined staff college.244 The first two points reflected key 
changes in the composition of the staff discussed in the previous chapter and would remain a 
point of conjecture throughout future discussions of reform proposals discussed in later 
chapters. These articles, whilst being generally reformist in attitude demonstrated the range 
of opinions held by army officers regarding the Staff College, its role within the army, and 
how it should adapt in light of the experiences of the First World War. 
 
Through the 1920s, a key debate amongst those discussions about the Staff College was 
whether it existed to impart a higher form of intellectual learning or practical staff duties and 
this debate is reflected in articles published at this time. However, all reflected an attempt by 
those officers publishing in professional journals to codify and understand the lessons of the 
First World War. In one example of this from November 1919, Lieutenant Colonel R.H. 
Beadon, Royal Army Service Corps (RASC), suggested that future Staff College training 
should focus on the moral [sic.] of British troops by, ‘communicating…a certain spirit and 
tradition…rather than that of overburdening them with a mass of academic knowledge, and 
an accumulation of facts.’245 This idea would be broadly echoed across the various responses 
to staff reform examined by this thesis and whilst education in spirit and tradition remained 
the purview of the regimental command and was never undertaken by the Staff College in the 
interwar period, that of providing education in morale quickly became a feature, first 
appearing in the 1919 Camberley staff course.246 With the change in composition of the 
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British Army over the course of the war, from a small professional force, to a large, 
conscription-based civilian army, issues of morale had grown in importance in the motivating 
a largely civilian, hostilities only force. This issue returned to the fore during the Second 
World War and historians have frequently noted the impact of both good and poor morale on 
the operational performance of the army and the way in which officers could address this if 
trained and sympathetic to this requirement.247  
 
In a similar manner, other articles published at this time were forward looking, even whilst 
the War Office was deciding that pre-war staff training had served the army well and no 
change was needed. The clearest examples relate to the role played by technical arms on the 
staff. Whilst the Braithwaite committee responses were seeking limits on the role of technical 
officers on the staff, RUSI articles were advocating the importance of greater integration 
between the technical arms and the general staff of formations with one stating, ‘Only thus 
will silly prejudices and jealousies be removed.’248  As will be seen in chapter five, such 
prejudices and jealousies were alive and well in the senior ranks of the War Office until at 
least 1931, fundamentally ignoring lessons learned through four years of war and falling back 
on pre-war ideologies and understandings of the role of staff training in the British Army, 
despite the advocacy of those publishing in professional journals. 
 
Similarly, positive attitudes in the realm of education and training can be seen in the attitude 
of the General Staff to the establishment of the AEC.249 Although of little direct relevance to 
the study of attitudes towards the reform of staff training, this does tell us much about the 
decision of senior officers to affirm the central conclusions of the Braithwaite committee that 
pre-war staff training remained well suited to the task at hand and had seen the British Army 
through the First World War. A frequent comment on the British officer corps of the First 
World War was that in spite of changes in its social construction, Edwardian ideas of 
paternalism by officers towards their men remained a consistent feature of leadership and 
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command.250 In this context, whilst it was the responsibility of an officer to look after the 
welfare, education and training of his men, he did so due to his innate command and 
leadership abilities, not because of any training in such duties. With its combination of 
vocational and general educational classes, the work of the AEC at the end of the First World 
War, in attempting to prepare soldiers, some of whom had  joined the army in 1914 at 
seventeen or eighteen and were leaving with no discernible skills for future employment, 
represented this pre-war paternalism to a high degree.251 The continuation of these courses 
beyond demobilisation and into the interwar period stands in contrast to the response of the 
War Office to the experiences of staff training during the First World War. As will be seen 
through the following chapters, it was not just Victorian paternalistic attitudes that remained 
in the officer corps following the First World War. Indeed, many of the worst attributes of the 
regimental system and what it meant to be an officer and a gentleman would remain 




Whilst the previous chapter has shown that significant changes were affected in the British 
Army’s practice of staff training as a result of conflicts from the mid-1850s, in the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War the situation was reversed. Whereas the Crimean War and 
the Second South African War had both seen changes made to the army’s system for training 
its staff officers, the report of the Braithwaite committee represented a collective head-
burying exercise by both senior officers in command in France and those at the War Office. 
Despite recognising that a large, national army required more staff officers than the British 
Army could train under its pre-war system, the Commissioners and the War Office ignored 
training measures developed during the war which provided a greater number of trained 
officers and immediately reverted to the pre-war system which had buckled under the strain 
of modern industrialised warfare. Indeed, with the re-opening of the Staff Colleges and the 
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desire to pass wartime trained officers through the post-war nominated courses, the War 
Office was not just ignoring the lessons of the war, it was rejecting them as unsuitable for the 
British Army. As will be seen in later chapters, the wartime structure for staff training would 
continue to resurface as a proposed reform in official memoranda, within the pages of 
professional journals and indeed in the practices of Commonwealth militaries. 
 
Additionally, it is clear that in the immediate aftermath of the war, junior officers recognised 
that the staff of the British Army required a shake-up to implement the lessons of the war. 
They recognised that technical officers of the army played a far greater role in modern war 
than had previously been the case and whilst the Braithwaite committee sought to limit their 
influence, professional journals were highlighting the petty jealousies of pre-1914 and urging 
greater involvement of technical officers both on the staff and at the Staff College. Once 
again, these issues would resurface through the interwar period and their discussion would 
centre on the institutional belief (enshrined in the Braithwaite committee report) that 
technical officers lacked the command ability or operational knowledge to become effective 
staff officers. Alongside this, the establishment and continuation of the AEC lends further 
support to the idea that War Office responses to proposals to reform the Staff College were 
based upon beliefs surrounding the role of the officer and the attributes necessary for 
command, rather than the demonstrated military requirements of modern war. Ultimately, not 
only did the report of the Braithwaite committee represent a missed opportunity to reform the 
practice of staff training based on the lessons of the First World War, but it established the 
institutional mindset which would mitigate against any significant reforms despite continued 
recognition of the problems with staff training and a desire for reform manifested in the 
various proposals put forward and the discussion of the issue within professional journals. 
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Chapter 3 – The Committee of Imperial Defence Sub-Committee on the 




As has been demonstrated thus far between 1914 and 1918, the course and development of 
staff training in the British Army had undergone a number of significant changes as a result 
of hard-won wartime experience. These changes were swept aside by the 1919 Braithwaite 
committee resulting in the first missed opportunity to enact significant changes to the pre-war 
system of staff training. Not only that, but it established in the minds of senior officers, such 
as Braithwaite and Whigham who would later influence the direction of staff reform, a return 
to earlier modes of thought around ideal characteristics and personality traits required of an 
officer effectively muddying the waters surrounding the role of the Staff College within the 
army. Alongside this, opinion within the officer corps was further split by relatively junior 
officers taking up the call for reform in the pages of professional journals leading to a variety 
of views and opinions as to both the role of the staff colleges and the degree of reforms 
required. Following these early debates over Staff College reform, the first report to offer a 
direct proposal for reform was that presented to the War Office in December 1925 by the 
outgoing Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley, Major-General Sir Edmund 
Ironside.252 Prior to this however, came the latest instalment in the long-running 
parliamentary debate over the establishment of a Ministry of Defence and the co-ordination 
of defence policy through the Committee of Imperial Defence, which itself served to codify 
certain assumptions and conclusions regarding the role of the Staff College.  
 
This came in the form of a 1923 Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) sub-committee, 
chaired by Edward Wood (the future Lord Halifax), then President of the Board of Education, 
to examine the possibility of forming a joint staff college for all services. Ultimately, the 
committee’s chief impact on the development of interwar British staff training was to come 
in 1926-27 with the establishment of the Imperial Defence College (IDC) in London (now the 
Royal College of Defence Studies). Perhaps surprisingly given the status of this institution, it 
has been mentioned sparsely across the existing historiography of the interwar period. Most 
recently, Edward Smalley has compared it unfavourably with the Staff College calling it, ‘a 
less revered military institution to provide service personnel with supplementary education 
 
252 See Chapter Four, pp. 112-118. 
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and equally neglect the Territorial Army.’253 The chronicler of the Staff College in the 
interwar period, Brevet-Major Goodwin-Austin, was unable to pass judgement on the IDC, 
beyond briefly noting the presence of the sub-committee and its recommendations, due to his 
work being published the year in which the IDC was established.254 Perhaps most 
surprisingly, Brian Bond’s otherwise magisterial study of British military policy in this 
period overlooks the IDC, despite his heavy emphasis on imperial defence.255 Indeed, the 
only tangible coverage of the Imperial Defence College and its foundation appears to be in a 
commemorative work published to celebrate its 50th anniversary and more recent coverage 
provided by Douglas Delaney.256 Within these studies, no consideration has been given to 
how the debates surrounding the formation of the Imperial Defence College impacted on 
broader issues of officer training within the three services and the army in particular.  
 
This chapter will undertake such an analysis and will demonstrate that whilst seemingly 
standing apart from those examinations of staff training undertaken under the auspices of the 
War Office, the CID sub-committee’s papers and the discussion on the proposal within the 
War Office, shed much light on the developing attitudes towards staff training and its reform. 
It will argue that the response of senior officers, particularly that of Field Marshal Sir George 
Milne, amply demonstrates the disparate understanding of the role of the Staff College within 
the British Army in the support and enthusiasm geared towards the IDC, in stark contrast to 
the views expressed regarding the contemporaneous proposals for the reform of staff training 
put forward by Major-General Ironside and examined in a later chapter. Alongside this, it 
will be demonstrated that from 1923, increased attention was paid in professional journals to 
the issue of staff reform, providing additional weight to the argument that across the interwar 
period, opinion on the role of the Staff College and the need for reform was broadly split 
between senior officers at the War Office and junior officers seeing the results of existing 
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A Ministry of Defence and the Committee of Imperial Defence 
 
The Wood CID sub-committee on the formation of a Joint Staff College had its origins in the 
long-standing debate within the British government over the need to co-ordinate all defence 
planning and policy. Early calls for such a system came from Lord Randolph Churchill in 
1888 resulting in the establishment of the Hartington Commission to, ‘enquire into the Civil 
and Professional Administration of the Naval and Military Departments, and the relation of 
each to the other and to the Treasury.’257 This commission established the Cabinet Defence 
Committee which theoretically served this function, although its effectiveness was called into 
question after the debacle of the Second South African War, with the 1904 Esher committee 
report recommending its re-organisation and the expanding of its scope to meet the defence 
needs of a global empire.258 The result was the creation of the CID, formally established in 
May 1904, with a remit to, ‘consider and formulate the principles on which defence policy 
should be based.’259 With no direct impact on the course and development of army staff 
training, it would be inappropriate to examine the work of the CID from its formation beyond 
noting that from its establishment it served as the key advisory body to the government on 
issues of imperial defence. 
 
It was in the wake of the First World War and the report of the Committee of National 
Expenditure (Geddes committee) in 1922 that the debate surrounding the establishment of a 
single Ministry of Defence re-surfaced. The now infamous committee set in train a series of 
economies and economic policies across the three services which resulted in ongoing clashes 
throughout this period between the service departments and the Treasury over every strategic 
and operational decision necessitating Treasury approval, described by Chamberlain as a 
policy of not putting guns before butter.260 Alongside its service specific recommendations, 
the Geddes committee noted significant overlapping of both responsibilities and 
administration and argued that, ‘In order to fully realise…economies the three Forces [sic.] 
must be brought together by the creation of a Co-Ordinating Authority or Ministry of 
 
257 Quoted in John Sweetman, ‘Towards a Ministry of Defence: First Faltering Steps, 1890-1903,’ in French & 
Holden Reid, The British General Staff, p. 29. 
258 Ibid, p. 33. 
259 Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume I, 1887-1918 (London: Collins, 1970), pp. 90-91. 
260 Edward Smalley, The British Expeditionary Force, p. 49; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 
p.143; Bond, British Military Policy, pp. 24, 33, 39, 96-7, 135-6; David French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p. 
36; Joe Maiolo, Cry Havoc: The Arms Race and the Second World War 1931-1941 (London: John Murray, 
2010), p. 144 and Alan Allport, Browned Off and Bloody-Minded: The British Soldier Goes to War 1939-1945 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), p. 17. 
 92 
Defence.’261 To address this need, a number of CID sub-committees were established in 
quick succession including examining the correlation and co-operation of the three services 
within the context of imperial defence (the 1923 Salisbury committee), a sub-committee to 
examine the possibility of amalgamating certain administrative services common to all three 
services and the sub-committee examining the potential establishment of a joint Staff College 
for the three services.262 It is the latter of these which form the focus of this chapter as the 
other committees and discussions around the potential establishment of a Ministry of Defence 
were focussed at the strategic, tri-service level and took no consideration of individual 
service attitudes towards staff training.  
 
Alongside its aim to increase the efficiency of Britain’s armed forces and more importantly, 
reduce expenditure, the Geddes committee commented unfavourably on the large sums of 
money spent by the army on its staff and the education of officers.263 As noted in previous 
chapters, the size and shape of both wartime and peacetime staffs had been heavily debated 
during the deliberations of the Braithwaite committee, whilst the necessity for maintaining 
skeleton staffs in peacetime had been established prior to the end of the First World War.264 
Whilst the Geddes committee was openly hostile to the educational costs incurred by the 
army since 1919, the experience of the First World War had clearly demonstrated that such 
technical training was necessary. Despite this, the educational vote of the Army Estimates for 
1923 was a mere £1,090,000 out of a total budget of £52,000,000 (a little over two 
percent).265 This budget allocation remained relatively stable over the course of the interwar 
period and although it is clear that from a political standpoint the cost of educating both 
ordinary ranks and officers would continue to come under scrutiny in Parliament, the military 
element of the War Office rarely cited pressing financial concerns as reasons to ignore a 
potential reform. Whilst in a roundabout way the Geddes committee would come to influence 
the course of army staff training through the auspices of the CID sub-committee, its financial 
arguments, although severely impacting the British Army in other ways, had little direct 
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impact on the course and development of efforts to reform staff training between 1919 and 
1939.  
 
However, the mental shift towards retrenchment engendered by the Geddes committee 
clashed with the strategic reality faced by the British Army in the early 1920s. In addition to 
traditional garrison duties across the empire, the British Army faced mounting unrest in 
Ireland over the issue of Home Rule, the need to maintain sizeable forces in the British Army 
of the Rhine and the former Ottoman Empire alongside additional imperial commitments in 
the Middle East and British involvement in the Russian Civil War.266 Furthermore, the early 
1920s saw the beginnings of a number of anti-military movements attempting to influence 
both public opinion and political decision-making predicated on the desire to avoid 
committing significant manpower to war on a similar scale to that experienced between 1914 
and 1918.267 The influence of these movements and the extent to which they represented 
widespread public opinion has been largely dismissed within the historiography.268 In this 
context, the British Army had to engage in thought regarding its future shape and 
organisation. As noted in the previous chapter, in the final months of the war it was broadly 
established that while a small professional army would remain, the British Army would retain 
divisional and corps commands in cadre form for expansion in war along the lines of the idea 
of a ‘nation in arms.’269 As will be seen below, whereas popular and political opinion were 
anti-continental commitment, the discussions of the CID sub-committee and professional 
journal articles examining the future structure of staff training continued to appreciate the 
need for war planning on a significant scale. Indeed, British doctrine as set out in Field 
Service Regulations emphasised the need for an army, ‘capable of modification to suit the 
special requirements of a particular campaign, and of rapid expansion in the case of a grave 
emergency.’270 It was in this broader context that the debate over the need for a Ministry of 
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Defence emerged and in which the subsequent discussions would recognise a need for a 
shake-up of the existing structure of higher level staff training. 
 
Committee of Imperial Defence Sub-Committee on the Formation of a Joint Staff 
College 
 
The sub-committee on the institution of a joint Staff College for officers of the three services 
was established in July 1922 and reported to the CID in May 1923.271 Its terms of reference 
to, ‘consider the institution of a Joint Staff College for officers of medium rank in the three 
services,’272 does little to address the context in which this examination was to be carried out 
although did pay lip service to the ideals of the Geddes committee by requiring that any 
alterations result in a reduction of expenditure. However, in terms of its relationship to the 
broader aims of this thesis, these terms of reference are of interest. As will be seen in the 
following chapter, the establishment of the IDC for officers of medium rank would be utilised 
by critics of later reform attempts to justify their opposition on the basis that a higher school 
of training existed and therefore any failings with the system of officer training had been 
adequately addressed.273 However, in the memoranda put forward by the three service 
representatives to this sub-committee, the resultant institution was never seen as a 
replacement, or even an addition to, individual service staff training. The three service 
representatives appointed to the committee were: Rear-Admiral Herbert Richmond, Major-
General Hastings Anderson and Air Vice-Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond. All had extensive 
experience of staff training, two (Anderson and Richmond) had commanded their respective 
service Staff Colleges and all had or would later play crucial roles in the development of their 
service. Richmond had been appointed Admiral President of the Royal Naval College, 
Greenwich in 1920 reflecting his long-standing interest in naval staff training, itself a 
relatively new phenomenon.274 For a service which failed to establish a fully functioning 
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naval staff until 1917, Richmond’s dictum that, ‘education ought to receive prodigious 
attention after the war,’275 set him up as the ideal representative in examining not just post-
war naval requirements, but also how best to fit these needs within their broader service 
context. The Royal Air Force representative, Geoffrey Salmond was on an equally upward 
trajectory as the newly appointed Air Member for Supply and Research. He had also been 
present at the 1919 Cairo Conference and had shown great interest in the development of 
imperial air routes.276 Although not directly involved in the development of his service’s 
Staff College at Andover, Salmond had passed through the Staff College, Camberley and 
thus, alongside his enthusiasm for the use of air power in an imperial context represented a 
similarly reformist appointment by the service chiefs.277 Much like the British Army 
however, it was not Salmond who presented the Royal Air Force memorandum to the sub-
committee. The author of the air force paper was Air Vice-Marshal Philip Game, a former 
officer in the Royal Artillery who had joined the Royal Flying Corps in 1916. He was 
renowned for his ability as a staff officer and was serving as Director of Training at the Air 
Ministry.278 Similarly to the change in army representative discussed below, with the delay in 
appointment of the committee as a result of the elections held in November 1922, Game had 
been appointed Air Officer Commanding, India and was not available when the committee 
first sat in early 1923.279  
 
The army’s initial choice of representative was similarly qualified to examine the future 
course of staff training as it related to the imperial nature of the CID’s thinking. Major-
General Anderson had been Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley from its re-
opening in 1919 until the summer of 1922 and was appointed to the CID committee on the 
basis of his, ‘intimate acquaintance with Staff College requirements.’280 Prior to the first 
meeting of the committee, Anderson, along with Richmond and Game, submitted written 
memoranda setting out individual service views on the question of a joint Staff College. 
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However, along with Game, Anderson was appointed to Army Headquarters in India and was 
replaced on the committee by Major-General Cecil Romer, at that time Director of Staff 
Duties (DSD) at the War Office. 281 It is worthy of note that, despite being appointed as a 
replacement for Anderson, Romer did not put forward his own memoranda regarding the 
proposals for a joint Staff College and indeed, his contributions to the three meetings of the 
sub-committee and his memoranda on the financial costs of the establishment of the IDC 
would broadly follow the army view as established by Anderson. It says much about the 
reputations of those appointed to the committee that three of the five service representatives 
Anderson, Game and Salmond (appointed Air Officer Commanding, India in 1926) would be 
appointed to key roles in India, at that time still the dominant feature of much British defence 
planning. 
 
This need to change the army representative was primarily due to a change in chair of the 
committee and the delay this imposed on proceedings. Winston Churchill, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies and agitator, alongside the authors of the Geddes committee, for the 
establishment of a Ministry of Defence was initially appointed as Chairman of the CID 
subcommittee.282 It was ultimately Churchill’s brainchild, having established in the wake of 
the Geddes committee report that, ‘any idea of a Defence Ministry was premature until there 
was in existence a staff familiar with the problems of the three Services and capable of 
advising the Ministry of Defence on such matters.’283 However, Churchill lost his seat in the 
election of November 1922 and the committee was reconstituted in December of that year 
with E.F.L. Wood (later Lord Halifax), President of the Board of Education as Chairman.284 
The relative merits of these two men as Chairman of such a committee falls outside the scope 
of this thesis; however, given Churchill’s penchant for cajoling and interfering with military 
decision-making it is easy to speculate that the final report and course of high level military 
co-ordination could have been different from that which resulted from Wood’s 
chairmanship.285 
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The memorandum put forward by Anderson is of interest to the broader thrust of this thesis 
as, when combined with the responses of certain officers within the War Office to the 
conclusions of the Wood committee, it further reinforces the idea that during this crucial 
developmental phase in British staff training, the senior leadership of the army could not 
agree on a single view of the purpose of the Staff College or the means to correct the 
problems identified with the structure of training then in force. It quickly becomes clear from 
a reading of Anderson’s memorandum that there were some senior officers with a clear idea 
of the role of the Staff College within the British Army. He noted that, ‘the Staff Colleges 
have their own special role, in the training of officers in the duties of the staff in their 
respective services; in work in liaison with other services; and, in the case of the Army Staff 
Colleges, in the higher art of War on Land.’286 Anderson also set out that any training 
undertaken at a new joint college should, ‘in no way be in substitution for the instruction at 
the present colleges.’287 As a result, it is clear that for Anderson at least, the Staff Colleges at 
Camberley and Quetta served a distinctive purpose and that any CID inspired institution 
should not interfere in these duties. Furthermore, Anderson’s views broadly align with those 
expressed by later reformers in that it recognises the fundamental duality of requirement. Not 
only was the Staff College to teach practical, day-to-day staff duties, but it was to serve to 
educate future commanders and senior staff officers in the higher branches of command and 
control. 
 
Such a view was broadly shared by both Richmond and Game, although even here it is 
evident that the army’s role for the Staff College differed from that of the other services.288 
Whilst Anderson included the study of the higher art of war, Game noted that, ‘At present the 
tendency of the Staff Colleges is to attempt to turn out budding Napoleons and Nelsons rather 
than efficient staff officers…Each service Staff College should confine itself to turning out 
officers with a thorough grasp of ordinary staff work and of the strategy, tactics organisation 
and administration of its own service.’289 With Game’s experience of staff training having 
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come via the Staff College, Camberley (when still a member of the Royal Artillery) it is clear 
that his views were informed by his experiences and so are equally reflective of the lack of a 
single understanding within the army as to the purpose of the Staff College within the army, 
despite his change of uniform. In addition, Game believed that by moving, ‘the study of the 
higher art of war…to a combined staff college, the course at the three Service Colleges could 
undoubtedly be shortened and more staff officers produced.’290 As will be seen over the 
following chapters, the idea of shortening the course at the army Staff College and increasing 
the output of officers trained in lower-level staff duties was to be a common feature of reform 
proposals throughout the interwar period.291  
 
Equally apposite in light of future proposals and the reforms eventually adopted by the army 
in 1938 were the assertions that the number of students at any joint college should be limited 
to those likely to reach senior appointments in their respective services and that all should 
have graduated from their service Staff College.292 Similarly echoing later reform proposals, 
Anderson argued that in addition to having graduated from Camberley or Quetta, army 
officers should also have undertaken a period of regimental or staff duty prior to attendance 
at the new college.293 Whilst initially applied to the newly introduced IDC, similar proposals 
would be put forward in 1925 by Ironside and would eventually be enacted as a result of the 
1938 Massy committee report.294 Despite being external to the War Office, the reports 
submitted to the CID committee by service representatives established a foundation of 
reformist thought, particularly within the army, at a time when senior officers remained 
broadly resistant to change. As will be seen below, such resistance was not limited to later 
reform efforts, but was also expressed in internal War Office communications regarding the 
establishment of the IDC.  
 
Additionally, it was clear where the military representatives believed the focus of any new 
institution should lie. All three memoranda broadly agreed on the need to establish a coherent 
strategic doctrine to ensure co-operation of the three services in both national and imperial 
defence. Although each had its own emphasis relative to individual service priorities, the 
overwhelming trend is clear. Game suggested that, ‘the curriculum at the Combined College 
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should deal with the combined operations of the three Services, the organisation and duties of 
each from the national point of view, and other problems of national organisation which 
affect war.’295 Reflecting similar beliefs Anderson established a broad curriculum outline 
comprising:  
 
(i) Lectures, discussions and conferences, on the higher executive direction of War, 
strategic and administrative, at sea, on land, and in the air, and in combined 
operations. 
(ii) A great part of the year’s instruction must be directed to a broader conception of the 
interdependence of the fighting services… 
(iii) Study of the resources of foreign powers, whose policy may conflict with that of the 
Government 
(iv) Investigation of practical problems. A realisation of the meaning to the Empire of the 
Midlands and the Black Country is essential.296 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly Richmond’s offering to the potential curriculum included; ‘the 
defence of MALTA [sic.], its security and utility as a base…The problem of defence of 
bases…The defence of trade in the Mediterranean…The defences of Jamaica…The main 
strategy of a war with Japan…The problem of substitution of detention of shipping in 
war…Whether it is to the advantage of this country to extend to aircraft liberty of action 
against merchant ships…The defence of oceanic convoy of transports…The command of the 
Mediterranean…The defence of the SUEZ canal.’297 Whilst overtly focussing on individual 
service priorities, these suggestions all speak to the IDC remaining focussed squarely on 
training officers to think beyond the limits of their own service and to ensure that senior 
commanders and staff thought in three-dimensional terms, appreciative of the role and 
capabilities of the other services. Such an approach had been missing from strategic decision-
making in the period leading up to the First World War and it is evident that this informed the 
desires of those officers tasked with providing professional advice on the issue of a joint staff 
college.298  
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These attitudes continued into the meetings themselves, despite significant personnel changes 
in the military representatives. In the case of the army, taking a similar view to Anderson, 
Romer argued that a ‘Joint Staff College was necessary to produce officers who could ‘think 
in three dimensions.’299 Indeed, within both the sub-committee and the CID support 
continued to grow for the establishment of an additional educational institution for officers of 
the three services and civilian departments to gain experience of working together, regardless 
of resistance from the Treasury representative, as to the need for the committee’s proposals to 
effect savings and questioning, ‘whether the proposed Joint Staff College really was a 
necessity and whether its work was not already carried out by other means, for instance by 
the Committee of Imperial Defence.’300 In the face of these proposals, the military committee 
members continued to argue that any joint college should be in addition to the existing 
service colleges and that, as a result, they did not believe that, ‘any economies could…be 
effected in the present Colleges.’301 Consequently, there was a clear recognition in some 
military quarters that the existing system of staff training across the three services failed to 
address fully the requirements of modern war and that change was needed to correct this. 
This belief was held to such an extent that it was argued that they should continue with, ‘a 
scheme for a Joint War College even if the necessary funds for its institution were not 
immediately available.302 When compared with the attitudes demonstrated by the British 
Army throughout this period, this conclusion demonstrated a clear contrast. While the 
Braithwaite committee and associated debates had argued that pre-war staff training required 
no modification in light of the army’s wartime experiences, the officers appointed to this CID 
committee recognised key failings in Britain’s system of strategic control and identified the 
training required to overcome them. Moreover, they did so in the face of adverse financial 
circumstances, advocating the establishment of a new training institution at an estimated cost 
of £14,000 per annum to be shared between the three services.303 Whilst the influence of 
these adverse financial circumstances has been commented on and has been acknowledged as 
an obstacle to British military progress, the continued pressure for the establishment of what 
became the IDC suggests that, even in the wake of the Geddes ‘Axe’, financial constraints 
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were not a decisive factor in the reform of staff training.304 Indeed, as will be seen over the 
following chapters, the financial impact of the various reform proposals examined as part of 
this thesis was never directly responsible for failures of reform.305  
 
The final report of the committee setting out its proposals for the IDC built on the 
memoranda submitted by the service representatives and the discussions over the course of 
the three meetings. The report agreed that any new institution should be in addition to the 
existing service colleges and noted that, ‘In order to prevent overlapping…it should be 
clearly laid down that the functions of the Staff Colleges are the training officers in Staff 
work, the study of strategy and of the tactics, organisation and administration of their own 
Services. The curriculum at the Staff Colleges should be kept under close review in order to 
prevent overlapping with the instruction given at the Imperial Defence College.’306 Despite 
this, the curriculum suggested that any overlap between the IDC and the service staff colleges 
would be unlikely. The course of instruction at the IDC was to comprise:  
 
(a.) Lectures, discussions and conferences on the higher executive direction of war, 
strategic and administrative. 
(b.) Study of the organisation of the fighting services from the national and Imperial 
point of view, and the influence of public opinion on the conduct of operations of 
war. 
(c.) Study of the economic, social, industrial and financial resources of the United 
Kingdom and British Empire. 
(d.) Study of questions of foreign policy and of our relations with foreign Powers. 
(e.) Study of the trade and resources of foreign Powers. 
(f.) Investigation of practical problems with a view to subsequent action being taken. 
(g.) Visits to dockyards, arsenals, training and other military establishments and railway 
and industrial centres. 307 
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Notwithstanding the desires of Churchill and Wood to not only reduce service overheads 
through the amalgamation of staff training, but also to bring all such training under a single 
institution, it was clearly recognised by the service representatives themselves that the 
individual staff colleges served a crucial purpose within the wider framework of officer 
training. From the army’s perspective, the committee report established a definition of the 
role of the army Staff Colleges in line with that formalised in written doctrine, although not 
fully recognised by senior officers at the War Office. Throughout the period covered by this 
thesis, King’s Regulations laid down that, ‘the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta are 
maintained for the purpose of affording selected officers instruction in the higher branches of 
the art of war and in staff duties.’308 As a result, when combined with the existing officer 
training institutions, the formal establishment of the IDC in 1927 represented a new final 
stage in a process of professional development which arguably had begun with Major-
General John Le Marchant and the Senior Department of the Royal Military College, High 
Wycombe in the late eighteenth century.309 By 1927, a British Army officer’s professional 
education began at either Royal Military Academy, Woolwich (RMA) or Royal Military 
College, Sandhurst (RMC) for cadet training before progressing to his arm of service school 
or regimental depot, followed by promotion examinations up to the level of Major. For many 
this was the extent of their education, barring a stint at the Senior Officers’ School prior to 
taking up command of a battalion.310 However, for those desirous of breaking away from the 
regimental system, until 1927, attendance at one of the Staff Colleges had represented the 
means to do so, but as noted in previous chapters, this had been the summit of professional 
training in the British Army. It aimed to fit officers for all levels of command and staff work 
far in advance of their taking up senior posts and limited opportunities for understanding 
inter-service developments and planning beyond the operational level.311 With the 
establishment of the IDC, army officers could now undertake training linked not just to tri-
service requirements, but also political and imperial organisation and planning in order to fit 
them for the highest commands, thus providing a progression of training from platoon 
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command to theatre command. However, whilst providing an additional level of training for 
military officers, access to the IDC was limited with only six army officers (holding either 
Lieutenant-Colonel or Colonel’s rank) attending each year out of a total cohort of thirty.312 
Whilst having very little direct impact on the reform of staff training at the Staff College, the 
IDC can be said to represent a significant reform in the development of officer training in the 
interwar period.  
 
The Army Response 
 
Despite this, the reaction within the War Office to both the committee’s report, the 
establishment of the IDC and later reform proposals, suggests that the precepts of King’s 
Regulations and the implied advance in staff training resulting from the establishment of the 
IDC did not accord with the thoughts of a number of influential senior officers about the role 
of the Staff College and officer training in general. Indeed, the disparity between the basis on 
which the IDC was instituted in 1927 and the views of the three services beyond the confines 
of Richmond, Salmond and Romer led to the delay in acting upon the committee’s proposals 
while further consideration was given to its advisability by the Chiefs of Staff (CoS) 
committee of the CID.313 This committee, similarly formed as a result of the long-running 
debate over the need for a single co-ordinating Ministry of Defence, had as its object the 
broad co-ordination of defence policy.314 However, competition for part of the ever 
diminishing defence budget, coupled with personal animosity and traditional service rivalries 
prevented the degree of co-operation necessary to make such a committee harmonious and 
effective.315 Whilst the details of these clashes between the service chiefs within the CoS 
committee across the interwar period fall far outside the scope of this thesis, the attitudes 
expressed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, contributing to the disagreement on the 
institution of a joint Staff College, are crucial in helping to establish why the success of this 
proposal did not lead to broader reforms within army staff training in the mid-1920s.  
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The views expressed by the two Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff (Field Marshals Lord 
Cavan and Sir George Milne) contributing to the discussion of the IDC and its establishment 
offer up prime examples of the lack of consistent direction in policy within the senior ranks 
of the army, which ultimately derailed numerous attempts to reform the structure of staff 
training in this period. Cavan’s views were submitted during a session of the (CoS) 
committee in January 1924. In setting out his views, he noted a general lack of enthusiasm 
for the scheme on the basis that, ‘I do not believe that any school but that of experience will 
guide officers of middle rank…to the formation of correct and sound conclusions on “war in 
its widest aspect.”’316 As will be demonstrated through later chapters, this attitude, which was 
based on ideas of the ‘gentleman officer’ with inherent qualities of leadership and military 
skill, flew in the face of the experiences of 1914-1918, continued to be advocated by senior 
officers throughout the 1920s.  
 
Additionally, he called into question the utility of the proposed institution as a whole, noting 
that, ‘I believe that such a scheme as is now before us would have been started long ago by 
the Germans – for instance – before 1914, and by the French and Japanese and 
Americans.’317 However, whilst Cavan’s initial assertion as to the benefits of experience over 
training stems from widely held attitudes, this later assertion is far harder to justify. 
Primarily, this is due to the fact that of the nations listed, Britain was the only one whose 
defence planning, both in the interwar period and for much of its modern history, were based 
on the balancing of multiple service requirements and the defence of Empire. France and 
Germany had always been predominantly continental powers, relying on large, conscript 
armies. Indeed, the reduction of the German Army in the wake of the First World War, the 
banning of a German Air Force and severe restrictions placed on its navy ensured that 
Weimar military policy remained heavily focussed on issues of land defence.318 Similarly, the 
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US army had, since the ending of the American Civil War in 1865, remained a miniscule 
force when held against the land mass of the United States, and retained a very limited role, 
the principal means of defence being the distance of the continental US from any potential 
enemy.319  
 
For Cavan to suggest that because no other power was establishing such high-level training, 
Britain should also not concern itself, demonstrates either a surprising ignorance of these 
nations’ historic strategic priorities (itself an argument in support of establishing the IDC), or 
a deliberate attempt by the CIGS to derail a planned reform. It is clear from the remainder of 
Cavan’s memo that the latter is the more likely. After raising concerns about any reduction in 
the funds allocated to the Staff Colleges or the Senior Officers’ School on the basis that they 
(according to Cavan) gave full value for money, Cavan noted the disparity of views between 
Maurice Hankey and Churchill.320 He feared that this would lead to the IDC being utilised as 
a means to appoint middle-ranking officers as military advisors, replacing the Chiefs of Staff 
committee as the prime military advisory body within the CID.321 Cavan’s views of the Staff 
College, although limited to a single statement, are instructive in demonstrating the 
permeation of the senior ranks of the War Office by the views expressed initially by the 
Braithwaite committee in 1919. This idea that the existing system of staff training gave value 
for money was clearly at odds with the experience of the First World War and the feeling of 
those officers lower down the chain of command. As will be seen below and through the 
following chapters, from 1924 a clearly discerned trend emerges of advocates for reform at 
odds with many of the assertions made by senior officers.  
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Also, of great interest to the analysis of proposed reforms is the attitude displayed two years 
later by the new CIGS, Field-Marshal Sir George Milne. Whilst during the Chiefs of Staff 
committee meeting on the 29th March 1926 Milne merely noted his agreement with the 
revised proposals for the IDC and argued for a single member of the Directing Staff from 
each service to avoid imbalance, it was in his discussions with the Permanent Under-
Secretary to the War Office, Sir Herbert Creedy, that the true extent of his contradictory 
attitude to his predecessor is evident.322 In a note to Creedy soon after the final plans were set 
out by the CID and the financial estimates for the cost of the IDC were sent to the military 
departments Milne noted that, ‘I am very anxious that this new College [sic.] should be 
generously treated. It is on an entirely different level to any other establishment we have.’323 
Building on this early enthusiasm for the IDC, in July 1929, the Army Council requested the 
increase of the number of army officers attending from five to six, a request which was 
approved by the Admiralty who lost an allocated vacancy as a result.324 Whilst it is evident 
that the impetus for this request came from Milne, it is impossible to establish the reasoning 
behind this desire to expand army representation at the IDC.  
 
It is clear that for Milne, Romer and Anderson, the IDC represented an opportunity to 
enhance the provision of professional training for army officers and provided a much-needed 
opportunity to enhance inter-service knowledge, capabilities and strategic planning at an 
imperial level. Indeed, of the reform attempts examined as part of this thesis, the IDC stands 
out as arguably the most impactful on the British Army, prior to those of 1938. Not only does 
it still exist as the Royal College of Defence Studies,325 but many of its early army graduates 
went on to play prominent roles in the Second World War, often in theatres where co-
operation with the other services proved decisive.326 However, whilst representing a 
significant advance in the provision of professional training to army officers, when taken 
alongside simultaneous discussions on staff training at Camberley, this period serves to 
highlight the lack of a single clear doctrine of professional training within the British Army. 
As will be argued in the following chapters, despite continued recognition of failings within 
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the system of staff training, the intellectual factionalism in the higher reaches of the army, 
focussed as it was on the debate over the need for any kind of professional training for 
officers and the role the Staff College was to fill, combined with practical concerns of 
recruitment and retention in the interwar army, mitigated against any significant reforms 
being made.  
 
Formalisation of Staff Doctrine 
 
Whilst this examination into wartime command and control was being undertaken by the 
CID, the War Office was similarly engaged in establishing a formal doctrine of 
administration and organisation through the publication in 1923 of a new volume of Field 
Service Regulations devoted to these subjects.327 Much like the suggestions and policies 
examined in both this and the preceding chapter, although this formalisation of doctrine did 
much to recognise and codify the lessons of the First World War, the implications of these 
lessons were not recognised at the highest levels. As will be seen, whilst this new volume of 
FSR represented a sharp break from previous iterations and highlighted the differing 
requirements between operational control and higher-level control of the army, the response 
of senior officers to proposals for staff reform based on these principles remained unchanged. 
Pre-war FSR had devoted no space to the staff, its role or broader problems of administration 
and organisation. 328 However, the complexities of modern European war between 1914 and 
1918 had clearly fostered a recognition of the complexities of modern war and the need to 
establish a formal doctrine to govern the supply and control of this new form of war. 
Alongside the detailed instructions on practical organisational problems such as transport, 
office work in the field, censorship, supplies, medical and ordinance services and battlefield 
clearance work, this new edition of FSR laid great stress on broader organisation questions 
and principles relating to the staff and the principles on which both they and the overall 
organisation of the army should be based.329  
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In setting out these principles, there was a departure from those in other volumes of FSR.330 
Whilst mobility, economy of force and co-operation remained, the remaining operational 
principles were dispensed with and replaced by the limiting of the number of subordinates the 
commanding general was required to deal with and the importance of centralised control 
combined with subdivision of labour and decentralisation of responsibility.331 This 
recognition of clear differences in requirements between operational and organisational 
questions was replicated in chapters dealing with the duties and responsibilities of 
commanders and staffs. In doing so, there was a clear codification of the specialist 
responsibilities of both commanders and staff, implicitly confirming that existing methods of 
training were no-longer appropriate in that they sought to prepare an officer for higher 
command in a broad sense rather than focussing on the specialist knowledge required for any 
number of different roles they could be expected to fill. FSR established that commanders 
(both commander-in-chief and subordinate commanders) were responsible for the 
maintenance, control, direction and military government of the formations or areas under 
their control.332 The staff were to, ‘assist their commander in the execution of the duties 
entrusted to him, to transmit his orders and instructions to subordinate commanders and to the 
services, to make the necessary arrangements in connection therewith, and to see that those 
orders and instructions are carried out…To give every possible assistance to the fighting 
troops and to the services in the execution of their tasks.’333 Crucially, however, the staff 
were vested with no military command powers of their own with, ‘every order…given by the 
authority and on the responsibility of the commander.’334 Such a separation of duties had 
been implicit in the role of the staff of the British Army since Wellington’s 1827 October 
Minute; however, it had never been formally laid down in British military doctrine.335 As has 
already been demonstrated, one consequence of this was that when the Staff College was 
established in 1856, there was no clear direction for its teaching, with Commandants 
adjusting the emphasis of the curriculum based on a combination of their own preferences 
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and beliefs about the shape of future war. This recognition of the Staff College as ‘the 
nursery of the General Staff’ during debates around the formation of that body, further 
removed emphasis away from the day-to-day staff work within formations.336  
 
As a result, whilst British staff doctrine developed in-line with the experiences of the First 
World War, as has been seen from responses to the Braithwaite committee report in 1919 and 
the CID sub-committee in 1923, attitudes and understanding of the role of the Staff College 
failed to grasp the fundamental shift in the nature of training required. Whilst it is clear that 
there was some recognition of the need for formal training in the highest aspects of command 
and control, hence the establishment of the IDC, there was still a failure to recognise that the 
increased importance of lower-level staff work in the context of modern, industrialised war 
necessitated alteration to the system of staff training, despite the recognition of the more 
complex nature of modern war within the army’s doctrine. As will be seen, although 
acknowledging significant problems with the system of staff training and receiving multiple 
proposals seeking to overcome these issues, the fundamental clash between newly established 
doctrine and traditional modes of thought around the staff, engendered in part by the British 
Army’s regimental system, served to retard the pace of reform to the structure of staff 
training in the interwar period.  
 
Continued Pressure for the Reform of Staff Training 
 
Whilst strategic staff training received significant attention in 1923 and 1924, this did not 
mean that debates over the need for reform of staff training within the army did not occur. 
Much like the immediate post-1918 years, moving towards the mid-1920s, a corpus of 
professional journal articles continued to highlight the importance of operational level staff 
work and the need to ensure that the lessons of the First World War were not forgotten. The 
most vehement of these was an article in Army Quarterly highly critical of the rapid reversion 
to pre-war norms and the presence of apathy towards the need to utilise the hard-won 
experience of the war.337 It noted that whilst it was impossible to foresee the nature of a 
future war, for Britain it was likely to be either a ‘small war’ for which the existing Regular 
Army was more than capable, or a ‘national struggle’ requiring the full power of the 
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Commonwealth.338 With the establishment of the ten-year rule, the primacy of the ‘small 
war’ idea in British political thinking was established.339 The dichotomy this produced 
between what the British Army was expected to do and Britain’s continued involvement in 
continental defensive arrangements resulting from the 1925 Locarno Treaty, would stretch 
Britain’s military capacity to breaking point. Yet despite this, the emphasis of the British 
Army’s role in imperial policing and ‘small wars’ was maintained by a succession of 
governments.340 The reality of such conflicts was that control was devolved to junior officers 
and the smaller formations required little in the way of organised staff work on the scale of 
the First World War.341 This resulted in a falling back to pre-war methods of war, 
disseminated through regimental exercises or pre-war publications such as Charles Callwell’s 
Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice, which made no reference to formation staffs in its 
analysis and explanation of imperial warfare, or Edward Hamley’s The Operations of War: 
Explained and Illustrated, which by the early 1920s was outdated and beginning to fall out of 
favour.342 The return to prominence of these Victorian tomes arguably led some within the 
army officer corps to return to the idea that regimental soldiering represented the ideal limit 
for their intellectual horizon and deriding those who sought advancement via the Staff 
College.343 
 
Against this, Beadon argued that modern war had become far more complex and the old 
adage that a good regimental officer is capable of any work was no longer applicable. 
Instead, the army required specialists who could be employed where they were best suited.344 
Whilst it is clear that there were elements within the senior officer corps who broadly agreed 
with this argument, as will be seen in the following chapters, there were many senior officers 
who continued to resist reforms to staff training based on the belief that only good regimental 
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officers from combat arms were suited to staff roles and that there was no need for 
specialisation on the staff.345 Reflecting the views of those who recognised the importance of 
the Staff College in preparing an overstretched British Army to meet future challenges, 
Beadon ended his article with the comment that, ‘It is for the Staff College, above all else in 
the Army, the ruthless economies literally cannot be afforded. An extra £30,000 or £40,000 a 
year, judiciously spent, might well make all the difference – and a single battalion on the 
home establishment costs some £75,000 per annum.’346 Whilst those officers involved in the 
CID sub-committee clearly held similar views to Beadon regarding staff training, albeit in a 
tri-service context, future calls for the reform of staff training in the British Army were not 




As has been demonstrated, as the British Army continued to process and delineate the lessons 
of the First World War, it became clear to those in the CID that there was an element of 
training in the highest levels of staff and command which was lacking in existing service 
provision. The establishment of the sub-committee under the chairmanship of Edward Wood, 
although primarily seeking to combine staff training for officers of medium rank and provide 
for a decrease in service expenditure, instead increased service expenditure on education and 
recognised the fundamental lesson of staff training in the First World War; namely, that a 
single course of instruction was inadequate to provide an officer with all the knowledge 
needed to undertake the full range of staff and command roles in their career. Over the course 
of the discussion surrounding the establishment of the IDC, the full extent of the divided 
opinion of senior army officers around training and the role and purpose of the Staff Colleges 
began to crystallise. Whilst Anderson, Romer and later Milne saw value in the IDC in 
providing training that the Staff Colleges could not, Cavan’s opposition to formalised training 
beyond that provided at cadet colleges and regimental depots and reliance on experience 
established oppositional attitudes which would persist throughout the interwar period. 
 
However, whilst the period up to 1923 was marked by the re-emergence of the discussion on 
the need for a Ministry of Defence and the recognition that existing service staff training did 
not provide officers with the necessary knowledge to undertake such joint planning, there 
 
345 See Chapter Five, pp. 150-153.  
346 R.H.B (Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Beadon, RASC), ‘The Staff College after the War,’ p. 33. 
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was still no institutional recognition that the structure of staff training, in the army at least, 
was equally in need of revision in light of wartime experiences. Indeed, as this and previous 
chapters have shown, such recognition only appeared in the pages of professional journals 
and via the pens of relatively junior officers. Whilst not affecting the structure of army staff 
training, the recognition by the CIGS in 1926 that the IDC was required as it was on a 
different level to existing staff training demonstrates some recognition within the highest 
levels of the War Office that there was scope for revision of existing practices. Ultimately, 
although the establishment of the IDC and the discussion surrounding it suggest a shift 
towards recognition of the need to reform staff training in light of the changed nature of 
modern continental war, it would fail to influence attitudes of a number of senior officers in 
the British Army, which rapidly fell back on pre-First World War understandings of the 
army’s role and failed to appreciate the fundamentally changed staff requirements of a 
modern war. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, such attitudes were aided by 
problems with the recruitment and retention of officers in the mid-1920s, which alongside the 
parochial attitudes of those officers failing to appreciate the changed nature of staff work, 




Chapter 4 – Changing Priorities: The Report on Higher Education for 
War, Recruitment Problems and Attitudes to Staff Training, 1925-1927 
 
 
Whilst there had been little in the way of formal discussion on the reform of staff training in 
the period immediately following the First World War, by the mid-1920s, the Staff College 
had begun to appear more frequently in debates and discussions of various aspects of military 
policy at the War Office. Alongside this, 1923 had seen the first formalised doctrine relating 
to the administration and organisation of the army in the field published as part of Field 
Service Regulations. Although there was a clear recognition of the importance of staff work 
in modern war, these discussions and doctrines did not result in subsequent reforms to staff 
training in light of the experiences of the First World War. Notwithstanding that these issues 
remained part of War Office discourse for the remainder of the 1920s, it became clear that 
from the middle of the decade, competing priorities began to take hold. At the policy level, 
the War Office was attempting to establish its role within the competing spheres of financial 
retrenchment versus increased imperial and European commitments.347 Internally, the British 
Army faced the doctrinal, technological and organisational reshaping of the army to codify 
the lessons of the recent war, whilst also facing stiff competition for manpower from the 
other services amid widespread antimilitarism within society.348 As this chapter will argue, 
by the mid-1920s, despite adopting a progressive attitude towards many of the issues facing it 
in this period (albeit limited in scope due to financial restrictions), the War Office failed to 
carry such progressive thinking into its dealings with officer training.      
 
Focussing primarily on the 1925 Plumer Committee, appointed to look into the promotion of 
officers in the army, and the 1925 Report on Higher Education for War, this chapter will 
highlight how, in the face of competition from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, the army 
fell back on an outdated view of the requirements of staff training. In doing so, they 
emphasised the need to establish the army as a more attractive career and examined the 
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training provided at the cadet colleges and ways to speed regimental promotion rates, but 
ultimately missed a clear opportunity to reform the system of staff training. This failure of 
reform was exacerbated by two features, the first of these being that in rejecting the reforms 
presented, the War Office was rejecting a training structure which had proven its utility in the 
First World War in favour of one which had been shown to have failed as early as 1915.349 
The second of these features was that in prioritising cadet training and adjustments to 
regimental promotion patterns over the reform of staff training, the army was moving away 
from the establishment of a progressive career pattern which was attracting officer cadets to 
the other services.350 In doing so, the navy and air force established themselves as forward 
thinking institutions providing practical skills and training which could be transferred to a 
myriad post-service careers. In contrast, the army appeared to emphasise an institutional 
mentality based upon the primacy of tradition and outmoded organisational structures. In 
examining these ideas, it will be demonstrated that the continuation of pre-existing 
uncertainty over the role of the Staff College, ulterior pressures focused on recruitment and 
retention of officers amid pressure from the other services and from civilian occupations, led 
to a hostile response from some in the War Office towards reform. It will be shown that 
elements within this response were co-ordinated by the Director of Staff Duties, Major-
General A.R. Cameron and led to the reversal of initial support from the CIGS, Field Marshal 
Lord Milne, resulting in a modified proposal which was abandoned after only a year of 
implementation.    
 
The Recruitment Problem 
 
As noted above, by the mid-1920s, among the many issues facing the British Army was a 
significant shortfall in the recruitment and retention of officers. Over the course of the 
interwar period this issue was to have a greater impact on attitudes to the reform of staff 
training than doctrinal, structural and technological changes. The responses of senior officers 
suggested an imperfect understanding of both the links between staff reform, the continued 
development of military professionalism and where the dissatisfaction with existing systems 
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of promotion and continued professional development was based. In addition, the continued  
spread of pacifist movements within the United Kingdom as a result of the casualties of the 
First World War may well have had an impact on public perceptions of the army.351 As 
Corelli Barnett argued, ‘the old, never really extinguished, conception of soldiering re-
asserted itself – a gentleman’s occupation that married well with social and sporting life in 
the countryside – smartness on parade and stiff regimental etiquette and custom.’352 This 
conception was indelibly linked to the belief that such men, ‘were as bloodthirsty as they 
were cretinous.’353 However, it must be remembered that such assertions, although made by 
commentators at the time, did not represent the complexities of the issue. Indeed, as Brian 
Bond has observed, many supposedly ‘anti-war’ writers, although desirous to avoid slaughter 
on the scale of the First World War, were not pacifist in any sense and many of their readers 
preferred positive tales of wartime duty and loyalty to those pressing directly pacifist 
messages.354 As a result, care should be taken in assigning significant influence to such 
tenuous assertions in the public mind. Of greater import in the struggle to recruit for the army 
was the relatively stultifying nature of regimental life when combined with long deployments 
abroad to the comparatively inhospitable climates of India and perceived imperial backwaters 
in the Middle East, with little chance of seeing operational service under ‘civilised’ 
conditions, such factors did little to raise excitement and intrigue in the minds of young men. 
 
By contrast, both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, retained far more positive images 
within the public mind. With their emphasis on the protection of Britain’s imperial sea lanes 
and the deterrent power of a large bomber force, both were able to market themselves as 
essentially defensive forces intent on securing British and imperial defence. Additionally, it 
has been noted that both were, ‘elite services which met their manpower requirements by 
their innate appeal.’355 The Royal Air Force posed a particular problem for the army as, 
whilst the Royal Navy and the Army had broadly delineated spheres of influence as regards 
 
351 For some examples of the development and spread of pacifist thought in this period see: Andrew Webster, 
‘The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of Nations' Pursuit of International 
Disarmament, 1920-1938,’ Contemporary European History, Vol. 14, No. 4, (2005), pp. 493-518; Martin 
Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) and Richard 
Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilisation, 1919-1939 (London: Penguin, 2009), pp. 175-
265. 
352 Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army (London: Allen Lane, 1970), p. 411. 
353 Bond, British Military Policy, p. 35. 
354 Bond, The Unquiet Western Front, pp. 28-34. 
355 Brian Bond & Williamson Murray, ‘The British Armed Forces, 1918-39,’ in Allan R. Millett & Williamson 
Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness Volume 2 The Interwar Period, New Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), p. 104. 
 116 
the public schools from which they recruited, the Royal Air Force began to compete for 
officer cadets in the same schools which had traditionally served as recruiting grounds for the 
army.356 When faced with the double blow of public perceptions of the army akin to those 
held in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and increased competition from services 
offering more glamourous and rewarding careers whilst also providing skills and training 
applicable to a future civilian life, the British Army faced a problem which would not be 
adequately resolved by 1939. Indeed, as will be seen in the following chapter, the issue of 
recruiting and retaining officers came to dominate staff conferences in the late 1920s and 
impacted on War Office attitudes towards the reform of staff training.    
 
In response to these problematic public attitudes, the War Office instituted a series of reports 
examining key aspects of the perceived problems.357 These examinations focused on the 
limited prospects of promotion within the regimental organisation, which was notoriously 
slow through the interwar period, often taking at least 12 years for a subaltern to achieve his 
captaincy, a situation which saw many young officers abandon their army careers for more 
lucrative employment in civilian roles.358 As will be shown in chapter six, the problem of 
slow promotion would likewise affect the army through to the late 1930s and was arguably 
never resolved before the outbreak of war in 1939. Whilst the Staff College remained the 
primary way to break out of the doldrums of regimental promotion,359 the limited number of 
places available each year meant that despite increasing numbers of officers applying, the 
vast majority remained wedded to a system of promotion by seniority which rewarded 
patience rather than initiative. It was this system which the 1925 Plumer committee intended 
to break, concluding that the system of promotion in the British Army, ‘does not ensure an 
officer of really outstanding merit rising more rapidly than those of inferior ability, and that 
in consequence there is a danger that such an officer may fail to reach the higher ranks at an 
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age when his services could be utilized to the best advantage of the State.’360 Although the 
full details of the committee’s examination of promotion falls outside the scope of this thesis, 
its comments on the Staff College and the memorandum submitted to the committee 
members by the Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley, Major-General Sir Edmund 
Ironside, would be instrumental in establishing the precedent for a future key reform 
proposal. 
 
The two sections of Plumer’s report dealing with staff training represented a reformist 
attitude towards staff training on the part of the committee members.361 They argued that staff 
appointments should be reduced to three years with periods of regimental duty in between to 
allow all staff officers the opportunity to qualify for command. Alongside this they suggested 
that the lower age limit for entry to the Staff College should be reduced from 35 to 30-32 and 
suggested there may be some advantage to splitting the existing course into a shorter junior 
course to be followed at a later point in an officer’s career by a course for those to be 
appointed to higher rank.362 These ideas would be echoed by Ironside in both his appendix to 
the Plumer committee report and his own independent report into higher education in the 
army and would later take effect in the reforms eventually enacted in 1938. Of interest to the 
central theme of this thesis is that despite offering up these recommendations, opinion 
amongst the members of the Plumer committee was divided to the extent that, as well as 
publishing a central report establishing key principles to be considered by the Army Council, 
each committee member attached comments on the report setting out why he did not 
subscribe to the scheme put forward.363 Whilst none of these statements specifically targeted 
the sections of the report focussed on the Staff College, their presence is indicative of a 
broader trend of disagreement within the British officer corps and the lack of a single 
institutional mindset for reforms in this period. 
 
In their response to Plumer’s proposals, a number of senior officers at the War Office 
expressed views which would continue to assert themselves in future discussions on staff 
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training reform. Both the Quartermaster General (QMG), Lieutenant-General Sir Walter 
Campbell and the Adjutant General (AG), Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Whigham364 argued 
that a change in the duration of staff appointments from four years to three would require 
great expense and inconvenience to those officers required to relocate. This was despite 
advocating a period of one-year regimental duty between staff postings which would 
presumably have resulted in a similar level of expense and inconvenience to the officer 
concerned.365 Whigham also believed that any changes to the duration of the Staff College 
course should be delayed until the policy regarding the institution of a joint Staff College, 
examined in chapter three, had been fully developed.366 Equally indecisive, whilst Campbell 
and Whigham expressed disagreement, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Lord 
Cavan and the Master General of the Ordinance (MGO), Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Birch, 
expressed broad agreement with Plumer and believed that the relevant War Office 
departments should be left to flesh out the proposals and a further committee should be 
avoided.367 Despite Birch’s pleading, the conclusions of the Plumer committee relating to the 
Staff College were then examined further in May 1925 by a committee under the Director of 
Staff Duties (DSD), Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Rice Cameron. This committee’s 
recommendations are of interest in that they broadly echo the proposal later put forward by 
Ironside in December 1925 in advocating the introduction of an advanced course for officers 
who had already obtained a p.s.c. from Camberley or Quetta with the aim of preparing 
officers for command and senior staff roles.368 In contrast, Cameron’s report differed 
substantially from Ironside’s appendix to the Plumer committee, which advocated a higher-
level War College aimed at training for higher level staff and command appointments in a 
combined college, primarily serving the Army and the Royal Air Force.369 Echoing the ideas 
proposed by the CID sub-committee on the formation of a joint Staff College, it is 
unsurprising that Ironside’s initial ideas were seen as repeating a policy already being worked 
on within the higher reaches of the army.   
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Ultimately, it was the objections of the Treasury which stymied Cameron’s committee. The 
Treasury representative at the War Office, Mr Millar, established a series of arguments 
against the financial requirements for Cameron’s proposed War College with the result that 
the Military Members of the Army Council decided that, ‘In view of the expense, £34,000 
per annum, of setting up the Advanced Course…the Military Members agreed to recommend 
that the present time was not suitable for entertaining this proposal.’370 With many of the 
officers involved in this decision, namely Cavan, Whigham, Campbell and Birch, having 
been lukewarm or openly opposed to the proposals originally put forward by Plumer, the 
extent to which the financial costs of the new course were decisive in the minds of senior 
officers is open to question. In particular, their assertion that, ‘they were totally opposed to 
any alteration or curtailment in the syllabus of instruction at the Staff College,’371 suggests it 
was the manner of the changes to which they objected. Indeed, whilst financial pressures 
have frequently been cited as underpinning British failure to reform in a number of areas, 
such arguments have been subject to recent revision and certainly with regards to staff 
training, beyond this example there is little evidence to suggest it was a feature.372 Alongside 
this, as noted in the preceding chapter, where financial objections were made regarding the 
establishment of the IDC these were swept aside and the proposed reforms were 
implemented.373 Equally, as will be demonstrated in both this and the following chapter, 
where financial assessments of reform proposals were put forward, they were shown to either 
have a negligible impact or were not referenced in the final assessment of the individual 
reform. 
 
As will be seen with the more in-depth responses given to Ironside’s proposals on this 
subject, it was primarily a lack of clear direction for future reform and understanding over the 
role of the Staff College in modern war which influenced the views of senior officers. In the 
CIGS and the AG, there were two personalities holding contradictory views of the need for 
development and reform. It has been noted of Cavan that he, ‘was so anxious to force the 
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pace of development…that in October 1922 he abolished cable communications in front of 
Corps headquarters except for the artillery.’374 Likewise, his tenure was based upon the desire 
to, ‘adjust the combined arms lessons of the First World War to the problems of mobile 
warfare.’375 Indeed, whilst tasked with overseeing the reduction of the army in line with the 
findings of the Geddes committee, Cavan was determined to ensure that, ‘the Army of to-
day…make[s] itself a harder hitting, quicker moving instrument for all its diminution in 
size.’376 In contrast to this, Whigham has already been shown to be an officer who, if not 
backward looking, was certainly opposed to any alteration in the methods of staff training. 
Indeed, as has been shown, the committee he sat on in 1919 advocated a return to pre-1914 
training methods, methods which had been shown by the war to produce an inadequate 
number of trained officers to meet the needs of an expanded wartime army.377 It was the 
presence of such diverse viewpoints among senior officers towards staff training rather than 
an overbearing, traditional, conservative core which served to retard the progress of staff 
reform. 
 
The Report on Higher Education for War 
 
Following these earlier proposals regarding potential structural reform to British staff 
training, in December 1925, Major-General Edmund Ironside, Commandant of the Staff 
College, Camberley, put forward a report on the higher education of the army for war. The 
impetus for the publication of this report came from the new Secretary of State for War, Sir 
Laming Worthington Evans, appointed in November 1925. 378 This continued pressure for 
structural reform of staff training in the British Army clearly suggests that there was at least 
institutional recognition that the system could be better, whether to serve the operational 
needs of the army or to ease pressure on sluggish regimental promotion. It has already been 
noted that the desire to build on the experiences of the First World War was also present in 
the pages of professional journals, similarly, with the resumption of General Staff 
Conferences between 1926 and 1933, issues with staff training were highlighted and 
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commented on by the CIGS.379 As has been demonstrated above and will be examined in 
greater detail below, it was not a lack of desire to reform the structure of staff training, but 
rather a lack of single direction among senior officers which ultimately stymied the proposals 
put forward in the various reports of this period, and would continue to prevent significant 
structural reforms to staff training until 1937. Indeed, whilst the proposals put forward by 
both Plumer and Cameron recognised and suggested a system broadly in line with that in 
place between 1914 and 1918, Ironside’s proposals went further in firmly establishing the 
link between operational failings and the need for structural change in staff training. Despite 
holding a number of high-profile commands throughout his career, Ironside had an uneasy 
relationship with the War Office, in part due to his close acquaintance with both J.F.C. Fuller 
and Basil Liddell Hart, and he continues to be the subject of ire amongst historians for his 
handling of the early months of the Second World War.380 Whilst by his own admission 
making an odd choice as CIGS,381 in matters of staff training, Ironside held views which, at 
the same time as remaining grounded in traditional emphasis on training for command, 
reflected the integration of the lessons of the First World War and built on a policy 
established earlier in 1925 by Lord Plumer and Cameron.  
 
He began by identifying that the structure of staff training established in the wake of the 
Second South African War failed to meet the needs of the ‘nation in arms’ of the First World 
War, arguing that, ‘After the South African War, the value of a good military education for 
Command and Staff was realised, and with the diminution in the number of Small Wars, the 
Staff Colleges became the only sure means of advancement in the Army…At the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1914, the number of these trained officers was strictly limited and wholly 
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insufficient for supplying the wants of the Command and Staff of the Army then being 
organised.’382 He also laid out his belief that, ‘The retention of the trained officers on the 
Staff, a wise precaution in the first instance, had been continued too long, with the result that 
the staff assumed an importance out of all proportion to what should have been the case… 
there arose a feeling that the Staff was being unduly favoured and…many officers were 
advanced to such Brevet rank that they were subsequently able to reach high Substantive rank 
without having exercised Command of any sort.’383 There was some justification for this 
view with a number of senior officers, including Ironside himself, spending much of their 
career serving on the General Staff and not undertaking opportunities for both company and 
battalion command through continuous service on the staff.384 For example, J.F.C. Fuller, 
after spending some time commanding small units in South Africa and with the Territorial 
Army in Britain, entered the Staff College, Camberley in 1912. He subsequently spent the 
period 1914-1929 in a variety of staff roles before turning down his next opportunity to 
command the troops of the Experimental Mechanised Force under the umbrella of 7 Brigade 
at Tidworth. Reasons for this rejection vary, but recent historiography has suggested that 
Fuller’s reluctance stemmed in part from his lack of command experience and fear of failure, 
preferring instead to continue his academic and theoretical pursuits in a staff billet.385 In 
addition, the belief that service on the staff effectively allowed an officer to circumvent the 
slow regimental promotion system, earn higher pay and gain more rapid promotion and the 
best billets hardened the attitude of many regimental soldiers towards the staff as noted by 
Ironside.386   
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After establishing these shortcomings, Ironside then took issue with the use of the term Staff 
College arguing that, ‘The Army as a whole is prone to regard them as teaching Staff duties 
to future Staff officers…the training given at the two Colleges is for Command and Staff and 
not for Staff alone.”387 As has been established both in earlier chapters of this thesis and 
within the broader historiography of the British Army in this period, this was not strictly the 
case, with many lamenting an over focus on strategic problems and training for command.388 
Examination of the Staff College syllabus would suggest that neither Ironside’s assertion, nor 
that expressed by its critics are completely accurate. The division of work across the courses 
was fairly even, with the junior year dealing with day-to-day staff duties at brigade or 
regimental level including: military writing, movements, A[dministrative] and 
M[iscellaneous].S[taff]. duties, night operations, defensive preparations, martial law, supply 
and transport and the organisation and administration of the various arms of the army.389 
Much like other aspects of staff training, this division over where the problems with the Staff 
College lay would combine with the established lack of clear direction over its role and 
purpose in preventing Ironside’s proposals from being examined in an impartial light. 
 
Together with these broad institutional issues, Ironside highlighted a lack of intellectual 
ability in many students. Undertaking an examination of students at the Staff College, 
Camberley during his period as Commandant, he noted that:  
 
First Year 
(i) All officers, with the exception of about 2%, are fitted for posting to a 3rd 
Grade appointment. The unfit 2% leave the Staff College at the end of the 
First Year. 
(ii) About 50% are obviously unfitted for anything but lower staff appointments… 
(iii) About 18% are doubtful cases. They are underdeveloped or otherwise difficult 
to judge. 
(iv) About 30% are obviously fitted for further training… 
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 124 
Second Year 
(i) The 50% labelled as unfit…fall further and further behind...Their presence in 
the second year, moreover, retards the better students…  
(ii) Of the doubtful 18% about 8% prove themselves… 
(iii) Of the remaining 30%, the best forge rapidly ahead…About 10% of the 
officers distinguish themselves above the others. 
 
At present, the p.s.c. certificate is given to 98% of those who enter the Staff College. 
There is no distinction as to quality...To the Army generally, all p.s.c. certificates are 
equal.390 
 
As with Ironside’s assertion regarding the problems with the pre-war system of staff training, 
his analysis of the student body would prove controversial to those commenting on his 
proposals and, as later chapters will argue, there was a similar lack of coherence in the beliefs 
of senior officers around the intellectual capabilities of students and the college and the 
degree to which this required addressing.391 Following this attack on the intellectual 
capabilities of the students attending the Staff College, Ironside proceeded to strike at the 
heart of the British Army’s regimental system and its distrust of the Staff College in noting a 
need to, ‘banish the ingrained British idea that continual presence with troops, chance 
participation in Small Wars, and exercise in games are the best training for high 
command.’392 This statement is not to suggest that Ironside decried the value of service with 
troops as his 1928 article on the modern staff officer shows, instead it pointed towards a more 
balanced career pattern taking in service in various branches of the staff coupled with regular 
service with troops as established in the body of his report.393 Such views had been and 
would continue to be expressed throughout this period, although not in such direct and 
provocative phrasing. 
 
Despite this, not all of Ironside’s assessments of staff training were as controversial. 
Continuing his earlier arguments supported by the Plumer committee and General Cameron 
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six months earlier, Ironside decried the existing age of graduation noting that, ‘The age of 
graduation (30-36) is a compromise. It is an age too high for an officer to be asked to take up 
the appointment of Staff Captain or GSO3. and yet all officers should commence their Staff 
services in the lowest grade appointments. In many cases, officers have already reached the 
substantive grade of Major and can hold such appointments only with loss of pay and time 
towards their pensions.’394 He also noted that the existing output of officers for both Staff 
Colleges for lower level appointments, ‘is…at a maximum, only 56 for both British and 
Indian Armies. As regards officers fit for the higher appointments…the Staff Colleges are 
turning out some 10 officers a year, and the judgement we make is made at much too low an 
age for it to be in any way a certain one.’395 Similar views were expressed by General 
Cameron in 1927 and have been highlighted by the historiography of the interwar British 
Army as a failing in its system of staff training in this period.396 As a result, unlike 
examinations of staff training prior to 1925, Ironside exposed and elucidated the 
shortcomings and failings of the British system of staff training. Previous examinations of 
staff training, generally failed to undertake a true critical analysis of the existing system of 
higher education and so missed opportunities to make fundamental structural changes.397  
 
The proposals put forward by Ironside sought to address the issues highlighted and differed 
only in small details from the ideas established by the Plumer committee and followed up by 
Cameron. In doing so, they not only reflected the lessons of the First World War, but 
crucially, were virtually identical to those reforms eventually enacted by the Army Council in 
1938.398 Ironside’s proposed system of higher education for the army centred on a curtailed 
one year Staff College course, to be followed by alternating periods of regimental and staff 
duty with a select few outstanding officers returned to Camberley to attend a ‘War Course’. 
The existing courses at Camberley and Quetta would be, ‘maintained for the purpose of 
training officers to take up 3rd Grade appointments on the Staff, Age of entry…27-30 years. 
Duration of course, 1 year. Entrance by Examination [sic.], 50% by competition, 50% by 
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nomination.’399 Alongside this, it was also proposed that, ‘the Staff College could 
accommodate 60 bachelors which together with 60 married officers would give a total of 120 
officers, 5 more than are at present at the Staff College.’400 These officers would be available 
to the army after one year and would be trained solely to fill lower-grade staff appointments. 
This course would be followed with alternating periods of regimental and staff duty across 
various branches coupled with, ‘a rigorous rejection of unfits with a view to having only the 
best officers as 2nd in Command and Lt. Colonel.’401 Between eight and ten years after 
attending the Staff College, around forty students selected via nomination would attend the 
new War College course focussed on, ‘training officers in the higher branches of the science 
of war, with a view to their taking up Brigade Commands or their equivalent and 1st Grade 
Staff appointments.’402 Ironside equally intended that the War College should be the path to 
the army’s senior ranks noting that, ‘The War College Certificate should entitle all possessors 
to the Bt. (Brevet) rank of Lt. Colonel. They will thus be placed definitely upon a list for 
promotion to General Officer.’403 The result of such a system would be an annual output of 
160 officers trained in all levels of staff work and command duties based on promotion by 
merit and theoretically preventing those not suitable for senior roles from reaching them.   
 
One casualty of this process was to be the Senior Officers’ School which according to 
Ironside had lost its original function of reporting on and preparing officers for regimental 
command and, ‘does not give results equivalent to its cost.’404 The Senior Officers’ School 
had initially been established at Aldershot in October 1916 on the orders of Sir Douglas Haig 
in order to overcome the problem of, ‘Majors and Senior Captains have[ing] little knowledge 
of the duties of a Commanding Officer.’405 Re-opening at Sheerness in 1920, the school 
continued to be subject to debate over its utility and its place within the broader spectrum of 
officer training.406 As will be shown below, much like the other aspects of Ironside’s 
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proposed reforms of officer education, the disagreement over the utility of the Senior 
Officers’ School played into wider responses to Ironside’s proposals.   
 
 
Responses to the Report 
 
Previous chapters have highlighted a range of responses to proposals and examinations of the 
need for reform of staff training in the British Army. It has been noted that whilst often 
differing on the details of individual reports and proposals there was generally broad 
agreement with the need to reform aspects of the British Army. Indeed, as part of a wider 
attitude of the need to adapt and innovate, this ties in well with the existing historiographical 
argument that it would be wrong to suggest that the army failed to appreciate the need to 
understand and apply the lessons of the First World War.407 Instead, it has been established 
that opinion within the officer corps was divided and that when it came to the Staff Colleges, 
a few unreceptive officers in influential positions were able to prevent the implementation of 
much needed reform and enforce their own ideas.  
 
Ironside’s own views on the production and reception of his report are as informative as those 
of the senior officers called to comment upon it. In late December 1925, Ironside noted in his 
diary that his report had been accepted by Worthington-Evans and that financial estimates 
were being prepared and locations for his proposed War College were being considered. He 
also noted that General Sir Walter Campbell (then Quartermaster General), ‘was flattering 
enough to say that he…was a great believer of my opinions…It shows how one person may 
effect a change if he has sufficient prestige to affect the people up above.’408 Consequently, 
the early signs regarding the reception of Ironside’s ideas were positive, albeit limited to the 
preparation of a financial estimate, assessing the suitability of locations and the comments of 
one of the senior military officers at the War Office. It is of interest to note that, despite such 
early positivity from Campbell, there is no surviving evidence to suggest that Campbell 
contributed to the discussion of Ironside’s proposal among the military members of the Army 
Council or the broader discussion between senior military personnel within the War Office 
and Home Commands.   
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Beyond this recollection of support from Campbell, Ironside’s proposals received broad 
support from his successor as Commandant of Camberley, Major-General Sir Charles 
Gwynn, who similarly believed that, ‘the instruction embodied in the Staff College course 
should be given in two periods separated by a term of years.’409 Notwithstanding a number of 
minor differences, principally the location of the two courses, the inclusion of Administrative 
Staff officers on the War Course and the age of the officers attending, Gwynn’s 
memorandum, represented the high-point of acceptance of these ideas within the senior ranks 
of the War Office. Besides that of Gwynn, Ironside’s proposal also received early support 
from the CIGS Lord Milne. In a note to the DSD, Milne sets forward his views on the 
potential future structure of staff training which was virtually identical to that put forward by 
Ironside in his Report on Higher Education for War.410 Despite this early support, it was a 
campaign orchestrated by DSD, Major-General Cameron (who had previously put forward a 
proposal to reform the Staff College and had it rejected on financial grounds), which would 
influence the outcome and result in the implementation of an ultimately ineffective alteration 
which was abandoned after only a year. Much of the heaviest criticism came from two 
officers whose conservative tendencies have already been identified. These were the GOC-in-
C Eastern Command, General Sir Walter Braithwaite and the Adjutant General, General Sir 
Robert Whigham. As chairman and member of the 1919 Braithwaite committee, these two 
officers had already established themselves as being against significant structural reform of 
staff training and were unlikely to reverse their position in light of comments made by a 
relatively junior General officer. As with all of the examples cited within this thesis, whilst it 
is clear that there was a significant body of opinion within the British officer corps opposing 
the various reform proposals, it was characterised by a lack of cohesion. As will be 
demonstrated below, alongside those officers such as Braithwaite and Whigham who 
opposed reforms, there were those who recognised that reform was needed, but were unsure 
of the best manner to implement change. Whilst the reforms proposed remained broadly 
consistent throughout the interwar period, they represented a minority opinion within a much 
broader sea of indecision. 
 
As noted above, whilst the individual views of the officers concerned are of interest in 
demonstrating the incoherent response of senior officers towards the reform of staff training, 
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it was the attempted co-ordination of these responses by a senior officer at the War Office 
which is of greatest interest. Attaching his own highly critical assessment of Ironside’s 
scheme to the papers sent to senior officers, Cameron requested that, ‘when considering 
Ironside’s proposals will you take into consideration that he may take an unduly severe view 
of the proportion of officers fitted to undergo the second year of the course, as he has been 
dealing with officers still suffering from the abnormal state of the Army since the war.’411 It 
is unclear whether Cameron’s critical response stemmed from the earlier rejection of his own 
similar proposals nine months earlier; however, certain of his criticisms point to an 
unfounded hostility towards Ironside’s ideas.412 The clearest example pertains to his 
assessment of the number of officers graduating versus annual staff requirements. Cameron 
initially noted that the existing system training 72 officers per annum was not perfect yet, 
‘carried us through the late war, though naturally inadequate to meet the enormous expansion 
of our armed forces.’413 His comment that Ironside’s scheme, which proposed training 
annually 110 officers for junior staff posts and 45 for senior staff and command, was that this 
would be, ‘only sufficient to meet the claims of our Regular Army.’414 Despite this seemingly 
critical analysis, after setting out his own views and restating the plan proposed early in 1925, 
Cameron noted that: 
 
The result would be that instead of at present turning out 72 officers per annum 
trained for two years and nominally fitted to rise in course of time to 1st grade 
appointments, and at the same time filling 41 per cent of Junior staff appointments by 
officers who have not been through the Staff College; we should turn out 110 officers 
per annum trained for one year and fitted for junior staff appointments only, and we 
should fill all staff appointments by officers who have done one year’s course, but we 
should turn out only 44 officers per annum trained to hold Colonels’ appointments, 
and Command and Staff appointments above that.415  
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It seems apparent that at a fundamental level, despite broad agreement with the principles of 
Ironside’s proposals, Cameron’s key criticism of the report and the reforms contained within 
were that they were not his own. Much of the criticism centred on traditional understandings 
of the role of professional education for officers within the British Army. General Walter 
Braithwaite, alongside disagreeing with the whole prospect of compulsory military education, 
set out that he believed Ironside did not understand the role of the Staff College, suggesting 
that its value was, ‘(a) To get into the way of concentrating on work. (b) To learn how to 
work and what to work to. (c) To learn how to read with understanding…In fact the true 
value of a Staff College course is not so much to learn what you do learn…as to be put in the 
way of continuing your own education.’416 In a similar vein, the Adjutant General Sir Robert 
Whigham emphasised the importance of training for officers within the regiment as opposed 
to professional education at an external school or college. He argued that, ‘the sooner we get 
all regimental commanders, Brigade Commanders, Divisional Commanders and their Staffs, 
as well as the Staffs of Commands, to realise to the full their responsibilities for the training 
of the regimental officer the better…With the necessary guidance from the Army Council in 
general and your department [General Staff] in particular there should be no difficulty in 
establishing a general body of teaching based on sound principles.’417 Such attitudes would 
initially appear to corroborate the argument that the British Army continued to foster an anti-
intellectual spirit.418 However, this is not the case. Indeed, neither is suggesting that officers 
did not require post-commission training, but instead that such training should encourage the 
desire to learn and that such learning should take place both in central educational 
institutions, but also within the bounds of the regimental system. On this basis, tying into the 
central theme of this thesis in that fundamental attitudes underpinned the failure to reform 
staff training across this period, it was not an aversion to education, but instead almost a 
pedagogical debate over the role, scope and requirements of officer education and training. 
 
In addition to this pedagogical disagreement, the three officers mentioned so far, alongside 
the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I), at this time Major General Sir 
John Burnett-Stuart, were also influenced in their attitudes by the belief that the 
acknowledged dip in quality of Staff College students and graduates was the result of high 
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junior officer casualties in the First World War.419 Burnett-Stuart’s note to Cameron provides 
the best summation of this view as being that, ‘the majority of the best officers who would 
have gone to the Staff College in the last few years were killed in the war. In time the 
standard will recover.’420 In putting forward this view, the CIGS went further, writing that, 
‘owing to the fact that the most promising young officers were killed during the War, the 
standard of education at the Staff College since the War may [has was deleted] be[en] 
[decidedly] below the average. I think this to a great extent accounts for the rather scathing 
criticisms on some of the officers. Again our standards may be higher.’421 As has been 
alluded to above and will be shown in the following chapter, such an attitude belied the 
reality of the recruiting situation for the army, the facts of which these officers should have 
been well aware. Such attitudes suggest an attitude towards officer higher education which 
goes beyond the argument set out by both this thesis and recent works that reticence for staff 
reform stemmed from a lack of understanding over the role of the Staff College.422 Indeed, 
whilst the lack of agreement over the role of the Staff College does play a role in the 
prevention of reforms, it was the sheer range of competing factors and attitudes held by 
senior officers which would ultimately result in a lack of decisive reform. 
 
Together with the belief that the dip in quality noted by Ironside was a temporary 
manifestation as a result of high officer casualties during the war was the belief that the 
recently announced establishment of the IDC would fill the educational void which existed in 
the peacetime army.423 With the purpose of this new institution being based on the provision 
of tri-service training for future senior commanders and staff, such an attitude represented 
either a failure to understand its purpose, or failure to recognise the changed nature of staff 
work in a modern, European conflict with its emphasis on the need for larger numbers of 
officers trained in lower-level staff duties. Similarly reflected in the gamut of alternative 
views of staff reform was the belief that any reduction to the existing two-year course at the 
Staff College could mean that, ‘great attention would no doubt be given to the technique of 
 
419 Cameron to Braithwaite and Whigham, 11 March 1926, Braithwaite to Cameron, 22 March 1926, Whigham 
to Cameron, 22 March 1926 & Major General Sir John Burnett-Stuart to Cameron, 11 March 1926. TNA WO 
32/4840. 
420 Burnett-Stuart to Cameron, 11 March 1926. Ibid. 
421 Milne to Creedy, 9 April 1926. TNA WO 32/4840. 
422 For the most recent iteration of this view see Douglas Delaney, ‘The Eighth Army at the Gothic Line, 
August-September 1944: A Study in Staff Compatibility and Coalition Command,’ War in History, Vol. 27, No. 
2, April 2020, p. 301. 
423 Whigham to Milne, 31 March 1926. TNA WO 32/4840. 
 132 
Staff Duties [sic.] but the spirit might be lost.’424 With no additional explanation of what the 
spirit of staff duties was, it is impossible to establish what Whigham was trying to establish 
(beyond a rejection of the reduction in course length). It may imply that staff officers were 
required to share a similar esprit de corps external to their regiment. However, this is 
speculation. In a similarly nebulous vein, Burnett-Stuart harked back to earlier ideas of 
officership suggesting that regardless of education, ‘the capacity to command is inherent – 
any trained officer can command if he has “character”. If he has not “character”, however 
well trained he is he will never command.’425 Such attitudes were less about failing to agree 
on a role for the Staff College and based more in nineteenth-century attitudes towards 
command and elements of the gentleman amateur citing unquantifiable criteria in their 
discussions of learning and reform instead of strategic and operational realities.  
 
Again, moving beyond the narrative that failure to reform was simply a case of not defining a 
clear role for the Staff College in this period, both Burnett-Stuart and Milne referenced 
arguments relating to the difficulties experienced in the recruitment and retention of officers. 
Burnett-Stuart suggested that, ‘all these changes are disturbing to the Army and only 
justifiable if there is some very obvious advantage to be gained; I cannot help thinking that 
this change would be looked on by the average officer as a high-brow scheme to mess people 
about.’426 Emphasising a similarly disruptive argument, Milne argued that requiring officers 
to return to Camberley for a second course, ‘would cause a domestic upheaval in the Army, 
quite out of proportion to the advantages to be gained. Officers could hardly be expected to 
settle down at Camberley with their families twice within eight years and I am 
afraid…attendance at the Staff College would become very unpopular.’427 For this reason, it 
is clear that concerns over the already disruptive career pattern of the army officer and the 
historic perceived division between the ‘average’ or regimental officer and the staff also 
contributed to the disruption of reform efforts in this period. 
 
Additionally, there was also a body of opinion in the higher ranks of the War Office that 
accepted the need for change, disagreed with the proposals put forwards and failed to 
enunciate clear views on how to effect change. These officers included the commander of 1st 
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Division Lieutenant-General Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd (who would later become 
Adjutant-General in 1931 and CIGS in 1933), Director of Military Training (DMT), General 
Hon. Sir Francis Gathorne-Hardy, and the Master General of Ordinance (MGO) Lieutenant-
General Sir Noel Birch. The general attitude amongst this group off officers is best 
summarised by Montgomery-Massingberd: ‘I think it may be admitted that in the average 
class…there are a considerable number of officers who are not likely to rise above the lower 
staff appointments…I do not know whether there is any way of preventing these officers 
from getting into the Staff College…It must also be admitted that we have not got enough 
Staff Officers for our needs in peace and certainly not for expansion in war.’428 These points 
would be examined in greater detail between 1927 and 1931 and are covered in the following 
chapter.429 For now it is sufficient to note that three senior officers, seemingly well aware of 
the extant problems with the army’s system of staff training, failed either to support or 
condemn proposed reforms thus contributing indecision to the milieu of attitudes surrounding 
their examination.   
 
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that clashing personalities further complicated War 
Office attitudes towards Ironside’s proposed reforms. In his response to the Permanent  
Under-Secretary, Sir Herbert Creedy, Milne noted that, ‘unfortunately General Ironside, in 
his paper has not confined himself to dealing with the Staff College, but has rather wandered 
all over the question of education and employment of senior officers and on some of these 
points I am not prepared to attach very great value to his opinion.’430 He followed this up, 
referencing the Senior Officers’ School, noting that, ‘as regards the Senior Officers’ School. I 
am rather afraid that General Ironside knows nothing about it and, therefore, he is in no way 
qualified to express an opinion either on the necessity for the School or for the work done at 
the School.’431 There are multiple explanations for this attitude reflecting psychological 
interpretations of leadership, the structure of the British Army and the various personal 
animosities present within it. Norman Dixon offers a psychoanalytical explanation of the 
more personal elements of Milne’s critique. He notes that, ‘military leaders 
like…Milne…displayed behaviour symptomatic of extremely weak egos…[leading to a] 
devouring urge for power and positions of dominance.’432 Following Nixon’s argument, 
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Milne’s response to Ironside’s criticism of the military education system, of which Milne had 
just become the head, represented a desire to confirm his dominance as Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff over the criticism of a subordinate. Such analysis perhaps overcomplicates the 
hierarchical nature of the British Army with its top-down approach to command and 
control.433 However, the tone of Milne’s assertion that he did not attach great value to 
Ironside’s opinion on certain matters suggests that this response came in part from the uneasy 
personal relationship which Ironside had with Milne. There is precedence for such attitudes 
to play a role in the formation of military policy and the adaptation of reforms. 434 
Furthermore, Ironside himself had a turbulent relationship with his seniors. He closely 
associated with both Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller, the latter appointed as Senior Instructor at 
the Staff College by Ironside with, ‘free reign…to transform the Staff College.’435 This 
association led to a rebuke from Milne suggesting that there would have been little sympathy 
for Ironside’s ideas should they be anything less than perfect.436 That this ill-feeling was 
significant is suggested by the fact that thirteen years later, during a discussion on the lack of 
war preparedness in 1939, Ironside, ‘pointed to the portraits of Milne and Montgomery-
Massingberd…and burst out: “Those are the two men who ought to be shot.”’437  
 
Therefore, it can be seen that there were a number of additional factors affecting the decision-
making process within the War Office, highlighting issues far beyond the idea that there was 
simply a lack of understanding over the role of the Staff College. The overwhelming focus 
appeared to be on the belief that the declining quality of officers training at the Staff College 
was purely temporary and the result of excessive junior officer casualties in the First World 
War and that any significant alterations would prove disruptive to an officer’s domestic life 
and be perceived as an intellectual exercise with little practical benefit. The extent to which 
each individual factor influenced the lack of progress in reforming the structure of British 
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Army staff training in the context of the Report on Higher Education for War is impossible to 
definitively state. However, given Milne’s initial support their general impact is clear.  
 
Milne’s Alternative Proposal 
 
Despite his early enthusiasm for Ironside’s proposals, by April 1926 Milne had performed a 
complete volte face in response to the numerous challenges put forward by the Military 
Members of the Army Council and other senior officers. Instead, Milne put forward a three-
point plan which suggested very little change to the existing system of training. Milne stated 
that: 
 
After careful consideration of the whole of the facts, with both General Ironside and 
General Gwynn, I have arrived at the following conclusion:  
 
(i) The Staff College to be retained at present with a two years’ course. 
(ii) At the end of the first year such students as are not up to standard 
intellectually to return to their Regiments. 
(iii) During the second year the remainder to be divided into two classes. In Class I 
will be the 30% mentioned by General Ironside as obviously fitted for further higher 
training owing to their character, industry and ability. In Class II will be the 
remainder who, as they do not come up to the standard of ability of Class I, will be all 
the better staff officers for a further year’s training. By dividing the second division 
into two classes the possibility of really good students being held back by those who 
are not of the same mental calibre will be avoided.438  
 
This plan was approved by Creedy on the 23rd April 1926 and was to come into force in 
January 1927 with the details being sent to Major-General Gwynn at the end of May.439 Prior 
to this report it was, in theory, standard practice to send those who had failed their first year 
(in Milne’s parlance those not up to the intellectual standard) back to their units. 
Additionally, the grading system in use at the Staff College and recorded on students’ final 
reports by the commandant effectively served the purpose of Milne’s division into Class I 
and II. What Milne proposed was the maintenance of the status quo with certain very minor 
 
438 Milne to Creedy, 9 April 1926, TNA WO 32/4840. 
439 Cameron to Major-General Gwynn, 28 May 1926. Ibid. 
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tweaks in the techniques of reporting on an officer’s suitability for high rank. Indeed, the 
division into two classes aimed to fulfil the same function as Ironside’s alterations with Class 
I students intended to deal with large strategic or administrative problems and Class II to be 
good divisional staff officers.440 This was the very definition of a compromise solution in that 
it paid lip service to the desire to ensure that those officers graduating from the Staff College 
were of the requisite quality whilst not requiring any substantive change to the system of staff 
training. It is unsurprising that this scheme was not greeted with enthusiasm by Major-
General Gwynn.  
 
In his report of the first iteration of Milne’s scheme, Gwynn highlighted a number of 
practical and morale difficulties with the division of the Senior Division of the Staff College 
into two class groups. At the practical level, Gwynn noted that it was impossible to make 
decisions on officer classification prior to the end of the first term of the second year on the 
basis of differing levels of work, new instructors and the fact that different officers developed 
at different speeds and with differing capabilities.441 From a morale perspective, Gwynn 
noted that whilst not a factor in the year under examination, the splitting of the Senior 
Division into two classes had the potential to exacerbate petty jealousies and result in the 
exceptional students developing, ‘swollen heads.’442 He concluded by citing the benefits 
gained by working with officers of different abilities and capabilities and that the rigid 
segregation required by Milne’s scheme was impracticable and inadvisable to the service due 
to its impact on morale. He also recommended that no future segregation of the Senior 
Division should be attempted, and that classification of an officer should only occur when 
students had completed the course of instruction.443 As a result, the scheme proposed by 
Milne was dropped and the course of instruction at the Staff College reverted back to that 
which had been in place since its formation in the 1850s. This series of reports, memoranda 
and meetings represented the clearest opportunity since the ending of the First World War to 
take stock of a system of staff training which had been found wanting and had required 
significant changes in order to continue to provide the British Army with significantly greater 
numbers of trained staff officers. That Ironside’s proposals emphasised the requirement for 
higher level training reflected the continued dominance of the belief that it was the training of 
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commanders which should be prioritised whilst the provision for training over one hundred 
officers per annum for junior staff posts reflected the hard-won lessons of the war.  
 
Whilst the period up to 1925 saw a number of articles published in professional journals 
dealing with issues of staff training, between 1925 and 1927 only one article appeared in 
Army Quarterly which put forward ideas for a new Junior Staff College. Written by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sherbrooke, the article explicitly links back to the wartime staff training 
schools and argues that the two important lessons to take from the war were that it was vital 
to ensure co-operation between all arms and that the provision of junior staff officers in 
peacetime needed to be adequate to cope with similar wartime expansion.444 Echoing 
concerns expressed by the War Office over the attractiveness of the army as a career, 
Sherbrooke suggested that an officer failing to gain one of the limited places at Camberley 
faced twenty years of routine regimental duties which, ‘to the keen and ambitious man…is a 
disturbing thought.’445 To this end, pointing to similar examples in Italy, the United States 
and France, he proposed the establishment of a course for around two hundred officers (80% 
to come from the army, 20% from the Royal Air Force), lasting for one year with those 
obtaining higher marks being allocated nominated vacancies at the Staff College. In line with 
broader trends of thought within the army, Sherbrooke saw the Staff College as providing 
higher level staff training, fitting an officer for senior staff and command posts with little 
provision made for training officers in junior staff duties. His proposed course would serve as 
the peacetime equivalent of the Junior Staff courses established during the First World War 
and shut down in 1918.446 Although approaching staff reform from a bottom-up perspective 
when compared to Ironside’s emphasis on a War College for higher level training, the 
intention was broadly the same: to split the existing staff course into a junior and a senior 
element and to ensure that a greater number of junior staff officers were trained in peacetime. 
Much like earlier articles dealing with the Staff College, Sherbrooke’s demonstrates a single 
attitude towards the need to reform the system of staff training and shows an emphasis on 
ensuring that the lessons of the First World War were not forgotten.  
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Equally present within Milne’s assessment of Ironside’s proposals, was a belief that 
regardless of the capabilities of an individual officer, all would derive some benefit from their 
Staff College education. In November 1926, Cameron highlighted the cases of two officers 
who, after receiving indifferent final reports on their time at Camberley, had received highly 
unfavourable reports from their first staff appointments.447 Cameron requested clarification 
over what the Army Council’s policy was to be in future regarding officers who continued to 
receive adverse reports after theoretically having passed Staff College. Arguing that those 
who complete the course but are found unfit for staff duties being award the coveted p.s.c., he 
suggested that: 
 
(i) The officer has been through the full two years course at the Staff College and 
must have benefited by the instruction he has received. 
(ii) The effect of refusing a p.s.c. is not to leave the officer exactly as if he had never 
been up for the Staff College. Whatever may be the intention of the War Office, 
the actual result will be to leave the officer with a stigma against him and in a 
worse position that if he had never been up. 
 
The officer may have had consistently good reports, have worked very hard to     
obtain an entry, and found himself adversely affected professionally for his 
efforts.448  
 
The implication in Cameron’s memorandum was that it was more important to protect the 
future careers of officers found wanting after their time at the Staff College, than to maintain 
the efficiency of the British Army staff. Such an attitude played into the broader problems 
faced by the army in the recruitment and retention of personnel in this period and gives a 
further boost to the importance of this issue in the minds of the War Office when considering 
potential reform proposals. To Milne’s credit, he dismissed such concerns by noting that all 
officers deemed unsuitable for staff roles should not be allowed to proceed into the second 
year of the course and emphatically states that they, ‘cannot allow the standard of p.s.c. to be 
reduced to a farce.’449 In a similar manner to Milne’s alterations in the wake of the Report on 
 
447 The two officers concerned were Captain B.M. Ward, Kings Dragoon Guards and Captain A.L. Elsworthy, 
Royal Scots Fusiliers. Lieutenant-General Cameron to Field Marshal Milne, 2 November 1926. TNA WO 
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Higher Education for War, the alterations developed between November 1927 and February 
1928, represented more of an administrative change than a real development. They confirmed 
that, whilst still seeing and initialling their final confidential report from the Staff College, 
graduating students would not see their final classification or their recommended branch of 
the staff.450 As with the attitude taken towards the Report on Higher Education for War, the 
approach to this problem represented something of a ‘softly softly’ approach to staff reform 
on the part of the War Office, owing more to concerns about morale and career progression 




As has been demonstrated across the proceeding chapters, the early interwar period was 
characterised by multiple opportunities to enact reforms of staff training. Whilst earlier 
opportunities were not as clear cut as that presented by both the Plumer committee and 
Major-General Ironside’s Report on Higher Education for War, a pattern emerges of 
discussions beset by uncertainty and inconsistency of approach.  Likewise, with the 
advancement of the members of the Braithwaite committee of 1919 to senior roles at the War 
Office and on the Army Council, it would appear that the attitudes held by the authors of its 
report became de-facto army policy in the second half of the 1920s. The role played by the 
Director of Staff Duties in attempting to co-ordinate the responses of senior War Office 
officers suggests a conspiracy of sorts and an aversion to educational reform. However, as 
has been shown, the reality is more complex than both this and the generally held assumption 
that it was a lack of consensus over the role of the Staff College that held back efforts at 
reform. Though conservatism held some sway over examinations of staff training, by 1926 it 
is evident that the sheer volume of competing priorities thrust upon army decision makers 
was paralysing efforts to reform this fundamental area of the army. As noted above, a number 
of senior officers recognised a need for change but failed to discern what form that change 
should take. Others were hampered by the pressure to improve the career prospects and 
conditions of service for officers and felt that any significant alteration would prove too 
disruptive to be worthwhile.   
 
 
450 For the discussion surrounding this see letters between Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter (then 
DSD at the War Office) and the Colonel Jackson of the Director of Military Training Department, Indian 
General Staff between 9 November 1927 and 9 February 1928. TNA WO 32/3102. 
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Moreover, as has been demonstrated, this paralysis of decision-making was primarily present 
within the War Office as in the pages of professional journals junior officers (and indeed 
some more senior officers such as Ironside) continued to put forward the case for investment 
in and reform of the British Army’s system of staff training. Largely fuelled by their 
experiences of service on the Western Front, these officers recognised the changes that had 
overtaken staff work over the course of the war and in Ironside’s proposals the War Office 
was presented with a codified and actionable set of reforms based on these experiences. As 
will be seen in chapter six, similar plans were enacted in 1938 as part of a broader effort at 
military reform faced with the looming threat of war and so the failure to enact these reforms 
in 1926 represents a significant missed opportunity on the part of the War Office. As the 
following chapter will show, issues surrounding the Staff College continued to be examined 
at Whitehall, but the drastic changes implied by the experiences of 1914-18 were not raised 
again. Instead, the War Office would attempt to overcome the supposedly temporary drop in 
quality of officers attending the college without having resolved the more fundamental 





Chapter 5 – The Reform of Staff College Entry, 1927-1931 
 
 
As has been shown across the previous chapters, between 1918 and 1926, the British Army 
missed multiple opportunities to reform the structure of staff training along the lines of its 
experiences during the First World War. It did so primarily due to the sheer multiplicity of 
attitudes, views and lack of consensus present in those called to discuss the proposed reforms. 
Some of the attitudes expressed during these discussions harked back to long-standing 
cultural beliefs around the role and desired characteristics of an army officer, whilst others 
simply represented uncertainty over the best way to proceed. Similar problematic approaches 
to reform are present in the discussions examined in this chapter relating to the alteration of 
the system of entry to the Staff College. In this context, the focus of these arguments would 
be on the desirability of allowing an increasing proportion of competitive vacancies to go to 
officers of technical arms, rather than the fighting arms and the relative proportion of 
nominated to competitive vacancies. Implicit within these discussions were links to broader 
requirements to improve the attractiveness of the army as a career and the difficulties 
associated with the regimental system and attempts to disseminate a single doctrine and 
system of organisation across the army as a whole.  
 
As with previous attempts to reform aspects of Staff College training in the early 1920s, it 
will be demonstrated that the sheer multiplicity of views and attitudes expressed by senior 
officers muddied the waters to the extent that no clear direction for reform could be 
discerned, despite widespread recognition that reform was required. Furthermore, as with 
earlier examinations of reform, many of the views expressed linked back to long-standing 
perceptions of leadership and the requirements of an officer, rather than taking account of the 
fundamentally changed requirements of staff work as highlighted in the opening chapter of 
this thesis. Alongside this, it will challenge certain prevailing orthodoxies within the 
historiography regarding the utility of nomination as a key element in the allocation of 
vacancies to the Staff College. Furthermore, historians of the British Army in this period, 
notably Edward Smalley, have suggested that nomination allowed below-par officers to 
access Staff College education and thus is held up as a key failing of staff training, this 
chapter will show that, whilst certainly allowing officers who struggled with the demanding 
examination access to the Staff College, the army’s commitment to nomination was not the 
cause of the declining quality of staff officer trained in this period. Instead, focus will be 
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shifted to the combination of views and differing attitudes which ultimately stymied efforts to 
reform the structure of staff training in the British Army throughout the 1920s, despite 
widespread recognition of the need for change and the continued desire to adopt the lessons 
of the First World War.  
 
The Process of Staff College Entry 
 
In the early years of the Staff College, admission was purely through success in competitive 
examinations. However, as a result of an 1880 War Office committee on entry to the Staff 
College, by the turn of the century there were two ways to gain entry to Camberley (and from 
1905 Quetta): either through obtaining a competitive vacancy or through nomination to a 
place, both of which required the passing of the Staff College entrance examination.451 The 
examinations were held once a year, primarily in London and Delhi, with officers posted to 
more isolated points of the empire able to compete locally under centrally established 
conditions.452 For the period covered by this thesis, the examination was divided into two 
sections (obligatory and voluntary subjects) and tested the skills deemed necessary to succeed 
as a staff officer. Those subjects rated as obligatory were: Training for War (divided into four 
papers), Organisation and Administration (across two papers) and Imperial Organisation (also 
two papers). The optional subjects included a wide variety of languages, physics, chemistry, 
political economy and the history of British India.453 This division of subjects, with its 
emphasis on training and organisation, was itself the result of a process of steady and 
consistent reform since the establishment of the Staff College, with differing emphasis being 
laid on those subjects considered obligatory. As with many British Army reforms in this 
period, those that occurred generally reflected the results of lessons learned over the course of 
the Second South African War, but also reflected lessons gained from contemporary 
European conflicts. In May 1870, the Civil Service Commissioners, responsible for Staff 
College entrance examinations, decreed the following to serve as the syllabus for future 
examinations: ‘Fortification, field engineering, and road making; Artillery; military drawing, 
field sketching and surveying; reconnaissance; military art (strategy), history and geography; 
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practical military telegraphy and signalling; military administration and law; Either French, 
German or Hindustani; Riding.’454 These changes largely obviated the emphasis on 
Mathematics, chemistry, geology and natural philosophy which had formed part of the 
original college examination.455 Similar alterations took place in 1886 as a result of a 
committee under General Clive and shifted the emphasis further away from overly scientific 
subjects and more towards making the entrance exam more reflective of the requirements of 
military efficiency.456 Similar alterations were made to the final examinations demonstrating 
a marked shift towards the provision of a more practical staff education in this period.457 As 
will be shown below, although further alterations were made to the Staff College entrance 
examination during the 1920s, these changes arguably reflected the desire of senior officers 
to prevent the growing dominance of technical arm officers at the colleges, rather than 
reflecting a continued effort to apply the changing nature of war to the Staff College 
examination.     
 
Whilst the examination was weighted to favour the obligatory subjects, the inclusion of a 
wide range of optional subjects served to recognise that, ‘every branch of military science 
and organization…will continue to become, infinitely more complex than in the 
past…officers should be encouraged to extend their knowledge to cover the widest possible 
field.’458 This opinion, expressed by the examiners in 1921, stands as further evidence that in 
the immediate aftermath of the First World War, there was a recognition within the army that 
the experience of that conflict had fundamentally changed the nature of military staff work 
and the proliferation of experience that was now required. The evolution in the Staff College 
examination principally came from the updating of questions within all subjects and the 
occasional modifications to the list of optional subjects. Ultimately, as will be demonstrated 
below, this allowed senior officers within the War Office, specifically the Director of Staff 
Duties (DSD) and his department, to retain some control over the prospects for each arm by 
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adding or removing subjects from the examination. The manner in which officers prepared 
themselves for the examinations varied significantly. The War Office published yearly 
reports on the previous year’s examinations, including the notes of the examiners and 
examples of questions which were available to those officers studying for the examination.459  
Additionally there was the possibility of making use of the knowledge of officers within the 
regiment who had attempted the examination and those p.s.c. officers who had returned for 
their regimental tours. Despite this, many officers resorted to the use of a ‘crammer’ to aid 
their preparations. These men provided officers with a short, intense period of instruction 
prior to their sitting the examination, with the aim of imparting the knowledge required to be 
successful. The usefulness of such men was considered suspect, A.R. Goodwin-Austin stated 
that they, ‘waste a pupil’s time and money…dictating notes compiled from publications 
easily available to him…fully aware that if a candidate fails…he may return a second or third 
time to try again.’460  
 
The alternative method of obtaining a place at the Staff College was through the process of 
nomination by a panel of senior officers. In order to be eligible for nomination, an officer 
also had to have achieved the minimum pass mark on the competitive examination. In the 
immediate aftermath of the First World War, its purpose had been to enable, ‘distinguished 
field officers to supplement their battlefield experience with formal, theoretical training in 
staff matters.’461 However, its secondary purpose (and that which assumed greater importance 
through the 1920s) was to allow those who fared relatively poorly in the examination, but 
were felt to be particularly deserving of a place on the staff, due to their dedication and 
performance in their regimental duties, to obtain a vacancy. Recent historiography has been 
highly critical of the British Army’s process of nomination to the Staff College. Edward 
Smalley argued that, ‘The initially sound use of nominations to utilise Great War talent 
reduced in value…until it reached the point of undermining the credibility of the Staff 
College.’462 The same article condemned the senior officers’ belief in their own judgement 
and suggests that a reliance on nominations to fill any vacancy at the Staff College was 
detrimental to the overall output of the college. As will be demonstrated below, this analysis 
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of the methods of entry to the Staff College is inaccurate. However with the remainder of 
studies of staff training simply noting the arduous nature of the process of entry to the Staff 
College, it serves as the only critical examination of the outcome of this process on the 
quality of staff officer completing staff training in this period.463 As with other examples of 
staff reform examined by this thesis, a deeper mining of the source material related to the 
Staff College competitive examination in the late 1920s reveals a more complex picture of 
attitudes and beliefs acting upon them than has previously been accounted for. 
 
Concerns Over the Staff College Examination 
 
Concern among senior officers over the utility of the existing system of entry to the Staff 
College was triggered in part by statistics derived from an analysis of entrance examination 
failure rates between 1923 and 1926. Across this period, there was an average failure rate of 
fifty-nine percent, a staggering figure given that these officers supposedly represented the 
brightest and best junior officers in the army. 464 When these figures are examined by arm it 
becomes even more evident that something was amiss with the system of selection. The teeth 
arms (the Infantry and Cavalry) were consistently the poorest performing, with the Cavalry 
having an average failure rate across the four years of sixty-seven percent and the Infantry 
sixty-five. By contrast, the more technical arms (the Royal Engineers and the Royal Corps of 
Signals), had average failure rates of thirty-seven percent and thirty-one percent 
respectively.465 It should also be remembered that these figures included individual officers 
re-taking tests in subsequent years, suggesting a broader trend of failure to improve at the 
individual level, as well as highlighting wider institutional problems. That these high rates of 
failure existed was likely indicative of a serious flaw in the provision of post-commission 
training of subalterns within the regiments, a problem highlighted repeatedly in the recent 
historiography.466  
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465 Ibid. 
466 See French, Raising Churchill’s Army, pp. 59-60; French, Military Identities, p. 158; and Anthony Clayton, 
The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to the present, (London: Pearson, 2006), p. 197. 
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In early 1927 at the Staff Conference held at the Staff College, Camberley, the issue of the 
Staff College examination was one of the major topics discussed. These conferences, held 
during Milne’s tenure as CIGS were open to all officers holding General Staff posts either at 
the War Office or in the various Home Commands and sought to discuss and address key 
issues facing the British Army.467 Although not necessarily representing a method of 
determining future policy, the reports of these conferences provide a barometer of the 
attitudes and opinions present within the British Army.468 In 1927, the concern expressed 
regarding Staff College entry was less to do with the content of the examination itself and 
more to do with the process prior to officers taking the examination. Colonel Thorpe, General 
Staff, British Army of the Rhine, suggested that the army as a whole failed to understand that 
the Staff College existed to train both commanders and staff officers with the result that large 
numbers attended with little regimental experience.469 He argued that, ‘There are lots of 
officers I know who do not wish to go on the staff, but would rather command their battalion 
or regiment. Therefore they stay in the regiment.’470 The existence of this attitude is broadly 
supported in the wider historiography, with Smalley providing a number of examples of 
officers being reluctant to take up, or indeed, turning down staff employment in the 1930s 
citing the boredom and lack of interest in office work combined with the feeling that, ‘many 
officers did not feel like soldiers unless they were out in the field.’471 Expressing a similar 
view, the Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley, Major-General Charles Gwynn, 
noted that, ‘there are a great number…who do not compete at all, they are keen on regimental 
work…and to work at the Staff College they must neglect some of their regimental work.’472 
The extent to which the attitudes expressed by Smalley were widespread within the army or 
indeed whether they truly represented boredom with office work or simply a lack of 
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familiarity with headquarter duties as suggested by French is open to interpretation.473 
However, these examples do suggest that despite years of post-war discussion and rumination 
on issues of staff training, there was still a broad lack of understanding amongst officers as to 
what the Staff College was for and what type of officer should be attending. 
 
Building on this point, the overwhelming focus of discussion during this conference centred 
on the role played by the regimental commander in determining which of their officers 
should be added to the Staff College list. This was a problem which was to plague the War 
Office into the 1930s and was arguably never satisfactorily resolved. Indeed, at the 1929 staff 
conference, Milne noted in his concluding remarks that, ‘The Staff College candidates are not 
right yet….The two points that have got to be considered are how to get the proper candidates 
and then how best to admit these officers to the Staff College.’474 Similarly in his remarks 
during the 1930 staff conference he noted that, ‘Going through the recommendations by 
commanding officers, I am astonished at the casual way they recommend officers for the 
Staff of the Army, and I…would not have some of them on my staff at any price.’ 475 
Regimental responsibility for putting officers forward for the Staff College examination 
began with the Staff College Selected List. Having either been identified by his commanding 
officer as a promising future commander or having expressed a desire to attend the Staff 
College and be placed on the list, a junior officer was required to obtain Certificate D which 
attested to the, ‘officer’s capacity for command and for staff employment both in the field 
and in an office.’476 In part, the problems associated with regimental commanders and the 
selection of suitable candidates stemmed from long-standing regimental suspicion of those 
seeking to advance themselves outside the regimental promotion structure. David French in 
his seminal study of the British regimental system has noted that many regimental 
commanders were loath to see their best officers leave the regiment in order to attend the 
Staff College and argued that, ‘some commanding officers regarded subordinates who 
wanted to widen their knowledge by attending the Staff College as being disloyal to their 
regiment.’477 Whilst this potential label undoubtedly put some officers off applying, the most 
 
473 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p. 164. 
474 Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley 14th to 17th January 1929, p. 117. TNA 
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475 Report on the Staff Conference held at the Staff College, Camberley 13th to 16th January 1930, (London: 
HMSO, 1930), p.59. TNA WO 279/66. 
476 Memorandum by the C.I.G.S on points dealing with the entrance and selection &c., of officers to the Staff 
College discussed during the War Office Staff Conference, January 17-20. TNA WO 32/3103. 
477 French, Military Identities, p. 153. Similarly, Field Marshal Ironside recounted an example during his time in 
hospital while serving in India when his visiting commanding officer questioned the presence of books on 
 148 
significant result of this attitude was in the lackadaisical approach taken to putting officers 
forward for the Staff College.  
 
Whilst Milne suggested that many regimental commanders used the Staff College as an 
opportunity to get rid of officers they did not like or want serving in their regiments, a more 
likely reason was that variable personalities amongst regimental commanders, differing 
interpretations of regulations, and a lack of institutional agreement as to the role of the Staff 
College, led to many commanders seeking to fulfil the wishes of their subordinates, rather 
than seeking to dispose of unliked officers.478 Key to these issues was the vagueness of 
King’s Regulations regarding the requirements for an officer put forward for the Staff 
College. The relevant section, paragraph 723 of King’s Regulations (1923) stated that an 
officer must be capable of: ‘(i) Steadiness and prudence; (ii) Activity, energy and force of 
character; (iii) Intelligence and discretion…(iv) Disposition and temper; (v) Efficiency as a 
leader and instructor.’479 Colonel R.G. Finlayson, then an instructor at the Staff College, 
Camberley, noted that these regulations gave, ‘to a commanding officer who is not perhaps 
so knowledgeable, strong, or conscientious as others, quite a loophole if he is held up to 
answer for the consequences of putting a bad officer on the list, and it does not help him very 
much if he doesn’t know what is wanted.’480 This situation was not aided by the fact that 
many Colonels of the Regiment had a very poor grasp of the capabilities and characters of the 
officers they were supposed to comment upon. Many of those commenting on this discussion 
believed that with sickness and long periods of leave, officers should remain on the Staff 
College Selected List for three years before being put forward for the examination in order to 
allow Colonels Commandant and General Officers Commanding to know their officers 
capabilities fully in order to make a better recommendation as to whether they be allowed to 
sit the Staff College Examination.481  
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In seeking to address these difficulties, two alterations were quickly made to the regulations 
regarding the inclusion of an officer’s name on the Staff College Selected List. To this point, 
only the Colonel Commandant of the regiment had been required to sign the certificate D 
which attested to a candidate’s suitability for service on the staff and attendance at the Staff 
College. As noted above, this officer was unlikely to know every subaltern in the regiment 
well and often relied on a single interview and a partial viewing of an officer’s confidential 
reports to decide whether to grant the certificate. In an attempt to overcome this, Milne 
proposed that a candidate’s commanding officer should now also be required to sign the 
Certificate D alongside the Colonel Commandant in order to, ‘ensure co-operation between 
Colonels Commandant [Colonels of the Regiment] and Commanding Officers and agreement 
as to the stamp of officer suitable to graduate at the Staff College.’482 As noted above, given 
that Milne was vociferous in his condemnation of some officers on the Staff College Selected 
List in 1930 and the examination of vacancy allocation below which continued into 1931, 
there was clearly little impact resulting from this change.  In a similar vein, Milne proposed 
and gained approval for a change in the wording of the section of King’s Regulations relating 
to Staff College appointments. Prior to Milne’s alteration, the qualities were more personal 
qualities than professional and allowed a wide interpretation in determining suitability. In 
contrast, Milne’s new wording stated unambiguously that, to be considered eligible for staff 
work, an officer should, ‘be in every respect a thoroughly good regimental officer; he must 
possess professional ability, industry and power of command.’483 Although seemingly at odds 
for a role which emphasised the need, ‘to assist their commander in the execution of the 
duties entrusted to him, to transmit his orders and instructions,’484 this view of the required 
attributes of a future staff officer was widely accepted within the army.485 Such attributes 
would have been more easily identifiable by Colonels Commandant and individual 
commanding officers who may not have been through the Staff College. 
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Although Milne’s comments in 1930 suggest that there was little immediate impact as a 
result of these changes (indeed without a substantial cultural shift among regimental 
commanders such change was unlikely), it clearly highlights that by the late 1920s there was 
widespread recognition that the process of entry to the Staff College required reform. The 
emergence of this recognition represents a change from that towards the reform of staff 
training in the early 1920s which had remained largely supportive of the reversion to the pre-
war structure and blamed any shortcomings in the system on the junior officer casualties of 
the First World War. However, as will be demonstrated below, despite undertaking further 
examinations into how both competitive and nominative vacancies to the Staff College were 
allocated, the result was the continuation of a pre-war quota system rather than a wholesale 
modernisation of the system of admission. 
 
The Nomination Conundrum 
 
One of the features of the allocation of vacancies examined by the War Office in this period 
was the process of nomination. As noted above, the process of nomination to the Staff 
College has been heavily criticised by Edward Smalley on the basis that, although having a 
solid foundation, with the diminution of wartime experience among officers applying for the 
Staff College, it instead served to undermine the value of the Staff College. Citing only the 
example of the German General Staff, Smalley suggested that a system of nomination 
allowed, ‘some individuals with debatable qualities…to access staff training…on condition 
they were well connected.’486 Despite the vehemence of his argument, there is no statistical 
evidence to back up this argument and so the continued use of nomination should not be seen 
as one of the problems facing the British Army in this period. Indeed, statistics presented by 
the Commandant of Camberley, Major-General Charles Gwynn, demonstrated that in the 
majority of cases, nominated officers were equal to those who had gained entry via the 
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Table 2: Order of Merit of officers passing out of the Staff College, Camberley by 
method of entry 1926-28.487 
 
Gwynn further subdivided the statistics by arm of service and the dominions in 1928 and it is 
of some interest that British Army officers dominated the 21 competitive vacancy officers in 
bottom 31 (representing 14 of the 21), whilst the nominated candidates in this lower half 
were more evenly spread (the British Army providing four of the ten officers in this 
category).488 However, the analysis of the 1928 figures only dealt with the junior division 
with Gwynn conceding that, ‘it is too early as yet to weight the order of merit…The marking 
must be taken as a very rough approximation.’489 While not presenting a definitive 
conclusion, it is possible to attain a level of consensus and suggest a conclusion. This being 
that, contrary to Smalley’s assertion, the nomination process was not allowing intellectually 
deficient officers to gain access to the education offered by the Staff College. Indeed, on 
average, nominated officers were performing better than those gaining entry via the 
examinations who tended to dominate the lower end of the order of merit. Analysis of the 
order of merit was not continued by Gwynn beyond the period covered by this chapter and 
was produced specifically to support the examination of the system of entry to the Staff 
College, so it is not possible to follow this trend throughout the interwar period. To examine 
fully the factors underpinning these statistics would fall beyond the scope of this thesis and is 
worthy of dedicated study as a topic in its own right. For now, it suffices to note that, despite 
being seen as a fundamental flaw within the structure of staff training, the process of 
nomination helped to maintain academic standards at the Staff College. Moreover, as 
discussion in the late 1920s turned to the allocation of vacancies to the Staff College by arm 
 
487 Numbers compiled from ‘Results of the Division passing out Dec. 1926’, TNA WO 32/3092. 
488 Ibid. 
489Report by Commandant Staff College on Junior Division 1928. Ibid. 
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of service, its utility shifted from allowing deserving officers who had missed out on a 
competitive vacancy to access Staff College education to maintaining a balance of all-arms at 
the Staff College. In a memorandum to senior officers at the War Office, Milne noted that, ‘if 
it is necessary to adjust the numbers of the different arms…this should be done by the 
nominations in the hands of the Army Council.’490  
 
The Allocation of Vacancies by Arm of Service 
 
Amongst all of the discussions regarding reform to the Staff College examination up to 1931, 
the issue which emerged as the most crucial and which was to exemplify the impact of long 
standing beliefs and attitudes relating to staff training, was the debate over the allocation of 
vacancies by arm. Whilst earlier discussions of reform foundered over the multiplicity of 
viewpoints expressed, it will be demonstrated that when examining this issue, the 
overwhelming factor affecting progress was the long held belief in the need for good 
regimental soldiers (principally those officers from the Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery) 
attending the Staff College. With the declining quality of Staff College students being 
highlighted by both Ironside’s report and the discussions taking place at the 1927 staff 
conference, the War Office began to look at the potential removal of the existing quota 
system for Staff College entry.  Under this system, a certain number of competitive vacancies 
were allocated to the individual arms of the home establishment (Infantry, Royal Artillery 
[R.A.], Royal Engineers [R.E.], Cavalry, Royal Army Service Corps [R.A.S.C.] and Signals) 
based on the perceived future needs of the army. If an individual arm failed to fill its 
competitive allocation, these were then added to the number of vacancies available for 
nomination. While this theoretically ensured that the best candidates from each arm obtained 
places at the Staff College, this did not necessarily mean the best qualifying officers were 
obtaining competitive vacancies as the highest qualifying candidate could be far down the 
order of merit. 
 
On this basis, Milne, undertook a statistical analysis of the recent Staff College examination 
results establishing four possible permutations to replace the existing quota system.491 Based 
 
490 Field Marshal Lord Milne to Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Whigham, Lieutenant-General Sir Walter 
Campbell and Lieutenant-General Noel Birch, 17 June 1926, TNA WO 32/3090. 
491 (i) All British Service officers excluding Royal Marines on one list, (ii) all candidates competing on one list, 
(iii) having British service officers divided into two lists (one for R.A and R.E competing for seven vacancies, 
the other for all other arms competing for 15 vacancies) and (iv) Indian Army and Royal Marines added to the 
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on the results of his analysis, he noted that, ‘were the quota system not in force there would 
be very little difference in the results, there being a slight increase in R.A. and R.E.’492 More 
importantly in light of the desire to ensure that the best and brightest attended the Staff 
College, each of these permutations raised the pass mark of the lowest placed officer gaining 
a competitive vacancy at the colleges. Under the quota system, the lowest successful mark 
was 5473 out of a possible 10,100: in contrast, by removing the quota system, the lowest 
successful mark rose by between 147 and 456 marks to a maximum of 5929.493 Given that 
when all British officers competed on the same list, the difference between the lowest seven 
qualifying marks was less than one hundred, this finding is significant. By assuming that the 
difference in marks between candidates broadly followed that in the list provided to the Army 
Council, under the quota system, the lowest qualifier would have sat eighteen places lower in 
the order of merit than under a system of open competition. With only twenty-two 
competitive vacancies available in the 1927 intake, the relative intellectual gulf perpetuated 
by the retention of the quota system is clear. On this basis, it was agreed at a meeting of the 
Military Members of the Army Council on the 1st July 1926 that, ‘the existing system of 
allotting vacancies by arms should be abolished for those officers who enter by 
competition.’494 Following this it was approved by the full Army Council on the 27th July to 
be put into force at the next round of Staff College examinations in January 1927. However, 
this positive development to overcome an identified problem with the structure of British 
staff training would prove to be short-lived. This was a move greeted positively by some, 
with Basil Liddell Hart in The Times stating that, ‘It was inherently wrong that corps whose 
officers on entering the Army were…the best educated should henceforth be penalised in the 
advancement…Now, at last, the competitive vacancies go to the highest placed candidates, 
irrespective of their arm of service.’495 However, the results of this seemingly positive 
development would result in a reassertion of outdated attitudes towards the technical arms. 
In an analysis of the impact of open competition in July 1927, Cameron noted that whilst the 
system of open competition resulted in increased numbers of Royal Artillery and Royal 
Engineer officers being successfully appointed to the Staff College, ‘though the highest 
appointments may go pretty well in proportion to the number of officers in each arm, a larger 
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proportion of officers of R.A. and R.E. may be fairly included in the lower grade 
appointments.’496 Such a policy of appointing senior officers in proportion to the numbers 
within each arm was theoretically sound when it is considered that the more units an arm had, 
the greater number of officers would be required to command formations dominated by that 
arm. Equally, the experience of the First World War had shown that including technical 
officers in subordinate positions on formation staffs had aided the development of inter-arm 
co-operation. However, despite this theoretical proportional representation, throughout the 
interwar period infantry officers continued to dominate senior appointments. They obtained 
roughly sixty-six percent of all senior appointments where infantry officers made up fifty-one 
percent of all regular officers in the British Army. Whilst the Royal Artillery and Royal 
Engineers obtained twenty-six percent of senior appointments, their officers made up thirty-
five percent of the regular officer corps.497 Although it could be argued that the disparity in 
these figures can be put down to the fact that many higher-level appointments in the army 
were in infantry-heavy formations, the fact remained that the traditional fighting arm 
continued to dominate at the highest levels of what was rapidly becoming a far more 
technical staff.  
 
The removal of the quota system in 1927 did see a slight shift in the proportion of officers 
from each arm gaining competitive vacancies at Camberley (see table 3). Crucially for later 
discussions over the allocation of competitive vacancies, it was the artillery who benefited 
most and the infantry who lost out with only modest gains for the more technical engineers. 
Furthermore, an analysis by S.D.1 of the DSD’s department showed that those additional 
artillery and engineer officers were as knowledgeable in operational matters as those infantry 
and cavalry officers who they replaced at the Staff College. These figures showed that the 
additional Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer officers achieved better average marks than 
the excluded infantry and cavalry officers (6083.25 compared to 5855.75).498 The broadly 
comparable scores in the Training for War papers, seen as the litmus test for potential staff 
officers499 (2321.7 for the artillery and engineer officers compared to 2374.25 for the cavalry 
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 155 
and infantry), suggests that the successful officers also possessed a solid grasp of the broader 
operational capabilities and planning requirements associated with other arms.500  
 
Table 3: Allotment of Vacancies by Arm, 1927 Examinations.501 
 
Cavalry Royal Artillery 
Royal 




system 2 7 3 1 16 1 1 
Open 
competition 1 12 7 0 10 1 0 
 
In following up this analysis, Gwynn noted that although he saw no conclusive reason to 
abandon the trial, he suggested that, if it was considered, officers of each arm should be 
required to achieve a certain placing in the order of merit in order to be eligible for a 
competitive vacancy to the Staff College without the check of a nomination interview.502 
What followed was a clear example of the inherent contradictions which established 
themselves within the institutional identity of the British Army in this period. David French 
has established that by the opening of the Second World War, the British Army was 
attempting to implement a fluid and mobility-based doctrine requiring initiative and freedom 
of action whilst reliant on a command and control system predicated on rigid command 
structures and strict observance of the military hierarchy.503 Similarly, this thesis has 
demonstrated thus far that despite the evidence of wartime experience and continued calls for 
reform, the War Office failed to enact significant reforms to the system of staff training. The 
mentality discussed below relates to the army’s staff requirements, its belief in the role of the 
Staff College and its continued adherence to the regimental system. 
 
The regimental system was introduced as one part of a series of reforms brought in by 
successive Secretaries of State for War, Edward Cardwell (Secretary of State for War 1868-
1874) and Hugh Childers (Secretary of State for War 1880-1882). Through the 1872 
Localisation Act, Cardwell sought to establish regiments in particular regions, replacing 
regimental numbers with local titles and establishing regimental depots to encourage 
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localised recruiting.504 As David French has shown, between the passing of the Localisation 
Act and the late twentieth century, the results of Cardwell’s reform has exercised a great deal 
of influence over the development and reform of the British Army.505 In the context of this 
thesis, it has already been established that regimental suspicion of the Staff College 
influenced the reaction of some officers towards those putting themselves forward for staff 
training and clearly influenced the selection of officers for the Staff College Selected Lists. 
Such regimental suspicion only increased as a result of the faster promotion within the ranks 
of the army staff, leading to the comment that the selection of officers for promotion outside 
the normal pattern of time promotion within the regiment having the potential to cause, 
‘serious unrest in the Army, disturb the cordial relations which ought to exist between 
officers belonging to the same regiment, and weaken that esprit de corps which is so 
conducive to fighting efficiency.’506  
 
However, it was the institutional culture of delineating an unhealthy disregard for the 
command capabilities of officers of the Royal Engineers, compared to those in the fighting 
arms, which was to prove the most significant impact of the regimental system upon the 
progress of staff reform in the late 1920s. The Royal Engineers had long had a complex 
relationship with the Staff College. Early iterations of the staff course, particularly during the 
tenure of Colonel W.C.E. Napier (Commandant between 1861 and 1864), saw the standard of 
staff officer required as essentially being that of a Royal Engineer officer, leading to the 
publication of a general order removing the requirement of a Staff College Certificate for 
engineer officers appointed to staff posts.507 Although this was rescinded by General Order 
41 in April 1870, engineer officers continued to struggle to make inroads into gaining 
military commands outside of their regiment.508 Ian Beckett notes the existence of prejudice 
against Royal Engineer officers taking on general military commands, noting Wolsey’s 
caution to Gerald Graham on being appointed to brigade command in Egypt in 1882 that he 
had, ‘to prove that REs [sic.] can command troops in the field…the credit of the Corps 
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appears to rest on me.’509 Similar prejudice can be seen in both the replies to the Braithwaite 
committee in 1919 whereby the command powers of officers from both the Royal Engineers 
and Royal Artillery were to be strictly limited to the issue of orders only to their own arms.510 
By 1928, it appears that within the War Office, these prejudices came to focus on the Royal 
Engineers on the basis of their increasing success in the Staff College examinations.  
 
Table 4: Distribution by Arms of first 40 candidates competing for Camberley.511 





available to R.A. 
& Infantry only) 
1930 
Cavalry 1 1 2 - - 
Royal Artillery 10 12 9 10 10 
Royal Engineers 6 8 7 15 13 
Signals 2 - 1 1 2 
Infantry 16 14 11 8 5 
Tank Corps 1 1 1 - 1 
Royal Army 
Service Corps - - 2 2 1 
Indian Army 4 4 7 4 8 
Royal Marines - - - - - 
 
Despite the continued domination of competitive vacancies by infantry officers, in October 
1928 Bonham-Carter submitted a report to Milne in which he considered it, ‘advisable to 
limit the number of R.E. officers who can enter the Staff College without the check of 
nomination.’512 His reasoning centred on the belief that, ‘the R.E. officer inspires less 
confidence in commanders and troops because of his lack of regimental experience… the 
duties of the R.E. officers when at regimental duty are frequently such as to give little 
opportunity for the testing of character and power of command in the field.’ 513 Bonham-
Carter’s argument centred on the well-established prejudices towards engineer officers cited 
above and reinforces the historiographical criticism that the Staff College was over focussed 
on preparing officers for command. Much like the Braithwaite committee, Bonham-Carter’s 
attitude seemingly overlooked British Army doctrine centred on the intimate co-operation of 
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all arms, requiring staffs made up of a broadly equal proportion of those arms. This belief 
was reflected by some senior officers at the War Office, with both Lieutenant-Generals 
Hastings Anderson and Webb Gillman (QMG and MGO respectively) suggesting that the 
staff and by extension the Staff College should contain proportionate numbers of officers 
from each arm to ensure a well-balanced staff.514 Likewise, Gillman decried the dominance 
of any arm on the staff, being critical of the fact that, ‘during the war the staff became 
Infantry to excess.’515 Although the figures in table 4 do demonstrate that the continuance of 
the system of open competition may have led to the domination of competitive entry by 
artillery and engineer officers, it had already been established by Milne that any imbalance in 
numbers from each arm could be corrected through the use of nominations, thus admitting 
infantry officers to counter-balance the increasing number of engineer and artillery.516 
Indeed, as table 2 and the experiences of General Gillman suggest, in many cases officers 
nominated to the Staff College were more likely to score higher in the final examinations at 
the end of their time at the Staff College than those gaining competitive vacancies, obviating 
any clear quality gap in taking infantry officers from further down the entrance examination 
order of merit. 
 
Ultimately, the problem associated with the presence of large numbers of engineer officers 
attending the Staff College stemmed from its dual role as provider of both staff officers and 
future commanders for the army. Furthermore, as Ironside noted in 1928, there were 
essentially two forms of staff work, one as part of a formation staff with the troops and the 
second based at the War Office.517 It was into the latter that Royal Engineer officers tended to 
congregate, a fact which Bonham-Carter in particular saw as a problem.518 It has already been 
noted that there were some regimental officers in particular who sought to avoid staff 
postings on the grounds that they did not involve regular contact with the troops and indeed 
Brian Bond has stated that many in the army saw service at the War Office as negative, 
believing it to be, ‘the fons et origo of an incredible mass of unnecessary rules.’519 Although 
not going quite so far, Ironside noted that War Office staff work was more mental and less 
physical with a greater focus on preparing for future movements of large numbers of men and 
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equipment in the case of various scenarios requiring deployments beyond those normally 
required to police the empire.520 With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see how the 
situation highlighted by Bonham-Carter as a problem perhaps represented a good fit for the 
requirements of the British Army. The highly educated, more cerebral minded artillery and 
engineer officers would gain more competitive vacancies, but could then be placed in 
commands to facilitate inter-arm co-operation or at the War Office to undertake the in-depth 
planning and organisation required to prepare plans for future operations. The regimental 
officer, better able to demonstrate his leadership skills and regimental experience through the 
nomination interviews, continued to alternate between regimental and staff postings 
preparing himself for leadership and command roles which continued to be dominated by 
officers from the infantry and artillery. Such analysis is, by its nature, highly subjective and 
not to be taken as an attempt to define what would have happened. However, it can perhaps 
serve to suggest that the perceived problem of Royal Engineer officers at the Staff College 
was far smaller than some suggested. 
 
As with other reform discussions in this period, the sheer variety of responses presented by 
senior officers highlights why the formation of a single policy towards the reform of the Staff 
College was impossible. Continuing his conservative approach to staff reform, General 
Braithwaite commented that he was, ‘apprehensive of an overdose of R.E. officers at the 
Staff College and the resultant difficulty of placing such officers, when they become p.s.c. to 
the best advantage so far as the good of the Army is concerned.’521 As with General 
Whigham’s comments in 1927 regarding the ‘spirit of staff duties,’522 Braithwaite’s comment 
is unclarified and sufficiently ambiguous to almost defy historiographical interpretation. 
However, his later comment that, ‘that the number passing would embarrass you in the 
placing of them on the staff in the future,’523 looks back to the late Victorian perception of the 
engineer officer as a poor commander of troops. Indeed, despite his early advocacy of a 
balanced staff, Gillman argued that, ‘the object of the Staff College Course is, presumably to 
benefit the army and the Empire by turning out as many trained Staff Officers as is possible, 
and in my opinion, the man who is likely to become the best staff officer is one who has 
obtained ample practical experience in the handling of troops prior to entering the Staff 
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College.’524 Similarly, Hastings Anderson, having argued for a balanced staff suggested that, 
‘the bulk of staff appointments are of the nature of “knock about turn,” calling for common 
sense.’525 He went onto suggest that such appointments could be best filled by infantry and 
cavalry officers who also gained the most benefit from a Staff College education with those 
more technical appointments being filled by officers from technical arms.526 
 
It is clear that despite concerns over the quality of officers gaining entry to the Staff College 
as expressed by Milne at the 1927 staff conference, the key determinant in War Office policy 
towards the admission of officers and the allocation of competitive vacancies was not the 
ability displayed by an officer through the examination, but his perceived abilities as a leader 
of men. Through prioritising the future command potential of Staff College graduates, these 
1928 debates overlooked the importance and increasingly technical nature of lower level staff 
duties. Indeed, as will be seen below from the simultaneous examination of Staff College age 
limits, it was the provision of large numbers of junior staff officers in the event of 
mobilisation which required prioritisation, rather than the comparatively small number of 
senior commanders. As it was, Milne disagreed with Bonham-Carter’s analysis of the 
situation, but faced with opposition or disagreement from the majority of senior officers 
making up the military members of the Army Council there was little he could do. 527 At a 
meeting of the military members in November 1928, it was decided to, ‘recommend that the 
allotment of vacancies at the Staff College to officers of technical corps, in which they 
include the R.E., R.C. of Signals and the R.A.S.C., should be limited in number.’528 Papers 
drawn up by Bonham-Carter serve to demonstrate exactly how restrictive this quota system 
became for the officers of the technical corps. Figures for 1930 demonstrated that the infantry 
was allocated sixteen competitive vacancies to the Royal Engineer’s four.529 Given that the 
other technical arms were only granted one competitive vacancy each and in 1930 failed to 
fill them, it is evident that the implicit aim of the quota system was to prevent Royal Engineer 
officers achieving parity with or indeed overtaking the infantry. That this would have 
happened is indicated by the analysis of the 1931 results had places been allocated under the 
previous system of open competition. Under that system, the infantry would have fallen to 
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third place, obtaining only six competitive places, this compared to seven for the Royal 
Artillery and eighteen for the Royal Engineers.530 Additionally, Bonham-Carter made clear 
that these numbers were decided based, ‘on regimental peace establishments.’531 This is the 
clearest indication thus far that the decisions discussed above were based not on the future 
wartime needs of the army or indeed the experiences of the First World War, but on long-
standing prejudice toward officers of the Royal Engineers. By decrying the abilities of 
technical officers, they were overlooking the fact that by the end of the First World War, it 
was technical subjects including; artillery, field works, logistics and operational planning that 
had emerged as the principal responsibilities of the staff necessitating officers with 
knowledge of these areas, rather than those displaying command skills more useful in small 
unit actions and imperial policing operations. 
 
Upper Age Limits for Staff College Entry 
 
Also discussed during the examinations of staff training in the late 1920s was the issue of age 
limits for entry to the Staff College and the duration an officer should remain on the Staff 
College Selected List. 532 In the context of the broader debates taking place within the War 
Office and set out above, this aspect was a minor consideration. However, it does provide 
additional clarification of the fact that throughout these debates senior officers were well 
aware of the problems facing the army in ensuring an adequate provision of staff officers yet 
continued to block potential reforms. The upper age limit for admission to the Staff College 
had been a moving target since Army Order 342 in 1923 which put into force a gradual 
reduction of the upper age from thirty-seven to thirty-three.533 The relatively high upper limit 
had been brought in for the immediate post-war courses in an attempt to ensure that those 
officers who missed out on attendance due to the war had an opportunity to attend in the 
immediate post-war years. As both war experience diminished, and problems began to arise 
with officers finding themselves completing staff training, but holding too senior a rank to 
undertake lower-level staff duties this gradual reassertion of pre-war norms was required.534 
As part of his desire to improve the quality of officer obtaining vacancies at the Staff College, 
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in 1927 Milne proposed scrapping this reduction in the upper-age limit, expressing the desire 
that this would, ‘ensure Commanding Officers and Colonels Commandant…know the future 
candidates and will facilitate attachments to other arms.’535 Such an approach, whilst 
theoretically achieving the aims set out by Milne, did nothing to rectify the problem 
highlighted by Ironside, namely that by beginning their studies in their late thirties, usually as 
senior Captains or Majors, officers would then effectively lose seniority on graduation by 
being required to undertake their third grade staff appointment as Staff Captain. 
 
More significantly, the DSD, Cameron noted a significant problem with re-establishing a 
higher upper-age limit for the Staff College if mobilisation was required, as even prior to the 
increase in age limits there would not be enough trained staff officers to fill all the required 
posts. He noted that in the event of any form of mobilisation, in order to fill all required 
second and third grade staff appointments, the army would require, ‘in addition to all p.s.c. 
officers already holding peacetime appointments:- (a) All p.s.c. officers of the R.A.R.O of 
suitable rank; (b) All students of the Senior Division at the Staff College; (c) All p.s.c. 
officers at Regimental Duty (less C.Os) or…an equivalent number of suitable non p.s.c. 
officers.536 Were the rise in age limit to be enacted, the situation would have become far 
worse as whilst officers would still be retiring at the same rate, they would not join the staff 
until two years later. Cameron noted that the impact of the raising of the upper age-limit 
would be to reduce the number of p.s.c. officers, ‘by two years supply or about 100 officers. 
This would render the situation on mobilisation even worse than at present – particularly in 
the junior appointments where the difficulty now chiefly lies.’537 Despite Cameron’s early 
advocacy against adopting Ironside’s 1926 proposals,538 it is clear that he was well aware of 
serious defects in the British Army’s system of staff training and felt the reassertion of a 
higher upper age limit for entry was a step too far. 
 
It is of interest that Milne’s response to Cameron makes no mention of his concerns over 
severe shortages of junior staff officers in the event that the upper age limit was raised, 
instead emphasising the need for India to follow suit in any changes.539 Similarly there is no 
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record of the issue having been discussed by the Army Council in 1927.540 Despite this, at a 
meeting of the Military Members of the Army Council on the 28th April, it was decided to 
accept Milne’s proposal that the upper age limit for entry to the Staff College be raised, ‘from 
33 years to 35 years by one year at a time.’541 Consequently, in a similar manner to the 1926 
Report on Higher Education for War, the importance of ensuring that the British Army went 
to war with a staff of adequate size for its needs fell by the wayside. Instead, Milne opted for 
smaller scale qualitative gains over longer-term stability. In any event, as noted above these 
changes did not automatically bring the requisite qualitative improvement Milne was looking 
for, a problem which Cameron had also foreseen noting that, ‘it is probable that Commands 




As has been demonstrated, much like earlier attempts to reform the interwar structure and 
system of staff training, the examination and debates surrounding the allocation of vacancies 
and the entrance examination foundered under a milieu of contrasting beliefs, institutional 
culture and seemingly more pressing requirements. It is clear that for the CIGS it was the 
qualitative improvement of officers passing through the Staff College which was the most 
important benchmark to achieve. This was despite the warnings of the DSD regarding 
significant shortages of trained junior staff officers in the event of mobilisation. Alongside 
this, it has been clearly demonstrated that debate was skewed by traditional prejudice towards 
officers from technical and supporting arms, principally of the Royal Engineers with 
measures enacted to prevent them from dominating the Staff Corps. Notwithstanding the fact 
that evidence available to senior officers clearly highlighted that such officers were as 
capable as officers of the infantry and cavalry. Such prejudice flew in the face of the 
developments in staff role and structure that had taken place during the First World War with 
its increased emphasis on providing logistical support and integrating all arm co-operation 
and increasingly technological methods of waging war.  
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As well as the more openly conservative elements among senior officers at the War Office 
were those such as Anderson and Gillman who, although not as clearly against the idea of 
reform, failed to establish a cogent position or nail their colours to a particular mast, adding 
to the multiplicity of opinion from which policy was supposed to spring. Furthermore, such 
positions effectively served to undermine the position of Milne as efficiently as those who 
openly disagreed with him, leading to an inability to force through any form of reform. 
Although primarily dominated by institutional cultures of leadership and the regimental 
system, the examination of these issues was beset by the same challenges as earlier efforts at 
reform and fell short of actual significant change as a result. 
 
As will be seen in the following chapters, whilst being completely overlooked in the 1932 
Kirk committee report, the conclusions of which came to dominate much of the army’s 
business in the early 1930s, in the last few years of the decade serious reform was afoot. It 
will be shown that whilst the 1920s represented a period of vacillation and uncertainty and 
the 1930s saw continued high-level debate over the role of the army in the event of European 
war, with significant alterations being adopted after the briefest of examinations. Although 
coming far too late to have any appreciable impact on the staff of the British Army before 
war broke out in 1939, the recognition that earlier proposals for the reform of staff training 
represented the best means to reform and improve the existing system of staff training in line 
with the technological, logistical and doctrinal developments highlights rapidly altered 




Chapter 6 – Staff Reform in the 1930s 
 
 
As the previous chapters have shown, between 1919 and 1931 the War Office received and 
debated a number of proposals and reports proposing potential reforms to the system and 
structure of staff training in the British Army. For a number of reasons, ranging from outright 
hostility to the idea of compulsory further education for officers, to vacillation and 
uncertainty over how best to enact change, these proposals remained just that. In addition, it 
has been demonstrated that where changes were made, such as Milne’s attempted sub-
division of the senior class at the Staff College, the attempted removal of the quota system for 
the allocation of vacancies and the raising of the upper-age limit for entry to the Staff 
College, they were primarily in response to broader problems within the army. As has been 
highlighted, these problems concerned the ability of the British Army to continue to attract 
adequate numbers of officer cadets in the face of greater competition from the Royal Navy, 
Royal Air Force and civilian sectors. It was this desire to resolve the recruitment problem 
which was to act as the catalyst for staff reform in the years immediately preceding the 
Second World War. As this chapter will demonstrate, with the continued inability to define a 
clear role for the British Army up to 1938, alongside wider-ranging efforts to bring it up to 
readiness for a modern continental war in the wake of emergent threats from Italy, Japan and 
Germany, the reform of further education for officers received a sudden burst of impetus 
resulting in a substantial and belated revision.  
 
This chapter will argue that the early 1930s saw the War Office become over focussed on the 
findings of the 1932 Kirke committee report, to the exclusion of continued engagement with 
the requirements of staff reform. Whilst the Kirke committee report had staff training as part 
of its broad remit, it will be shown how the final report completely ignored this vital aspect of 
military capability, leading the army to overlook the continued necessity to reform staff 
training in light of long-standing shortcomings and the lessons of the First World War, in 
particular the shortage of trained officers in the event of mobilisation.  Moreover, it will argue 
that impetus for the reforms to staff training which took place in 1938, came from the 
wholesale changes made at the War Office by the Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-
Belisha. Whilst other secretaries of state had some influence on the course of debates on the 
reform of staff training, by essentially effecting a generational shift in the senior ranks of the 
army, Hore-Belisha, either by accident or design, removed the vacillation and varied nature 
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of discussion in the senior ranks. As will be seen, this meant that when proposals were put 
forward, they were implemented with virtually no debate or dissenting opinions or argument. 
Whilst it will be established that these reforms were enacted too late to have an impact on the 
British Army before the outbreak of war, mirroring as they did those proposed in the mid-
1920s, they serve to demonstrate that until 1938 the War Office missed multiple 
opportunities to enact significant change in the system of staff training in the British Army. 
Such reforms have already been shown to have been in line with the lessons and experiences 
of the First World War and equally, on paper at least, served to counter problems identified at 
the time with the system of British staff training.  
 
The Kirke Committee and the Staff College 
 
The 1932 Kirke committee has long been highlighted by historians as a key examination of 
British Army capabilities and learning in the interwar period, albeit one that came later than it 
should.543 This view has been dismissed by recent examinations, with David French 
demonstrating that despite analysis to the contrary the British Army, ‘had abandoned its 
“human-centred” solution to the problem of overcoming the fire-power of the modern 
battlefield over a decade before the committee was established. It had enthusiastically 
embraced a technological solution and was experimenting with ways to give it effect.’544 
Indeed as has been demonstrated by this thesis thus far, this attempt to codify the lessons of 
recent war was not merely present in British examinations of technological solutions to the 
problems of the First World War, but also took in educational solutions to the challenges 
posed by the war (albeit with no reform enacted). The Kirke committee served to continue 
this trend. As a comprehensive examination of the British Army’s experiences over the First 
World War, its remit included, ‘not only the principal strategic and tactical lessons, but also 
the more important administrative lessons and those lessons falling under the headings of 
training, organization, higher command and staff duties.’545 The characterisation of the non-
operational lessons as more important is of interest to this thesis as between them they only 
occupy thirteen pages of the final report compared to the sixteen pages devoted to strategy 
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and tactics.546 In addition to being the only subject discussed during the 1933 staff 
conference, much like the report itself, the conference focused primarily on the tactical and 
operational lessons of the war, paying no attention to issues of officer training and only 
discussing communications in relation to operational requirements.547 As a result, the primary 
achievement of the Kirke committee report, although professing to highlight the importance 
of organisational, administrative and command and staff lessons, alongside the 1933 staff 
conference and later reviews such as the 1935 War Office memorandum on reorganisation, 
was to crystallise British ideas on the shape and scope of future war.548  
 
In doing so, there is evidence to suggest that whilst broadly applying the operational lessons 
of the First World War, the evidence utilised in the compilation of the Kirke committee 
report further served to entrench long-held institutional beliefs which did not mesh with the 
requirements of modern, industrialised warfare. Despite over eighty pages of memoranda and 
analysis, there are only two references to peacetime staff training.549 Of these, that by Kirke 
examining the lessons of the Gallipoli campaign presents more questions than answers, 
asking whether the students themselves displayed initiative and confidence in their own 
abilities, whether an officer’s personality was fully considered by the nomination selection 
board and whether regimental commanders were putting forward the correct type of 
officer.550 By contrast, the report by Major-Generals B.D. Fisher and C.C. Armitage 
examining the Mesopotamian campaign suggested the oft proposed solution of reducing the 
Staff College course to one year in order to double the output and avoid the, ‘repetition of an 
inadequate and untrained supply of staff officers in war.’551 Upon graduation p.s.c. officers 
would then return to their units for at least a year and, presumably with regular rotation 
between staff and regimental posts, would obviate any issues with oversupply in peace. 
Fisher and Armitage also combat the belief that without the second year an officer would not 
gain the necessary experience and training for higher staff appointments with the idea that 
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experience would be gained through experience in lower staff appointments and that, ‘it is 
only a small proportion of p.s.c. officers who attain these high grade appointments.’552 
Therefore, although far from presenting a clearly defined and structured proposal for reform, 
all three officers clearly recognised that staff training required a degree of reform in order to 
avoid the deficiencies of the First World War. The continued highlighting of these points 
throughout the period covered by this thesis clearly demonstrates that these deficiencies were 
well known throughout the army with broadly similar proposals consistently advanced.  
 
As has already been noted, much like earlier proposals, the comments of Kirke, Fisher and 
Armitage were subsumed beneath the operational and technological lessons of the report. The 
issue of armoured forces was a prominent part of the report, alongside the use of artillery and 
aircraft and it is this that effectively sets the tone for the period discussed in this chapter. 
Indeed, whilst J.P. Harris titles his chapter on the early 1930s ‘Losing the lead: 1931-1936’553 
the chapter itself sets out that while Britain did lose the lead internationally, experimentation 
and innovation remained a theme of British Army policy in this period. One significant 
feature of the report has been highlighted by David French as reaffirming pre-war ideas of 
command and control: the primacy of senior officers and ideas of control from above.554 
Indeed, the only reference made to the Staff College in the final report was the note that, ‘The 
system of peace brevets, a considerable portion of which are allotted to officers who have 
graduated at the Staff College, means that it is from the Staff Colleges that many of our 
future commanders will come. In selecting students for nominations it is suggested that this 
point should be kept prominently in view.’555 Such a view was hardly revolutionary, with this 
thesis consistently demonstrating that emphasis on the production of future senior 
commanders was a feature of every proposal, discussion and examination pertaining to the 
potential reform of staff training. Whilst perhaps less clear-cut than other opportunities for 
reform highlighted by this thesis, the Kirke committee report stands as yet another example 
of competing views and priorities leading to a missed opportunity to correct long-standing, 
identified problems with the system of staff training in the British Army. 
The Strategic Context and Leslie Hore-Belisha at the War Office 
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Perhaps more so than the 1920s, for the British Army in particular the 1930s was a period in 
which any strategic certainties were thrown into complete disarray. From 1935, various 
governments had pursued a policy of limited liability, a policy established in large part due 
to, ‘bitter memories of the trench deadlock in the First World War which had recently been 
freshly stirred up by a flood of “anti-war” literature.’556 Alongside the anti-war attitude of the 
British population, this idea was also influenced by the reassertion by Basil Liddell Hart of a 
‘British Way in Warfare’ relying on the avoidance of a direct military commitment.557 Far 
more damaging to the British Army in this period was the 1937 Inskip report. This report of a 
committee chaired by the newly appointed Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Sir 
Thomas Inskip, was instrumental in the, ‘downgrading of a British continental commitment 
for the Army’s Field Force. Emphasis was placed on the Air Force as the mainstay of 
Britain’s defence.’558 Inskip’s appointment and the resulting report were part of a growing 
concern that the Royal Air Force was being underfunded, the result being a fundamental shift 
in emphasis creating additional problems for the development and re-arming of the army in 
this critical period.559 This is not to say that this was a new problem for the army. Indeed, as 
has been seen in the preceding chapters, throughout this period the British Army was dogged 
by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force who laid claims to defensive, and more importantly, 
cheaper, force projection to secure the British empire, whilst also offering its recruits 
practical skills training and a better image amongst civilians than the army.560 Furthermore, 
as a result of the continued debates and discussions, in 1937 the Secretary of State for War, 
anxious that army re-armament plans should not be further impeded, ‘requested that a paper 
should be put forward showing the modifications that would be possible if the role of the 
army were defined, minus the Continental commitment.’561 In this context, the problem of 
officer recruitment and retention re-asserted itself as a prime concern together with the 
continued doctrinal, operational and technical developments taking place. As will be seen 
below, it was the continuation of the recruitment problem which was to maintain awareness 
of the need for structural reform of staff training in the minds of those at the War Office. 
Principally this was to be in the context of the new Secretary of State for War’s desire to, ‘put 
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the Army on the national map and make soldiering a respected career.’562 Whilst both the 
1937 Warren Fisher committee and the Committee on the Supply of Army Officers (referred 
to hereafter as the Willingdon committee) highlighted issues with staff training primarily 
from this viewpoint, the later Committee on the Military Education of the Army Officer (the 
Massy committee) provided the most comprehensive analysis of officer education in the 
period covered by this thesis.563  
 
Notorious for his wholesale changes to the Army Council in 1937, Hore-Belisha’s time as 
Secretary of State for War marked a period of seismic and rapid reform within the British 
Army.564 Many of these reforms targeted the poor conditions experienced by ordinary ranks: 
 
Barracks were properly heated and equipped with showers and recreation rooms, 
catering was revolutionised, combat uniform was simplified, married soldiers…were 
allowed to live outside the barracks. Idiotic regulations were abolished…Pointless 
drill routines were scrapped. Training programmes were introduced to encourage 
soldiers to make the best of their ability and to equip them for civilian life.565 
 
Not only did these changes do much to overcome weaknesses with the army’s ability to 
recruit, but they directly addressed concerns that the British public had with a career in the 
army. This was largely due to the efforts of the army’s first Director of Public Relations, 
Brigadier Alan Dawney, previously the army instructor at the Imperial Defence College. In 
this role, Dawney was to, ‘promote a closer mutual understanding than it had hitherto been 
possible to establish between the army and all sections of the civil life of the country.’566 Not 
only was this move revolutionary, becoming only the second government department after 
the Post Office to establish such a role, but it also represented a recognition that the War 
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Office needed, ‘to understand popular feeling as a prelude to administrative action.’567 
Measures such as those noted above were clear manifestations of this understanding. 
Alongside this, Hore-Belisha clearly believed a similar turnaround in the attitude of potential 
officers could be achieved through the reform of the army’s system of post-commissioning 
education and the General Staff. Within seven months of his appointment as Secretary of 
State for War, he had established as priorities, the need for a department within the General 
Staff focussed on military research, the reorganisation of the Staff College course and the 
institution of a short staff course for officers of the Territorial Army.568 Although far from a 
popular figure among senior officers, Hore-Belisha’s changes resulted in the implementation 
of reforms which had been mooted since the mid-1920s.  
 
Additionally, it must be remembered that whilst the international context had changed 
significantly by the late 1930s, the role which the army was expected to fulfil had not. In 
February 1938 a cabinet paper was presented which established the army’s priorities in any 
future war as being: (1) home defence, subdivided into air defence, internal security and 
coastal defence, (2) imperial defence and finally (3) continental commitments with 
formations whose equipment and reserves would not necessarily be to the continental 
scale.569 Although Hore-Belisha was to find himself reversing his attitude by 1939, in 1937, 
‘he had no doubt it was right to put the continental commitment last.’570 As a result, any 
suggestion that the reforms taking place in this period were only due to a likely continental 
role for the British Army can be dismissed. Until the acceptance of a continental commitment 
after the German annexation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the role of the British Army 
rested on the twin pillars of home and imperial defence. 571 Consequently, it was Hore-
Belisha’s desire for reform of the army and to increase its administrative efficiency which 
ultimately led to the establishment of the committees and reforms which took place in the 
final years of peace. 
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The Committee on the Supply of Army Officers  
 
As noted above, one significant problem facing the British Army in the late 1930s was the 
continued difficulty in recruiting both officers and men.572 With earlier efforts as a result of 
the 1925 Plumer committee having resulted in no tangible change, a Committee on the 
Supply of Army Officers, was established under the chairmanship of Lord Willingdon.573 The 
committee’s membership was made up of two senior officers, the Director of Finance at the 
War Office, the Master of Whitgift School and the Master of Corpus Christi and Chairman of 
the Appointments Board, Cambridge University.574 Its terms of reference were to, ‘enquire 
into the causes of the present shortage of officers in the Army and to recommend measures to 
remedy it, and also to consider where the present system of promotion from the ranks is 
working satisfactorily and whether it can be extended.’575 As with the problem of staff 
training, this report essentially re-hashed long-standing arguments and cited virtually 
identical factors affecting the recruitment of adequate numbers of officer cadets. Where 
Willingdon’s committee departed from the existing trope of discussions around officer 
training and staff reform, was in its appreciation of the fact that the two issues went hand-in-
hand as part of a wider discussion of officering the army.576 The committee interviewed 105 
public school students and concluded that the reasons for the continuing shortfall in officer 
recruitment centred around six factors: 
 
(1) It costs too much to get into the Army. 
(2) The emoluments are unsatisfactory, pay being too low and allowances frequently 
inadequate in relation to the expenses they are designed to cover. 
 
572 Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley, 14th to 17th January, 1929, pp. 42-44, 
WO 279/65 and Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley, 13th to 16th January, 
1930, WO 279/70. 
573 The Right Honourable Freeman Freeman Thomas, 1st Marquess of Willingdon, 13th Governor-General of 
Canada (1926-1931) and 22nd Viceroy and Governor-General of India (1931-1936). 
574 Respectively; General Sir C.P. Deedes (late Military Secretary, War Office), Major-General E.K. Squires 
(Director of Staff Duties), T.J. Cash, Ronald Gurner & W. Spens. 
575 Second Report of the Committee on the Supply of Army Officers, December 1937, p. 2, TNA WO 32/4461. 
576 Prior to this report, whilst the Plumer Committee had briefly discussed staff training in relation to regimental 
promotion prospects, the overwhelming examination of issues of officer recruitment and the improvement of 
educational provision had remained vested in either the Army Educational Advisory Board or the frequent 
reviews of training provided by the RMA Woolwich and RMC Sandhurst. (For examples see TNA ED 
109/4119 Board of Education, Full Inspection Report of London, Woolwich, Royal Military Academy [1920] & 
TNA ED 109/152 Board of Education, Full Inspection Report of Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, October 
1937). Such examinations eventually led to the proposal to combine the two cadet colleges (TNA WO 32/4671) 
a move strenuously opposed by the RMA Woolwich, but eventually taking place in 1947.     
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(3) Army life in general and regimental life in particular, is in peace-time dull and 
lacking in intellectual interest; there is insufficient inducement to work; and the 
slowness of promotion and the fact that it is mainly by seniority in the lower ranks 
have a deadening effect. 
(4) Uncertain promotion prospects and the danger of having to retire at a 
comparatively early age lead to a feeling of insecurity. 
(5) The preparation for a military career, and (except in certain specialised corps such 
as the R.E, R.A.S.C. and R.A.M.C.) Army service itself, contain no element of 
vocational training. 
(6) A boy who does not come from one of the leading public schools is 
handicapped.577 
 
A footnote to the report noted that all 105 students surveyed came from the same school and 
given the presence of Mr Ronald Gurner, Master of Whitgift School on the committee, it is 
likely that they were students at this school. This is of interest as C. B. Otley has 
demonstrated that the schools supplying the armed forces were dominated by; Charterhouse, 
Eton, Harrow, Marlborough, Rugby, Winchester, Cheltenham, Clifton, Haileybury and 
Wellington.578 As a result, assuming that the students surveyed were from Whitgift, they 
represented the very group of public school students the army required to make-up its 
recruiting shortfall, as the traditional bastions of officer recruitment were failing to provide 
enough candidates in the face of competition from the other services and civilian 
occupations. Unfortunately, no evidence survives to explain why this limited pool of students 
was selected or of the broader discussions related to the final conclusions of the report. As 
such it can only be speculated as to why this particular cohort were selected.  It must also be 
remembered, that whilst there were a number of traditional motivations for joining the 
services including, but not limited to, coming from a service family, patriotism and belief in 
the empire, a desire for adventure and fascination with the idea of a life in the military, for 
those outside the traditional military elite, the need for a career with good pay and 
progression would have been a key influence over whether to opt for the army as a potential 
career.579  
 
577 Second Report of the Committee on the Supply of Army Officers, December 1937, p. 8, TNA WO 32/4461. 
578 C.B. Otley, ‘The Educational Background of British Army Officers,’ Sociology, Vol. 7, No. 42, (May 1973) 
p. 209. 
579 David French, Regimental Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, & the British People c. 1870-
2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 37-44. 
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The report also established that, ‘we are not concerned here with the genuinely outstanding 
man who finds his outlet through the Staff College and the variety of work…which it opens 
up to him, nor with the man of high technical capacity…Our concern…is mainly with the 
regimental officer.’580 In a similar vein to the discussions accompanying the Report on 
Higher Education for War and the debate over the allocation of Staff College vacancies, it is 
clear that there was a broader concern over the morale factor within the officer corps, an 
attempt to avoid regimental jealousy of those gaining places at the Staff College and breaking 
the hold of the regimental system over individual rates of promotion.581 Where this report 
differed from earlier examinations into the retention and recruitment of officer cadets, is that 
it recognised staff training, at least for lower grade appointments, as a crucial part of the 
education of the regimental officer corps. As part of their solution to the recruitment problem, 
the committee, ‘heard with great interest that proposals to create a Junior Staff College have 
been put forward from time to time.’582  These proposals were those discussed in previous 
chapters, specifically the report focussed on the opportunities to double the number of 
admissions to Camberley and Quetta allowing a much greater number of staff officers to be 
trained to GSO3 level.583 However, unlike earlier attempts to establish a junior staff course, 
the purpose of this split was not to fix the shortfall in junior staff officers required for a 
mobilised wartime army. Instead, the committee believed that the establishment of a Junior 
Staff College allowing roughly one in six regimental officers some form of advanced, 
professional training would provide, ‘interest and incentive to ambitious officers in their early 
years.’584 An additional proposal was to allow officers who had passed the competitive 
examination, but failed to obtain a place at the Staff College, to attend a short staff course in 
order to qualify for staff employment in order to go, ‘some way towards removing the present 
feeling of discouragement and even discontent among those officers who…have failed to 
achieve their ambition to get to the Staff College.’585 Much like Ironside’s proposals, the 
Willingdon committee similarly recognised the need for a Senior Staff College. Although 
setting out ideas which had been touted on multiple occasions to reflect the staff lessons of 
the war, as with responses to previous reform proposals, the overriding influence was the 
 
580 Second Report of the Committee on the Supply of Army Officers, December 1937, p. 42, TNA WO 32/4461. 
581 See Chapters Four and Five respectively. 
582 Second Report of the Committee on the Supply of Army Officers, December 1937, p. 44, TNA WO 32/4461. 




need to ensure the army could compete with both the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy for 
suitable numbers of young men to become officer cadets.  
 
Ultimately, the report of this committee was never published due to the creation of a new 
Warrant Officer rank which made up for the shortage of subalterns by reassigning some tasks 
to senior NCOs.586 However, whilst its conclusions relating to the Staff College represented a 
repetition of those ideas put forward throughout the 1920s, it is the reaction of senior officers 
to these ideas which is the most important aspect of this report. Although the Adjutant-
General, Lieutenant-General Sir Clive Liddell merely noted that the changes to the staff 
colleges should be carried out by the War Office and the Quartermaster General, Lieutenant-
General Sir Reginald May noted his agreement with them,587 another senior officer noted 
that, ‘I hope it is found possible to proceed with the proposal of a Junior Staff College. 
Something of this sort is badly wanted.’588 Setting aside the motivation for change, it is 
evident that there was a greater appetite for reform among senior officers of the 1930s than 
had been the case in the 1920s. However, such reform-mindedness was not universal. In 
March 1934, now retired General Sir Hubert Gough wrote an article in The Daily Telegraph 
which was critical of an army which he perceived to have gone ‘a little school mad.’589 
Regarding the Staff College, despite recognition by the army itself in the late-1920s that the 
Staff College did not produce enough trained staff officers, Gough believed that the provision 
of one staff officer to every 230 regimental officers and men was excessive and advocated the 
shedding of large numbers of both General and Administrative staff officers with the aim of 
halving the number of students, ‘as well as provide[ing] a sensible and sound opportunity for 
reducing the staff there.’590 Much like Walter Braithwaite and Robert Whigham, Gough’s 
views on the Staff College were formed based on experiences prior to 1914 and he had spent 
much of the First World War in senior command roles.591 In a similar vein to both, Gough 
had clearly failed to discern the greater complexity of daily staff duties and the more 
 
586 Note by the ACS, 12 October 1943. TNA WO 32/4461. 
587 Lieutenant-General Sir Clive Liddell to Herbert Creedy, 27 January 1938 and Lieutenant-General Sir 
Reginald May to Herbert Creedy, 18 January 1938. TNA WO 32/4461. 
588 DMGO to A.E. Widdows, 31 December 1937. TNA WO 32/4461. 
589 General Sir Hubert Gough had commanded the Fifth Army on the Western Front and had retired from the 
army in October 1922, thus had been uninvolved in the myriad discussions and debates surrounding the needs of 
the British Army through the period covered by this thesis. 
590 General Sir Hubert Gough, ‘Training of the Army: Woolwich and Sandhurst Could be Combined.’ The Daily 
Telegraph, 26 March 1934. LHCMA, Papers of Basil Liddell Hart, LH 15/3/58. 
591 Gough’ experiences of the Staff College comprised limited experience as a student at Camberley in 1889 and 
as an instructor between 1904 and 1906. Gary Sheffield, ‘An Army Commander on the Somme: Hubert Gough,’ 
in Sheffield and Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front, p. 73. 
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specialised staff requirements which had developed as a result of the experiences of the First 
World War.  
 
Although the conclusions of the Willingdon committee report were ultimately folded into and 
were re-examined by the Committee on Conditions of Service of Officers of the Royal Navy, 
the Army and the Royal Air Force,592 its members noted that regarding the Willingdon 
committee’s conclusions on staff training, ‘it is not therefore necessary for us to comment 
upon this development…We put it on record…that whatever the direct result may be…we 
welcome this step as likely to have a real effect upon the standard of keenness and 
intellectual activity among officers of the Army.’593 Ultimately, although grounded in the 
desire to increase promotion prospects for regimental officers and stimulate broader interest 
in intellectual pursuits rather than address key failings with the structure of staff training, 
these views represented a dramatic shift in mentality amongst the most senior officers at the 
War Office. Whilst earlier reform proposals had foundered on a combination of the sheer 
multiplicity of views presented and outright opposition from key personnel with prior 
experience of examining staff training, by the mid-1930s, the British Army had a body of 
senior officers more open to educational development than their predecessors. 
 
One reason for this changing attitude was the generational shift which took place in the 
higher ranks of the army during the 1930s. This shift saw long-standing opponents of 
proposals for staff reform, including General Walter Braithwaite, General Sir Robert 
Whigham and General A.R Cameron replaced by those such as General Lord Gort, 
Lieutenant-Generals Sir Harry Knox, Sir Clive Liddell, Sir Reginald May and Sir Hugh Elles 
and Major-General Alan Brooke, all of whom showed themselves amenable to long resisted 
reforms to staff training.594 This generational shift in attitudes rested on the differing 
experiences of each in the First World War. For example, in his biography of Lord Gort, J.R. 
Colville noted that, ‘Gort was acutely aware of the mistakes made by the High Command 
because he had seen them at first hand and had suffered from them. To the extent, therefore, 
 
592 See Draft Reports of the Committee on Conditions of Service of Officers of the Royal Navy, the Army and 
the Royal Air Force, TNA T 162/992; Warren Fisher Committee, Miscellaneous Papers, TNA T 162/478. 
593 Report of the Committee on Conditions of Service of Officers of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal 
Air Force. p. 34. TNA T 162/992. 
594 Both Generals Braithwaite and Whigham retired from the army in 1931, whilst another opponent of staff 
reform General Sir John Burnett-Stuart had moved on to command British troops in Egypt in 1931 before 
becoming General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Command in 1934. 
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that when he looked backwards to the First World War it was in eager enthusiasm to teach 
the lessons which could be learned from past errors.’595  
 
Whilst those holding high rank in the 1920s had largely experienced the First World War 
from the vantage of the War Office or senior command and staff posts far removed from the 
fighting front, those reaching high rank in the 1930s had primarily served in regimental or 
relatively junior staff roles for much of the war. Additionally, many of those reaching high 
rank in the 1930s had either been contemporaries at the Staff College or had served together 
on the directing staff during Ironside’s tenure as Commandant of Camberley.596 Mark Frost 
has identified the role that personal connections between instructors and students had in terms 
of their potential for career development and it is reasonable to suggest that time spent at the 
Staff College under Ironside could have shaped the attitudes of these officers towards the 
need for reform in staff training.597 Indeed, the continued proposal and eventual adoption of 
reforms shaped by a combination of the short staff courses developed during the First World 
War and the ideas formulated by Ironside in 1926, certainly suggest that this generational 
shift at the top of the army had a profound impact on War Office attitudes to the reform of 
staff training. Nowhere was this more evident than in the report of the Committee on the 
Military Education of the Army Officer, chaired by Brigadier H.R.S. Massy. As will be 
shown below, this committee undertook the most comprehensive review of military 
education, bringing together cadet training, promotion examinations, the subjects required for 
study, progressive training up to command level and the Staff College.   
 
The Massy Committee on the Military Education of the Officer 
 
Historians of the interwar period have paid little heed to the details of the committees 
established in the late 1930s and what they can tell us about shifting attitudes towards 
education at the higher levels of the War Office. Indeed, in relation to the reforms brought in 
as a result of the Committee on the Military Education of the Army Officer, where these are 
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597 Mark Frost, ‘The British and Indian Staff College in the Interwar Years,’ in Douglas E. Delaney, Robert C. 
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mentioned, it is primarily the resultant reduction of the Staff College course to one year and 
the establishment of a Senior War Course at Minley Manor, Farnborough which is noted, 
rather than how and why this volte face in attitudes to reform took place.598 As will be 
demonstrated below, this report when taken alongside the Willingdon committee report and 
the various examinations of different aspects of staff training through the 1920s, 
demonstrated a marked shift in the attitudes of senior officers towards military education. 
Although still primarily approaching the problem from the perspective of the recruitment and 
retention of officers, unlike earlier examinations, it recognised the interlocking nature of 
different phases of officer education and training and the need for continued topping up of 
knowledge prior to undertaking higher level posts. 
 
The committee on the Military Education of the Army Officer was established exclusively to, 
‘consider how far the system now in force for the military education of the officer meets with 
modern requirements and to submit recommendations as considered necessary for its 
alteration.’599 The committee itself was the brain-child of the Director of Military Training, 
Major-General Alan Brooke, but had the approval of the CIGS, Field Marshal Sir Cyril 
Deverell. The committee was chaired by Brigadier H.R.S. Massy, Brigadier Royal Artillery, 
Southern Command600 with its membership comprising Lieutenant-Colonel C. N. Norman, 
9th Queens Royal Lancers601 and Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Nye, 2nd Battalion The Royal 
Warwickshire Regiment.602 All of these officers had passed through the Staff College post-
1918 with Massy subsequently serving on the directing staff at Quetta and Nye at Camberley. 
In addition, Massy had attended both the Imperial Defence College and served as an 
instructor at the Indian Army’s Senior Officers’ School at Balgaum, whilst Norman had 
experience of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. By the time the committee reported in 
March 1938, Hore-Belisha’s sweeping change of personnel in the Army Council had taken 
place with Lieutenant-General Lord Gort becoming Chief of the Imperial General Staff, a 
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fellow former Commandant of the Camberley Staff College, Major-General Ronald Adam, 
appointed as Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Major-General Charles Liddell 
appointed as Adjutant General, and Major-General A.P. Wavell recalled from India and 
appointed as G.O.C.-in-C. Southern Command.603 With all of these officers having begun 
their service in the First World War in relatively junior staff posts and having served as 
instructors at one of the Staff Colleges post-1918, this represented a significant departure 
from earlier attempts at reform.  
 
Together with its views on the required changes for staff training, the report also 
demonstrated a shift in view on the ideal type of officer required for the army. The Massy 
committee concluded that, ‘the ideal must be the educated commander, a combination of the 
thinker, the trained technician, and finally the man of action.’604 For the British Army in the 
interwar period, this combination had been virtually impossible to achieve despite its 
recognition of the need for, ‘officers who could manage large and intricate organization, 
recognize the problems that confronted them, and find practical solutions to them.’605 Instead, 
earlier chapters have demonstrated that there remained senior elements within the British 
Army who firmly believed that it was the traditional idea of the regimental officer, with its 
emphasis on leadership and hard work, which was the most desirable candidate.606 Therefore, 
the report was suggesting a change in institutional attitudes around the characteristics defined 
as desirable for an officer to possess and recognised, much as Ironside had as early as 1925, 
that the army required different types of officer for different roles.607 Arguably, this was a 
change in institutional mentality not fully resolved until the introduction of the War Office 
Selection Board (WOSB) in March 1942, a scheme established by General Sir Ronald Adam 
and built upon a recognition that the army needed to break away from the spectre of Colonel 
Blimp and utilise its personnel more efficiently.608 
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In its assessment of the existing personnel within the officer corps and their training up to 
command, the report was highly critical, noting an extremely low standard of officer cadet 
entering Sandhurst in particular. Much like the earlier Willingdon and Plumer committee 
reports, Massy’s committee stressed, ‘that in order to attract a larger entry of suitable material 
in the officer corps, conditions of service must be improved.’609 Throughout the interwar 
period, regular reviews by the Board of Education of both the RMA Woolwich and the RMC 
Sandhurst had been critical of the standard of student and the form of education provided, in 
particular that of the RMC.610 Such criticism was extended to the system of post-
commissioning training and resulted in the conclusion that, ‘no organization [sic.] exists in 
the Army to provide a comprehensive and systematic training for…officer[s].’611 The 
historiography of the British Army tends to emphasise the role this lack of comprehensive 
system had on a broad failure to disseminate a common way of working throughout the 
army.612 However, it equally does much to explain the poor quality of officer attending the 
Staff College, an issue previously ascribed to casualties among junior officers during the First 
World War and the failure of regimental commanders to put forward suitable candidates.613 
To overcome this, the report suggested the creation of a junior commanders’ school, a 
recommendation which was eventually put into action in 1939 by Hore-Belisha at the urging 
of both the CIGS, Lord Gort, and the DCIGS, Major-General Adam.614 This course was to be 
run parallel to the Staff College course in order to ensure that those officers who were either 
unsuitable for the staff or did not desire a staff post retained an outlet and established a career 
path outside the glacial pace of regimental promotion, but which did not rely on the hallowed 
letters p.s.c.615 Alongside the attempt to offer better prospects for promotion and intellectual 
advancement to young officers than had previously been the case, such a move also 
attempted to mollify the continued suspicion of the staff by regimental officers by offering 
comparable levels of training to both groups.616   
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Whilst many of these proposals represented new solutions to long-standing problems, the 
findings on the system of staff training were eerily familiar and echo the findings of 
examinations into staff training in the 1920s. Their criticisms of the system centred on 
analysis which suggested that; ‘probably 20% of the British service are inferior to other 
officers who never go to the Staff College…A proportion of officers – probably 40% - fail to 
obtain sufficient benefit from the second year’s instruction to justify the time and money 
spent…The second year’s instruction comes too early in an officer’s career…There are 
insufficient trained staff officers to fill existing third grade appointments. This position will 
be accentuated on mobilization and there will be no reserve.’617 As has been shown, these 
views were present in the minds of senior personnel throughout this period and their 
continued repetition by officers seeking reform contrasts with the assorted counterpoints put 
forward against successive reform proposals resting on largely outdated institutional attitudes 
towards education and training of officers. 
 
Much like earlier reforms there was a similar emphasis on the importance of nominations in 
ensuring suitable candidates obtained vacancies at the Staff College. Both the Massy 
committee and Ironside’s Report on Higher Education for War pressed for a seventy-five 
percent to twenty-five percent split in favour of nominations. 618 Similarly, many of the 
memoranda discussing the increasing presence of technical officers at the Staff College 
during the late 1920s emphasised a preference for nominating technical officers to ensure that 
they went before a panel of senior officers to confirm that they had the necessary 
characteristics of leadership alongside their obvious academic qualities.619 Despite the critical 
assessment by Smalley, on average, nominated officers performed better than their 
counterparts gaining competitive vacancies at the Staff College. Also striking a very similar 
note to earlier reform proposals was the recommendation that, ‘the entry into the Staff 
College should be greatly increased. To do this, it will obviously be necessary to shorten the 
course…We understand that doubling the entry will provide sufficient third grade staff 
officers to fill existing appointments.’620 This calculation owed much to the comments of 
Lieutenant-General Cameron in 1927 and his observation that the British Army was then 
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unable to fill its lower grade staff posts in war with qualified officers.621 Therefore, the 
assessment of the requirements of staff training by the Massy committee represented an 
accumulation of data over the preceding eighteen years. Whilst earlier proposals had focussed 
principally on the provision of an additional higher-level war course, the recognition of the 
need for greater numbers of trained junior staff officers reflected both the lessons of the First 
World War and the analysis of future requirements laid down by Cameron. Ultimately, by 
combining this with the long-standing requirement to improve the career prospects for young 
officers joining the army to prevent a widening of the gap between manpower requirements 
and officer recruitment, the provision of the Massy committee aimed to ensure that, ‘all 
officers with about ten years’ service will have completed either the course at the War 
College or attended the Junior Commanders’ School.’622 
 
Such a centralised system of officer education would have represented a break with tradition 
for the British Army. While myriad schools existed for officers and senior NCOs in this 
period, these largely served to train their students as instructors in a particular military skill. 
The prime example being the School of Musketry at Hythe at which, ‘infantry 
subalterns…spent three months…where they learned to become musketry instructors.’623 The 
introduction of these new educational institutions also served to reform the tradition of 
relying on senior regimental officers to provide those under their command with up-to-date 
tactical and operational training.624 In theory, regimental commanders could rely upon Staff 
College graduates serving with their regiments to ensure that such training was both realistic 
and based upon the precepts of Field Service Regulations, as was the case with Dominion 
forces.625 As it was, the lack of numbers trained by the Staff Colleges made this virtually 
impossible. Indeed, despite being part of the only Corps maintained in being during 
peacetime by 1936, ‘GOC 1st Division at Aldershot had only three staff officers permanently 
attached to his headquarters.’626 The radical nature of this report was not so much in its 
proposals for staff reform, which largely mirrored those presented at various points 
throughout the interwar period. Instead, it was the recognition that, ‘the Army is suffering to-
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day from the presence of far too many officers who have never succeeded in breaking away 
from the humdrum existence of regimental soldiering...generally speaking insufficient 
encouragement is given to officers temporarily to leave their regiments to widen their 
experience.’627 This problem has been noted in previous chapters and throughout the existing 
historiography, most recently by David French, but also in published primary material.628 
More so than with previous efforts at reform, which ultimately aimed to work within 
prevailing institutional attitudes, the Massy committee report was fundamentally seeking to 
alter the British Army’s institutional attitude towards officer education and the prioritisation 
of the regimental system. Alongside the Willingdon and Warren Fisher committees, the 
overarching aim in shifting these institutional attitudes was to enhance the benefits of a career 
in the army. However, whilst emphasising this aspect, the Massy committee report equally 
served up sound military reasons for such a fundamental shift in institutional attitudes 
towards officer education.  
 
Responses to the Report 
 
Unlike previous examples, the responses to the Massy committee’s report resulted in a rapid 
and significant degree of change in the structure of staff training in the British Army and 
faced no opposition. Indeed, though earlier proposals had been subject to a verbal barrage of 
objections, a note from A.E. Widdows (Assistant Under-Secretary of State for War) 
expressing, ‘the thanks of the Council to Brigadier H.R.S. Massy, D.S.O, M.C., and the 
members of the Committee for the excellent report submitted.’629 This contrasts sharply with 
the relative ire received by Ironside towards his report in 1926 and the intense discussion 
which followed the proposals to reform the allocation of vacancies between 1927 and 1931. 
Of interest in the formal minuted discussion which followed the publication of the Massy 
committee report, the subjects of the Staff College and staff training were absent. This does 
not mean to say a discussion on this did not take place, merely that no source material has 
survived to record it or it took place in a less formal, verbal discussion within the Directorate 
of Staff Duties at the War Office.630 As a result, it is highly likely that a similar discussion 
 
627 Report of the Committee on the Military Education of the Army Officer, p.72. WO 32/4357. 
628 French, Regimental Identities, p. 153, Col. W. N. Nicholson, Behind the Lines: An Account of Administrative 
Staff Work in the British Army, 1914-1918 (London: The Strong Oak Press, 1939), p. 168 and Major-General D. 
Belchem, All in the Day’s March (London: William Collins, 1978), p. 17. 
629 A.E. Widdows to Brigadier Hugh Massy, 6 April 1938, TNA WO 32/4357. 
630 Notes of a meeting held in the D.M.T.’s room, 1st April, to discuss certain recommendations of the Massy 
Committee, WO 32/4357. 
 184 
occurred within the Director of Staff Duties department, at that time headed by Lieutenant-
General E.K. Squires. Whilst no records of such a discussion exist, the outcome of the Massy 
committee’s recommendations is clearly evident. Army Council Instruction No. 170 of 1938 
established that, ‘The Staff College, Camberley, will be divided into two wings, a Junior 
Wing and a Senior Wing, both under The Commandant, The Staff College, Camberley.’631 
What followed as part of the Army Council Instruction, albeit not completely in line with the 
recommendations of the Massy committee, broadly followed its precepts. Some of the 
differences were superficial, such as the decision to retain the names Junior and Senior 
Wing.632 Others were more significant, but can be accounted for by the precarious 
international situation in which Britain found itself in 1938. Under previous proposals, 
officers who qualified from the junior course would spend a period of time, between five to 
eight years, at staff and regimental duty prior to attending the senior course.633 Under the new 
instructions, it was implied that officers could progress immediately from one to the other, 
‘The Senior Wing will be situated at Minley Manor…As the Manor House is only some four 
miles west of Camberley, married students transferred direct to the Senior Wing…will not be 
required to change their residence during the course.’634 Whilst not suggesting all those 
considered eligible for the senior course progressed immediately to it, this section clearly set 
a precedent to skip the periods of staff and regimental duty in certain cases. The most 
disruptive impact of these changes in reducing the two courses to a year apiece was felt by 
Dominion forces who would previously have combined a two-year stint at Camberley with 
broader travel and attachment to other units of the British Army to enhance their skills and 
knowledge.635 As it was, Gort allowed the system of allowing married officers to take the two 
staff courses in successive years to be utilised by the Dominions, thus resulting in very little 
disruption to dominion officers.636 
 
A separate, but still crucial development as a result of the committees established in the late 
1930s, was the decision to reserve two vacancies at both wings for officers of the Territorial 
Army.637 Up to this point, they had not been required to attend either the Senior Officers’ 
 
631 Army Council Instruction No. 170 of 1938, Army Council Instructions 1938, TNA WO 293/23. 
632 Ibid. 
633 See Report on Higher Education for War, TNA WO 32/4840. 
634 Army Council Instruction No. 170 of 1938, Army Council Instructions 1938, TNA WO 293/23. 
635 See Chapter Seven, pp. 188-189. 
636 See Chapter Seven, pp. 188-189. 
637 Army Council Instruction No. 170 of 1938, Army Council Instructions 1938, TNA WO 293/23. 
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School, or the Staff College.638 This change in attitude was largely due to the recognition by 
1938 that the Territorial Army would play a significant role in any future war, particularly in 
the defence of the United Kingdom.639 Furthermore, remembering the significant expansion 
of the wartime officer corps in the First World War, with its attachment of reserve officers to 
regular formations, those at the top of the army, faced with a rapidly brewing war, realised 
that any move to integrate the Territorials with the regular army prior to the commencement 
of war could only be of benefit.  
 
These reforms ultimately formed part of a larger swing in military attitudes towards the 
importance of the centralised education of officers and the development of a clear career path 
for both regimental and staff officers. As earlier chapters have made clear, this was a problem 
with which the army had been wrestling since the mid-1920s and the era of disarmament.640 
This relatively sudden action to reform the course of officer education, was accompanied by a 
concomitant increase in the amount allocated as part of the Army Estimates for educational 
establishments. Since the 1924 estimates (when the original heading of Educational &c. 
Establishments, Hospitals, Depots, &c. was dispensed with in favour of the heading ‘Vote 4. 
– Educational Establishments), the amount spent on all educational establishments had 
generally remained around £880,000 out of overall budgets of around £40 million, around 
0.45 percent of the army budget. By 1939, this had risen to an allocation of £1,542,000 out of 
an estimate of £148,155,000, an increase to 0.96 percent of the army budget.641 Whilst the 
vote as a percentage of the overall army budget did not witness a significant increase, in real 
terms the increase in the educational vote represented a very real commitment from the army 
towards the education of its personnel, both ordinary ranks and officers. With only one 
proposal (that of Lieutenant-General Cameron in 1925) foundering on financial grounds, the 
relative impact of budgetary concerns on the progress of staff reform is relatively negligible. 
However, the almost doubling of the allocation for educational establishments in a budget 
aiming to redress nearly two decades of restricted funding with its consequent impact on the 
British Army’s ability to meet its commitments is significant. This increase suggests a 
marked recognition of the growing importance of education within the army as a whole and is 
 
638 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p. 63. 
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indicative of a shifting of institutional attitudes towards education brought about by the 
changes in senior personnel at the War Office.  
 
The wider attitude towards these reforms was positive, with a number of newspaper articles 
appearing in the months following their announcement speaking to the long-awaited nature of 
the changes. The most prolific commentator on this issue was Basil Liddell Hart. Between 
May and June 1938, he published three articles on the subject all of which highlighted the 
long-standing need for changes to staff training. In a leader written in mid-May, he noted 
that, ‘While the Army has suffered from an inadequate supply of trained staff officers, the 
careers of too many promising officers have been cramped and their keenness blunted by 
failure to squeeze…through gates that were too narrow for their and the Army’s needs.’642 
With Liddell Hart’s role as an advisor to the Secretary of State for War, Hore-Belisha, such 
positivity was expected although equally understandable in light of the long-standing 
recognition of the need for change in staff training. However, whilst Liddell Hart lauded 
these changes noting that, such changes justified hope in the future of the army, it was 
recognised by some within the army that the changes didn’t resolve all recognised 
shortcomings with the system of staff training. In a letter to the editor of The Times, 
Lieutenant-Colonel B.G. Peel observed that despite the positivity in the changes of 1938, the 
selection of candidates for the Staff College entrance examination still required refining. 
Noting that the Brigade and Divisional Commanders were apt to put forward potentially 
unsuitable candidates to avoid a personal grievance, Peel suggested that the Senior Officers’ 
School should serve as the basis for a course granting permission to sit the Staff College 
Examination.643 While such a selection process was not discussed within the army prior to the 
outbreak of war in September 1939, Peel’s criticism highlights that whilst the reforms of 
1938 represented a significant development in the reform of British Army staff training, they 




It has been shown that the period 1936-1939 witnessed an in-depth examination of a series of 
problems which had plagued the British Army since the ending of the First World War in 
1918. As has been argued, this change was in large part due to a generational shift which 
 
642 Staff College Enlargement, 13 May 1938. LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 10/1938/40a, 
643 Selection for Staff College. The Times, 25 May 1938. 
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brought those officers to senior posts who had experienced the First World War as both 
regimental and lower-level staff officers, and who recognised that outdated institutional 
attitudes were holding the army back.644 Whilst the discussions of the late 1920s had 
emphasised the recruiting problem and primarily sought to improve the attractiveness of the 
army as a career through minor adjustments in conditions and rapid promotion within the 
bounds of the regimental system, this new generation recognised the need to establish a 
career structure based on professional education and intellectual development. However, 
whilst in part addressing these broader concerns of officer recruitment, the addition of the 
Massy committee on officer education demonstrated a clear commitment to professional 
education.  
 
The conclusions of that committee represented the distillation of four years of wartime 
experience, the introduction of short staff courses in 1917 and their eventual formalisation 
under War Office control in Britain alongside multiple articles in professional journals and 
reform proposals of the intervening period. The result was the establishment in 1939 of a 
system of staff training which addressed many of the issues identified by earlier studies. It 
introduced the division of the existing course of instruction into two separate courses at 
separate by proximate locations, allowed a significant increase in the number of officers 
trained for junior staff posts (a problem identified in 1925 by Ironside) a greater emphasis on 
nominated candidates and the recognition that not all officers attending the Staff College 
were suited to high command, nor did the army wish them to be. This combined with the 
introduction of a junior commanders’ school provided the army with the various types of 
officer required in a modern war and equally opened up a clear path of career progression for 
both staff and regimental officers. 
 
Ultimately, these reforms were introduced far too late to have much impact on the British 
Army which went to war against Germany in 1939. Despite this, the fact that such significant 
reforms were approved by the Army Council is indicative of a changing attitude towards 
education within the peacetime army which, despite having been forward thinking in its 
attitude towards doctrinal development and technological change, had largely retained pre-
Victorian attitudes towards the education of its personnel. Whilst this thesis has primarily 
 
644 Equally, the impending war in Europe should not be disregarded as a factor in the rapid adoption of the 
measures discussed above. However, the lack of enunciation of such concerns within the available primary 
source material makes such a link circumstantial rather than confirmed. 
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focused on developments within the War Office, the following chapter will briefly highlight 
how developments in staff training took place in two of the Dominion armies (Australia and 
Canada). At the same time as the Indian Staff College at Quetta remained virtually identical 
to that at Camberley and officers from both dominions were consistently a feature of both 
colleges, it is important to note that significant differences existed. Whilst the War Office 
failed to implement the lessons of the First World War related to staff training until the late 
1930s, it will be seen that both Australia and Canada recognised the increased importance of 
training officers in lower level staff duties and established their own staff courses soon after 
the ending of hostilities. In addition, shortly before the changes made in Britain as a result of 
the reports examined in this chapter, Australia established its own command and staff school, 
seeking to formalise its process of continued professional training. As will be shown, though 
operating within the broader framework of an imperial army, the dominions developed a 
drastically different institutional attitude towards officer education largely unimpeded by the 
long-held cultural and institutional beliefs of the British Army and the restrictions imposed 
by regimental thinking. In doing so, it will highlight the broader conclusions of this thesis 
regarding the myriad influences acting on the British Army’s ability to reform its system of 





Chapter 7 – Dominion Staff Training in the Interwar Period. 
 
 
As has been demonstrated, within the British Army between 1919 and 1938, despite a broad 
recognition that the pre-1914 structure of staff training had a number of flaws, any effort to 
overcome these through the proposal of significant structural reforms had failed to achieve 
much headway. In large part this was due to the maintenance of outdated institutional 
attitudes which in turn led to the lack of a single vision for, and understanding of, the role the 
Staff College was to play in the future British Army. Alongside this, the Staff College faced 
additional challenges through the persistence of incorrect readings of the lessons from the 
First World War and the presence of competing and conflicting priorities, particularly the 
recruitment and retention of officers in the face of increased competition from the other two 
services and declining public support for the army. These combined to create a perfect storm 
which built on the inherent conservatism within the senior officer corps and lack of clear 
direction over the lessons to be learned from the British experience of the First World War, 
resulted in a misguided approach to the reform of staff training in this period. This approach 
failed to recognise the inherent duality in staff training between the requirements of lower-
level staff duties and that required of senior staff and formation commanders. Such a division 
had been recognised by 1917 and was re-stated by Ironside in 1925, but it was not until 1937 
that the importance of training a larger pool of junior officers to staff formations and a 
smaller, more selective pool of officers capable of commanding and directing the staff work 
of larger formations became a formal part of British officer training. 
 
Building on this analysis, this final chapter will highlight that the experiences of Canada and 
Australia were markedly different. Indeed, whilst the course of instruction at Camberley 
provided training in lower-level staff duties, in the interwar period at least, the focus for 
many senior officers was on the provision of commanders for the army. In contrast, Canada 
and Australia both acted on the duality of purpose in staff training far earlier than the British 
Army, instituting cohesive and advanced systems of staff training and continued professional 
development. This was primarily the result of both dominions relying on largely militia 
forces. However, in the aftermath of the First World War, both recognised the importance of 
having a large pool of trained junior staff officers, as a result of the greater planning and 
logistical requirements of a modern industrialised war. In addressing this, Australia in 
particular developed systems of short staff courses and established a unified staff corps to 
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maximise professional knowledge. Moreover, both the Royal Military College’s (RMC) 
Kingston, Canada and Duntroon, Australia were modelled on West Point, with marked 
differences to RMA Woolwich and RMC Sandhurst, in pursuing a four-year course of study 
providing a broad military and civilian education with no expectation that their graduates 
would commit to a military career. In doing so, both Kingston and Duntroon provided cadets 
with both the skills they required in their regimental roles and an education in junior staff 
duties absent from the British system until attendance at Camberley or Quetta. As a result, 
despite a system of professional military education (PME) which was skewed towards 
supporting British interests, Canada and Australia came to develop a system of staff training 
which represented a significant advance on British methods by creating a pool of junior staff 
officers trained locally, and utilising Camberley and Quetta for its ability to train senior 
commanders and staff officers whilst also ensuring that doctrinal precepts followed those of 
the wider imperial army. That they were able to do so, without the level of debate taking 
place within the British Army around the same issue, demonstrates a unity of purpose and 
understanding that did not exist within the British Army. 
 
Finally, it will be seen that although the Indian Army Staff College at Quetta was established 
on the same lines as Camberley, followed its curriculum and undertook periodic exchanges of 
instructors, there were still a number of differences which hint at a differing institutional 
attitude towards staff training. Although largely inconsequential in terms of still persisting 
with a two-year course aimed at fitting an officer for all levels of staff work, these differences 
in institutional attitude, when combined with the pressure for reform from within the pages of 
professional journals, demonstrate how far the British Army’s continued missing of 
opportunities to staff reform was primarily the result of institutional attitudes within the 
British Army. In doing so, it will put forward a new understanding of the linkages between 
the Imperial General Staff in London and the General Staffs of the dominions. With the 
existing historiography emphasising the role education played in fostering links between the 
various imperial nations, this chapter suggests that alongside this, there was a more complex 
relationship between the various nations which refused to subordinate educational 





The Origins of Imperial Staff Training 1905 to 1918 
 
The idea of establishing an imperial basis for staff training had its origins in the debates of 
the early 1900s regarding closer imperial military ties. The importance of centralised systems 
of officer training in bringing the various imperial armies together was established by the 
CIGS in 1909, Field Marshal Sir William Nicholson, when he told the Imperial Conference 
of that year that, ‘education is the keynote of…the proposals [on an Imperial General 
Staff].’645 The aim being to disseminate British tactical and operational doctrine to the 
various imperial militaries by training imperial officers within the British staff system.646 
However, within this belief was the understanding that as the individual dominion’s 
requirements grew, decentralisation of staff training would have to take place. Preston argued 
that, prior to the 1909 Imperial Conference, it was recognised that, ‘if the self-governing 
dominions beyond the seas are ever to become self-contained in their military institutions, 
they themselves will…have to set up their own staff colleges.’647 Consequently, although 
seeking to establish a uniformity of thought between the various imperial militaries, the 
British desire for the dominions to become militarily autonomous entities gave the dominions 
the freedom to establish their own staff training methodologies within the overarching 
direction of British imperial policy. As has already been shown, General Staff policy towards 
staff training prior to 1914 was far more unified and open to reform than that demonstrated in 
the interwar period.648 As a result, this desire to decentralise staff training to the dominions 
reflected the recognition in 1908 that in order to expand in the event of war, the British and 
imperial armies would need to train more staff officers.649 As will be demonstrated below, 
this autonomy granted to the dominions in the first decade of the twentieth century allowed 
them to sidestep the divisions and debates within the British Army in the establishment of 
their own junior staff courses. This allowed the dominions to continue their practice of 
placing Camberley and Quetta graduates in key positions within their militaries as a 
‘collective conduit’ for British operational methods, whilst utilising local staff schools to 
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provide them with a body of trained staff officers for local organisation, training and 
operational planning.650  
 
Of the two dominions, it was Canada which had the smallest base to build from, ‘as no more 
than four…officers a year could be spared for staff college training, the creation of a 
Canadian Staff College would not be worthwhile.’651 On this basis, the course of instruction 
that was established in 1909 was a short course consisting of a few months of once-weekly 
classes, a short practical phase and an examination which aimed at, ‘a sensible affordable 
solution for providing elementary staff training in an army that was just beginning to develop 
into a modern military force.’652 Given the largely militia nature of Canadian forces at this 
time, such an approach allowed Permanent Force officers to continue attending Camberley, 
whilst also providing a pool of officers capable of undertaking junior staff duties in the event 
of wartime expansion. To this end, the course covered the full gamut of subjects required for 
junior staff officers, providing a solid grounding in topics from ammunition supply, 
topography camps and bivouacs, headquarters and staffs, advance guards and transport and 
supply through to imperial defence, colonial forces and various elements of Field Service 
Regulations.653 Though not quite following this pattern, Australia similarly established an 
initial short staff training course, set up by Colonel Hubert Foster of the Royal Engineers at 
the University of Sydney in October 1907.654 Whilst the Canadian example was principally 
aimed at militia officers, the courses started by Foster aimed to, ‘enable militia and 
permanent force officers to conduct staff work.’655 Foster’s ambitions extended beyond this 
to encompass a college to, ‘help militia officers to become more efficient as leaders of their 
men; second, train selected officers in staff duties, so as to ensure that there will always be 
enough available to furnish commanders and their staff for the forces.’656  
 
Although the Canadian system was relatively developed by the start of the First World War, 
turning out 129 trained staff officers by 1914, Australia’s system of staff training was slower 
to develop, largely as a result of the fact that the formal establishment of the Commonwealth 
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of Australia and the change from devolved state militaries to a single Australian Army, only 
took place in 1901.657 The RMC Duntroon, responsible for training officer cadets for the 
permanent forces, only opened in July 1911, with Foster’s staff courses being incorporated as 
a series of week-long courses run by the Australian General Staff from May 1913.658 
However, the importance of these developments is that they reflected a recognition of the 
importance of both staff work and continuous professional training for officers. Whilst 
British staff officers received their only centralised PME beyond their cadet training at either 
Camberley or Quetta, Canadian and Australian officers not only received a longer 
programme of cadet training at their respective cadet colleges, but they also received local 
staff training, before those identified for higher command went onto either of the British 
colleges. Consequently, while the British Army staff graduates were generally pigeonholed 
into staff roles upon graduation, both Canada and Australia built up a reserve of officers with 
experience of staff training within formations ready to staff expanded wartime formations. 
Although initially struggling to obtain high level positions within their own forces over the 
course of the First World War, for the Australian divisions the gradual process of 
Australianisation resulted in the comment by the official British historian Sir James Edmonds 
that, ‘by 1918 the staff work of Australian formations was better than that of the rest of the 
BEF.’659 Despite this, Edmonds’ assertion has not been validated by more recent 
historiography. Gary Sheffield argues that, ‘Australian divisions…were no better, and no 
worse, than comparable British formations.’660 As a result, it can be argued that the local staff 
courses run by dominion forces allowed them, with their largely militia officer corps, to 
operate at the same level of efficiency as British formations relying on professional, 
Camberley trained staff officers, having made more successful use of their systems of staff 
training than the British. As will be argued, as the interwar period progressed, the British 
Army struggled to assimilate fully the staff lessons of the First World War, whilst the 
dominion armies continued to develop and learn from their wartime experience, which by the 
time of the reforms enacted in the British Army in 1937 had led to Australia in particular 
cementing its lead over the British system of staff training.   
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The Australian Experience 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the Australian Army sought to pool its 
experiences of command and staff work through the establishment of the Australian Staff 
Corps in October 1920.661 This new corps consisted of all permanent force officers from 
combatant arms and represented an effort by the Australian Army to make use of the 
organisational and operational lessons learnt over the course of the war. By 1924, with the 
abolition of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and its reconstitution as a much smaller 
professional force backed by a volunteer militia, the Australian government reviewed its role, 
prioritising local defence with the Council of Defence asserting that Army expenditure 
should prioritise the training of commanders and staff.662 Whilst the Australian pre-war short 
staff courses continued in the interwar period, the initial staff training received by Australian 
officers came from the four-year course of instruction at RMC Duntroon, topped up by 
exercises run by the Australian General Staff. This emphasis on staff and command was in 
contrast to the British Army in the same period which, although not dismissing the 
importance of the staff, remained primarily focussed on the regimental officer and how best 
to ensure that he was able to obtain a satisfactory career in an era of glacial promotion and 
limited opportunities for action. David French argued that this British lack of focus on higher 
level training in the interwar period severely impacted its operational capabilities in the 
opening battles of the Second World War.663 Consequently, while Australian officers had 
fewer opportunities for regimental experience in comparison to British officers, they gained 
far more experience in staff work and organisation.   
 
Throughout the interwar period, the Australian Army continued to make use of the British 
Army staff colleges for training its officers. In doing so it emphasised that, ‘it is of paramount 
importance…that Australian officers should be afforded [to] the fullest possible extent the 
advantages of the higher staff training of the Camberley establishment.’664 In highlighting the 
higher staff training aspect of Camberley, it could initially be assumed that the Australian 
General Staff was falling into the same trap as the British in seeking to focus on the provision 
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of future senior commanders. However, throughout this period, the Australian Army was 
training its own junior staff officers through the curriculum of the cadet course at Duntroon 
or through one of the regional short staff courses run by the various army commands 
established prior to 1914.665 As a result, whilst British officers generally gained their first 
experience of staff work and training on appointment to the Staff College, nearly all 
Australian officers at the very least gained basic staff skills as a result of their cadet training. 
Whilst the junior year at a British Staff College served to sharpen up existing skills and bring 
an Australian officer’s knowledge of doctrine in line with British requirements, it was not as 
fundamental to the process of officer education as it was within the British officer corps. 
Instead, it was the senior year of the Staff College, with its focus on command, control and 
the idea of an imperial war effort which was of greatest utility to the Australian Army. With 
no comparable educational establishment formed until 1938, the colleges at Camberley and 
Quetta remained the primary provider of higher-level training for all imperial armies. 
 
In a similar vein to the War Office in 1919, the Australian government was keen to ensure 
that in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Australian officers who were likely 
to play a key role in the continued development of the army in the interwar period gained the 
benefits of the first post-war courses utilised to distil the lessons of the war. To this end, they 
proposed five officers to attend Camberley, including the future Adjutant General, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Carl Jess.666 Also nominated were the future Director of Military 
Operations and Training, Major William Foster, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel P.M McFarlane 
(who served on the General Staff in India and held District Commands in both South 
Australia and Western Australia), and Lieutenant-Colonel J.L Whitham (who served as an 
instructor at the Senior Officers’ School in 1919 and then as Director of Organisation and 
Personal Services and Base Commandant in Tasmania, Queensland and Victoria).667 That all 
of these officers went on to hold important roles within the interwar Australian Army most 
clearly demonstrates the use made of these early courses and the Staff College in general, by 
the Australian Army. The added importance placed on this higher training received at 
Camberley was emphasised when the War Office increased the cost to Australia of officers 
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attending the college from a pre-war rate of £200, to a post war rate of £700.668 Although 
baulking at the prospect of these costs being retrospectively applied to those attending the 
college up to September 1921, the Governor-General, Henry Forster, agreed to the increase 
despite the fact that, ‘when transport expenses and special allowances…are taken into 
consideration, the Staff College courses are proving very costly to the Commonwealth 
Government.’669 Australia continued to send officers to both Camberley and Quetta 
throughout the interwar period, although by the early 1930s with the worsening economic 
situation, Australia limited itself to one candidate for Camberley from 1933 and one in 
alternate years for Quetta from the same date.670 By this point the Australian Army had 
developed its own pool of highly qualified, staff-trained officers who had largely replaced 
those British p.s.c officers who had been crucial to the establishment and continued success 
of local training schools.671 Consequently, even when in severe financial straits and with the 
existence of cadet training and postgraduate short-staff courses capable of providing trained 
officers, the Australian Government continued to see British staff training as a key element in 
its staff officers’ military education. 
 
However, it was not just the education at Camberley or Quetta that resulted in this continued 
insistence on sending officers from Australia to British staff colleges. Indeed, it was the 
opportunities offered to broaden the knowledge of the Australian Army more generally. One 
of the key methods utilised in this regard by the Australian General Staff was a system of 
reporting by those officers attending both Camberley and Quetta.672 These reports contained 
lecture precis, papers relating to the various exercises and topics studied at the Staff College, 
and a summary report provided by the officer himself.673 Of interest in relation to the analysis 
of the system of staff training pursued by the Australian Army is the fact that all of the 
reports received, or at least those surviving in the archival record, relate to the senior division 
at the Staff College. Given the relatively cohesive training provided by the RMC and short-
staff courses in lower level staff duties, this focus is unsurprising. Furthermore, it is clear that 
the reports submitted by these officers served an important role to inform the General Staff of 
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new developments or subjects of interest being taught at Camberley, with copies being sent to 
various key departments.674 Additionally, it is clear that this was not a passive process of 
simply compiling and transferring records between staff departments. In October 1932, the 
future Chief of the General Staff Colonel Lavarack, then part of the Military Training 
department, noted that certain lectures reported on by Captain H. F. H. Durant would be of 
interest to the Intelligence section and requested they be sent copies.675 Whilst, as has been 
demonstrated within this thesis,  British Army p.s.c.’s often found their knowledge subsumed 
within the broader regimental culture of the British Army, the Australian General Staff 
ensured that it obtained the most value from its graduates by utilising their experiences to 
inform future military developments. As will be shown below, this continued focus on the 
higher elements of staff training provided at Camberley was primarily due to the advanced 
nature of Australian staff training, particularly by the later 1930s when the changes taking 
place in Britain were discussed in relation to Australian staff officers.     
 
Together with this utilisation of the lessons taught at Camberley in the wider development of 
Australian Army operational methodologies, the Australian General Staff sought to use the 
period officers spent abroad to learn as much as possible about training and education, as 
well as how other services operated. One such example is that of Lieutenant-Colonel Jess 
during his period at Camberley in 1920. Between May and July 1920, the Australian General 
Staff requested that Jess be allowed to visit the Senior Officers’ School, Sheerness in order 
to, ‘make a close study of the methods of this School with a view to advising the Defence 
Department in the matter on his return to Australia.’676 However, it was not just the British 
Army from which the Australian Department of Defence learnt. In June 1925, Wing 
Commander R. Williams of the Royal Australian Air Force returned to Australia after 
undertaking a course of instruction in the United Kingdom, followed by a tour of Canada, the 
United States and New Zealand. During the course of these visits, Williams visited the Air 
Ministry’s Directorate of Organisation and Staff Training and Area Commanders in the 
United Kingdom, the Canadian Director of Air Services, the US War and Navy Department, 
the Commanding General at Honolulu and the Director of Army Air Services, New 
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Zealand.677 Similarly to Jess, in 1933 Lieutenant C.T. Gamlin of the Australian Staff Corps 
was attached to the Royal Army Service Corps Training Centre in order to learn motor 
transport duties in order to broaden the experience and knowledge of the Australian Army 
Service Corps.678 Much like the reports provided by officers studying at Camberley, the 
utilisation of this experience allowed the Australian General Staff to update its training and 
operational practices in light of best practice from a variety of sources. As with the other 
factors cited above, it is clear that from the establishment of its policy prioritising the training 
of commanders and staff, the Australian Department of Defence ensured that despite less 
than favourable financial conditions in the post-war period, Australian officers continued to 
undertake training abroad to allow them to disseminate best practice from larger professional 
forces across Australian forces, helping to ensure imperial interoperability. Additionally, they 
continued to develop and provide lower level staff training at a local level to ensure the 
development of a pool of potential commanders and staff in the case of military expansion. 
This stands in sharp contrast to the British experience demonstrated in earlier chapters. 
 
Moreover, it is evident that at the same time as ensuring imperial interoperability, the 
Australian Department of Defence was not willing to follow blindly British directives on the 
training and education of its staff. As has been shown in chapter five, one significant problem 
identified by the War Office in this period was the problem of ensuring that only the most 
suitable officers found their way onto the Staff College Selected List. In discussing this issue, 
it was noted that some commanders were proposing unsuitable officers for the Staff College 
examination and that there should be some form of negative reporting of commanders who 
continued to do so.679 Whilst in the British instance, there was little oversight of this process, 
in Australia by 1925, commanders were responsible for placing officers on the list of names 
eligible for the Staff College examination, it was Army Headquarters (AHQ) who retained 
the final say on who went forward.680 As a result, although a potentially unsuitable officer 
could be recommended for the Staff College, the additional oversight provided by AHQ 
largely aimed to prevent these officers taking up valuable places at Camberley and Quetta. 
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Indeed, it was not always necessary for AHQ to step in, as divisional commanders were 
equally ready to step in if unsuitable officers were proposed.  
 
In March 1926, the Commander of 1st Division Major-General Julius Bruche wrote to the 
Secretary of the Department of Defence Thomas Trumble about the removal of an officer 
who, ‘was not qualified to sit for the Examination when his name was placed on the list.’681 
Thus, whilst officers were only removed from the War Office Selected Lists once they 
reached the age limit for entry to the Staff College, it is evident that the Australian General 
Staff took great care to ensure that only the most suitable officers were selected to sit the 
Examination for the Staff College. That this system prevented the same scale of poor-quality 
officers sitting the Staff College Examination compared to the British Army is established by 
the Australian response to the 1931 alteration to King’s Regulations regarding the Staff 
College Examination. At the end of the various discussions surrounding the allocation of 
vacancies at the Staff College, it was decided that the Staff College Selected list would be 
abolished, and officers would instead have their suitability for staff training added to their 
annual confidential report. Alongside these changes, officers would no longer be allowed to 
sit the examination on more than three occasions. In response to this change, the CGS Major-
General Sir Walter Coxen noted that the existing Australian system of a selected list 
maintained by commanders and annually reviewed by the Military Board, ‘has been found to 
be of great value in ensuring that only suitable candidates are allowed to sit for the 
examination.’682 Furthermore, Coxen believed that given the small number of vacancies 
available to Australian officers, the stipulation that an officer should only be allowed to sit 
the examination three times would be a hardship and that, ‘it is not considered that that any 
discouragement should be given to officers who are suitable and qualified.’683 As a result, 
Coxen’s recommendations that the Staff College Selected List be retained and the three 
examination limit would be introduced, but that any attempts taken prior to 1931 would not 
count.684 By doing so, the Australian General Staff effectively bypassed British regulation 
changes based on the knowledge that the methods in use by the Australian Army were 
already ensuring that only the most suitable were being put forward for the examination. This 
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in contrast to the War Office which had only found a compromise solution to a relatively 
minor problem of staff reform in 1931. 
 
Additionally, the Australian Army became the first imperial army to develop its own 
command and staff school, providing training to both militia officers and professional force 
officers in all levels of staff and command duties. The school, opened in Sydney in July 1938, 
was the brainchild of Lieutenant-General Lavarack who noted in 1936 that the Australian 
Army needed to build on its existing system of officer training by looking, ‘to develop and 
teach a system which, while taking note generally of the British Army system, will also be 
suited to our special conditions.’685 Historians have largely overlooked the importance of this 
development, with the principal references simply noting its establishment and the desire of 
Lavarack to establish a school of tactical instruction in Australia.686 However, a detailed 
analysis of the archival record demonstrates that the proposed college represented a crucial 
developmental stage in Australian staff training in the interwar period. In a memorandum 
written in November 1937, Lavarack identified the need for, ‘commanders of all grades to 
take full advantage of the strategical and tactical situation as it changes throughout the course 
of the operations and in having a trained staff who are able to implement the decision of their 
commanders.’687 After suggesting that the existing tactical training based on British methods 
was too restrictive for Australian requirements, Lavarack proposed the establishment of a 
Command and Staff School which he believed would, ‘fill a long-felt want and is essential to 
the achievement of the policy of the [Military] Board in regard to the training of commanders 
and staffs, as well as to provide a sufficient number of tactical instructors for duty with 
units.’688 Consequently, far from being a radical departure from existing institutional beliefs 
as the reforms instituted in Britain in 1938-1939 were, the establishment of the Australian 
Command and Staff School represented the culmination of the policy instituted in 1924. 
Whereas the initial emphasis in the memorandum was on tactical instruction, the proposed 
school was also intended to provide training in staff duties and administration in the field. 
The courses aimed to replace those held for both permanent officers and those of the militia, 
with the former courses to be of six weeks duration and the latter of two to three weeks.689 
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Additionally, these courses were to cater for all levels of staff work and tactical training with 
courses for staff officers from the rank of Lieutenant to Lieutenant Colonel. Alongside its 
educational functions, Lavarack also saw the Command and Staff College staff as a body of 
officers able to crystallise ideas on tactical and operational methods, while also overseeing all 
Staff Corps practical examinations and running exercises for senior officers.690 With this 
remit, the proposed college was to be far more than an institution for tactical training as 
suggested by the historiography. Indeed, as well as providing tactical instruction and staff 
training to all levels of staff and militia officer, it was to oversee the continued examination 
of Staff Corps officers and serve as a centre of doctrinal development for the Australian 
Army. The development of this institution was not seen as a replacement for the sending of 
officers to the British Army Staff Colleges which were still seen to be the, ‘incubators of 
imperial interoperability.’691 In contrast to the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta, the 
Australian scheme effectively recognised the differing requirements of each level of staff 
training alongside the need for the continuous training of officers and established courses to 
cater for this requirement. In doing so, these courses echoed the intention of those established 
in France and Egypt during the First World War in recognising the need for progressive 
training in differing levels of staff work, whilst also recognising the circumstances of the 
Australian Army in being a combination of professional force officers and militia officers 
requiring different training formats. 
 
This is not to say that these proposals proceeded completely unopposed. However, the delays 
which occurred were not the result of a confused understanding as to the role and purpose of 
staff training as was the case in the British Army. Instead, the delays were due to the 
significant alteration to the existing structure of training courses and a long-standing dispute 
between two key figures. In the former case, while it was possible for the Department of 
Defence to implement the introduction of the Command and Staff College unilaterally, as a 
result of the, ‘far-reaching principles involved…particularly in relation to the Militia Forces, 
the Minister submits the proposal for the consideration of the Council [of Defence].’692 
However, the delay caused by this referral was short-lived as on the 1st March, Lavarack was 
noting that, ‘the formation of this School has been approved in principle by both the Military 
 
690 Training of Commanders and Staff: Establishment of Command and Staff School, 17th November 1937. 
NAA A5954 913/8. 
691 Delaney, The Imperial Army Project, p. 185. 
692 Council of Defence Agenda, 22 February 1938. NAA A5954 913/8. 
 202 
Board and the Council of Defence.’693 Beyond some wrangling between Lavarack and the 
Finance Member regarding the salary of the Commandant in comparison to that of the 
Commandant of RMC Duntroon, the most significant dissent came from the Adjutant 
General, Brigadier Carl Jess. This hostility from Jess was not unusual as the two men did not 
get on. However, unlike the comparable example of personal hostility towards reform 
proposals in Britain (as displayed towards General Ironside’s 1925 Report on Higher 
Education for War) this hostility did not derail the process of reform in the Australian 
Army.694 In a minute to Lavarack, Jess took issue with a number of elements of his proposed 
Command and Staff College, primarily its purpose and the implied imposition of a set 
doctrinal methods on the Australian Army. In addition, he believed that the projected results 
across the range of courses did not justify its establishment on the grounds of his belief that 
the new school should focus on training senior officers.695 Lavarack pointed out that the 
initial paper was to be the basis for discussion, agreeing with Jess’ concern that the list of 
proposed courses was, ‘formidable.’696 He also sought to ameliorate the fears over the 
implementation of a rigid doctrinal approach by stating that this had never been the intention, 
but that the word doctrine would be removed from the college’s instructions.697 This was not 
the end of the back and forth between Lavarack and Jess over the institution of the Command 
and Staff College. However, as with the discussions in May, these later disagreements were 
over very minor changes of wording in the instructions and were quickly resolved.698 
Ultimately, despite the existence of friction towards Lavarack’s proposed establishment of 
the Command and Staff School, the school opened in August 1938, less than a month after 
the instructions for its implementation were sent out by the Military Board in July 1938.699 
As a result, Lavarack had achieved his proposed aim in ten months. That he was able to do so 
was in large part due to the existence of a single approach to staff training which had been in 
place in Australia since the mid 1920s.  
 
The effectiveness of this long-term approach by the Australian Military Board is clearly 
shown by its response to the changes to staff training taking place in Britain in the late 1930s. 
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In February 1938, whilst discussions were taking place regarding the establishment of 
Australia’s own command and staff college, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lord 
Gort sent a memorandum to Lavarack setting out the upcoming changes taking place in 
Britain and the justification for them. These changes have been discussed in the previous 
chapter and entailed the division of the Staff College course into a Junior Staff Course and 
Senior War Course, the latter to be attended five years after the former by a select group of 
high performing staff officers. Gort noted that the most significant impact these changes 
would have on Australian officers being sent to Camberley was that rather than spending two 
years at Camberley, dominion officers would spend one year at Camberley before going onto 
their second year at Minley Manor.700 Furthermore, Gort noted that, ‘although the age of 
British Service officers will gradually come down to “under 28” there will be no necessity for 
the age of Dominion officers to follow suit.’701 Although entailing significant changes to the 
British structure of staff training, the reforms instituted in Britain in 1938-1939 had little 
direct impact on the system developed by Australia over the preceding fourteen years. 
Indeed, the biggest impact of these changes was felt by the Indian Army. With the reduction 
of the course at Quetta to one year, Lavarack believed that, ‘we would get better value for our 
money if instead of sending anyone to Quetta, we sent an officer of about fifteen years’ 
service abroad for regimental training and practical experience during collective training.’702 
This policy adjustment would therefore allow Australia to continue taking advantage of the 
training at Camberley and Minley Manor whilst also gaining additional regimental 
experience, which many Australian officers struggled to obtain in the interwar period.703 
Analysis of these changes within the Australian General Staff saw the senior course at 
Minley Manor as being the most important for dominion officers attending courses in 
Britain.704 The reason for this focus being that, ‘the course at R.M.C together with subsequent 
employment in the Staff Corps and the increased age [Australian officers sent to Camberley 
at this point were generally in their mid-thirties] makes the standard of staff training of our 
officers higher…than that of British Service or Indian Army officers.’705 This view was not 
limited to the Australian Army. In 1917, Major-General Guy Dawnay, then Brigadier 
General, General Staff of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in a letter to his wife commented 
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on his Australian GSO3. ‘I asked for an Australian as GSO3; and have got a nice and very 
intelligent young fellow called Anderson. He is well grounded, too, as he was at Duntroon, 
the Australian Sandhurst, which has a most strenuous four-year course, and is a most 
admirable education founded on West Point (USA) and Kingston (Canada). Every time one 
has an opportunity of making a comparison, one is struck by the comparative laziness and 
inefficiency of our English educational system!’706  
 
As a result, the junior course at Camberley was considered to be a polishing up of existing 
knowledge and an updating of tactical ideas. The analysis concluded that the Australian 
Army should, ‘send to Camberley only officers we are convinced can absorb Minley in the 
following year and continue the present system.’707 Consequently, despite the significant 
upheaval and change the War Office proposals would have had on the British Army, the only 
real impact on Australia was that more consideration needed to be taken as to which officers 
were sent to Britain for staff training. It is evident that not only did the changes taking place 
in Britain have little impact on the Australian Army, but that analysis of these changes 
alongside the provision of staff training through Duntroon and various iterations of post-
commissioning staff courses suggested a more advanced and cohesive system of staff training 
than that developed in Britain over the same period.  
 
The Canadian Experience 
 
Much like Australian staff training in the interwar period, Canadian training was based 
largely on the requirements of a part-time militia army with a small cadre of professional 
officers. The most significant aspect of this training was that the Canadian General Staff did 
not develop its own junior staff course for its professional force officers. These officers 
would continue to receive their staff training at Camberley, with the Canadian General Staff 
continuing their pre-war Militia Staff Course (MSC). This course had been established in 
1910 when the Inspector General of the Canadian Militia Lieutenant-General Sir Percy Lake 
recommended a, ‘renewed emphasis on staff training (for permanent officers going to 
Camberley and Quetta and militia officers taking the militia staff course at home).’708 Much 
like the Australian Army, and in contrast to the British Army, the continuation of these 
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courses into the interwar period and their development represented a single cohesive policy 
decision on the part of the Canadian General Staff. As with the Australian Army, the 
Canadian General Staff recognised the increased importance of efficient staff work and staff 
training as a consequence of its experience in the First World War. To this end, they amended 
the 1917 edition of King’s Regulations (Canada) to reflect this. The new regulations stated 
that in order to be appointed to the staff of a militia formation, a Non-Permanent Active 
Militia (NPAM) officer must have passed the MSC or have undertaken active service on the 
staff of a formation.709 In this, the Canadian General Staff were being far stricter regarding 
their conditions of staff service than either the British or Australian Army, neither of which 
made appointment to staff roles at formation level conditional upon completion of centralised 
staff training. Moreover, any suggestion that part-time officers would be held to less exacting 
standards than their professional colleagues can be readily dismissed. Indeed, prior to a 
regulation change in 1924, militia officers failing more than one subject of the theoretical 
paper were required to undertake the entire theoretical course again, rather than just re-write 
the failed portion of the course.710 In a similar vein, militia officers were required to, ‘have 
obtained…full qualification in the theoretical portion within the three years immediately 
preceding the commencement of the practical portion.’711 Much like the Australian example 
above, despite the largely militia nature of its forces, the Canadian Army had recognised the 
importance of a large professionally trained body of junior staff officers for its army and took 
practical steps to ensure that high standards were maintained.  
 
A key part of Canadian policy towards staff training was in its belief that it was only through 
experience that an officer could fit himself for senior command and staff posts.712 This belief 
extended to the professional training provided in Britain at Camberley with the Canadian 
Chief of the General Staff Major-General Herbert Thacker noting that, Camberley’s, 
‘graduates receive appointments as Staff Captains and G.S.O.3s [sic] only…we could hardly 
accept them [Canadian Militia Officers] as qualified for higher appointments…after any 
course less thorough.’713 In this, Thacker, as Canadian CGS, held a view of British Army 
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staff training far removed from both the Australian and British attitude. As noted above, the 
Australian Army saw training at Camberley and Quetta as a way to foster imperial 
interoperability and provide a cadre of senior leaders and staff officers. The conflicting 
attitude towards staff training in Canada was evident as early as 1923 when in a 
memorandum to district commanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew McNaughton, a 
Camberley graduate and later Chief of the Canadian General Staff, noted that the early 
iterations of the MSC were too comprehensive and so military history was to be dropped and 
the emphasis on strategy reduced in future courses in order to allow more time for map 
reading and training for war.714 This then ensured an emphasis on practical training in staff 
duties. The resultant theoretical portion syllabus reflected this emphasis, dealing with map 
reading, military law, organisation and administration, training for war and staff duties. 
Similarly, the work of the practical portion focussed on formations from company to brigade 
and included work on billeting and bivouacking and moves by motor transport.715 On this 
basis, much like the Australian General Staff, the Canadian General Staff established a 
definite role and purpose for local staff training and ensured that policies and courses were 
developed to reflect these attitudes. In doing so, they reflected the experience of the First 
World War, namely the realisation that it was more important to ensure a large number of 
junior staff officers were trained in periods of peace as existing numbers of graduates fitted 
for senior command remained suited for the needs of a greatly expanded wartime army. The 
primarily militia nature of both dominions’ forces, with few peacetime commitments outside 
home defence, allowed this change of institutional attitude to take place, whilst in Britain, it 
has been shown that the institutional uncertainty and continued dominance of regimental 
soldiering, resulted in a plethora of attitudes and opinions which ultimately served only to 
stymie much needed reforms. 
 
The Indian Experience 
 
In contrast to the experiences of the Australian and Canadian armies, the Indian Staff 
College, Quetta’s experience of British staff reform was far more limited. With the central 
importance of India within British strategic thinking, the British Indian Army remained 
firmly tied to the system of military command and control in Britain through the introduction 
 
714 McNaughton to All District Commanders and Commandant R.M.C, 15 September 1923. CNA HQ-313-33-
18. 
715 Militia Staff Course, Sample Syllabus. 22 September [year missing, but either 1937 or 1938].  CNA HQ-313-
33-18. 
 207 
of the Cardwell system of linked battalions in the 1870s with one serving at home and the 
other abroad.716 Despite the continued importance of India to the British Army in the interwar 
period, the Staff College, Quetta remained the poor relation of Camberley to the extent that 
not only did Quetta mirror the wider shortcomings of Camberley in its failure to produce 
large numbers of junior officers, but it also experienced changes designed to benefit the 
British Army with little regard for Indian defence priorities. The varied level of opposition 
faced by the establishment of Quetta serves as one example of the confusion present within 
the senior ranks of the British Army in relation to the role and purpose of staff training. 
Senior British officers had been opposed to the idea of a separate Indian institution from its 
inception under Lord Kitchener in 1905.717 This opposition was to continue into the interwar 
period, with the CID sub-committee on Indian Military Requirements in 1922 and Ironside’s 
Report on Higher Education for War in 1926, both of which argued for the closure of Quetta 
and the transfer of all staff training to Camberley. The attempt to do so in 1922 was instigated 
by a note on the subject by Sir Charles Munro, the former Commander in Chief, India. Munro 
argued for amalgamation on the basis that Quetta did not allow the study of recent 
technological developments such as aircraft and tanks. He also believed that too much time 
spent in India would not be to the physical advantage of officers and that, ‘a local Staff 
College will certainly inspire local thought.’718 This echoed the concerns voiced during the 
discussions on the opening of the college in 1905 and which had been largely addressed 
through the close co-ordination of curricula and the regular interchange of directing staff. The 
decision was ultimately considered outside the scope of the sub-committee and was referred 
to the War Office in June 1922.719 The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal 
Earl Cavan, rejected the proposal, primarily on the grounds of cost and lack of 
accommodation at Camberley, but also on the basis that it would reduce the number of 
officers trained each year at a time when, ‘the combined output of the two colleges is barely 
sufficient for the needs of the Army.’720 As with latter discussions surrounding staff training 
in India, the proposals contained in Munro’s memorandum, although dealing with Indian 
military requirements, better reflected British military priorities. It is of interest that 
Ironside’s 1926 report called on exactly the same arguments as Munro set out in 1922 in his 
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attempt to combine all staff training at Camberley and it is of interest that on this occasion 
such a plan was rejected by the Army Council on the basis that Quetta was the best place to 
study frontier warfare.721 Recent historiography has proven the validity of this belief, as 
whilst Camberley featured Imperial Policing, from 1935 taught by the future Commander of 
14th Army in Burma, Lieutenant-Colonel William Slim,722 Quetta provided a number of 
lectures, exercises and conferences covering military operations on the North-West 
Frontier.723 Furthermore, the local terrain surrounding Quetta was the terrain such operations 
would be fought over and thus added an element of realism to outdoor exercises which the 
Welsh hills for those at Camberley could not. As with much of the analysis of the Army 
Council in this period, whilst these responses ultimately prevented the closure of Quetta and 
the transfer of all staff training to Camberley in the 1920s, the reasoning behind this 
demonstrates the diverse attitudes which held back staff reform in the interwar army. 
 
Although following the Camberley curriculum, exchanging instructors with the Camberley 
college and relying on the same entrance examination to select its students, much like Canada 
and Australia, there were still differences of institutional attitude, albeit minor, within the 
Indian General Staff towards the system of staff training in the Indian Army. Of these, two 
clear examples stand out. Whilst for the most part, Indian Army feedback to proposed and 
adopted alterations to the British system of staff training was simple agreement, when Lord 
Milne decided against implementing Ironside’s ideas in 1926 and substituting his own plan to 
divide the Senior Division into two smaller ability based cohorts, the Indian General Staff 
responded that they already had this system in place at Quetta and so had no objections to its 
adoption at Camberley.724 Although only a short-lived change in the case of the British 
Army, much like the Australian and Canadian armies, this difference shows a recognition in 
India, firstly, that not all officers attending staff courses were necessarily suited for higher 
command and, secondly, that this recognition suggested differences of institutional attitude 
between India and Britain.    
 
 
721 Report on Higher Education for War, 15 December 1925 and Summary of Replies to Ironside’s Proposal. 
TNA WO 32/4840. 
722 Frost, ‘The British and Indian Army Staff Colleges in the Interwar Years,’ p. 161. 
723 Tim Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 1998), p. 125. 
724 Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood to Herbert Creedy, 26 August 1926, TNA WO 42/4840. 
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The second most significant difference between the two armies was highlighted in 1937 
during alterations made to the allocation of vacancies to Quetta. This change occurred ten 
years after similar discussions had been held by the Army Council and formed part of a 
desire to make, ‘the method of allotment of vacancies approximate more closely to those 
adopted for admission to the Staff College, Camberley.’725 As it stood, Quetta operated on a 
system of competitive entry allocating places to those officers placing highest in the order of 
merit, ‘regardless of the service to which they belong, except as restricted…10 British 
Service and 16 Indian Army officers.’726 As has been demonstrated in chapter five, the 
British Army had experimented with a similar system in 1926 and as a result of the influx of 
Royal Engineer officers reverted to a quota system, despite the educational advantages 
enjoyed by these officers and the increasing importance of logistics, engineering and line of 
communications planning in modern war. J.S.H. Shattock’s (Under-Secretary, Defence 
Department, Government of India) memorandum set out a new distribution of competitive 
vacancies for Quetta (seven for British Service officers and eleven for Indian Army Officers) 
to be filled from the first twenty-five places in the order of merit and three British Service 
and five Indian Army nominations, with any unfilled competitive places being filled by 
nomination.727 These nominated places would be allocated between the various arms so as to 
ensure their being suitably represented at the Staff College.728 This reduction in the 
competitive British allocation aimed to ensure that British officers did not fill their vacancies 
at Quetta purely through the examination allowing more Indian Army officers to be 
nominated. This change was proposed due to the fact that the Indian army had fared poorly in 
the Staff College entrance exam for a number of years with the result that, ‘a number of 
competitive vacancies were given to officers pretty low in the order of merit.’729 This state of 
affairs mirrored that in Britain in 1927 when it was being lamented that the officers gaining 
competitive vacancies to the Staff College were not always of the requisite quality (see 
chapter five). Alongside this, the proposed reform aimed to prevent the feeling among British 
Service officers that they were being disadvantaged, as the poor performance of Indian Army 
officers resulted in their domination of nominated vacancies.730 Significantly, these changes 
should not be taken as evidence of the development of a local doctrine as feared by some in 
 
725 Memo by J.S.H. Shattock, 28 June 1937. Allotment of Vacancies at the Staff College, 1937-1939, BL 
IOR/MIL/7/3197. 
726 Ibid. 
727 Memo by J.S.H. Shattock, 28th June 1937. Ibid. 
728 Ibid. 
729 Memo by C.E.M Hemingway, 2 July 1937, Allotment of Vacancies at the Staff College, 1937-1939. Ibid. 
730 Note to Major Davies by unknown respondent, 12 September 1937. Ibid. 
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the early twentieth century, but rather the development of a separate institutional attitude 




At its most basic level, what can be taken from this comparative analysis, is that despite 
being junior partners, the Canadian and Australian armies recognised, far earlier than Britain, 
the importance of large numbers of trained junior staff officers. Furthermore, whilst India 
was more tightly bound to the British Army than either of these dominions, there was still an 
element of change in institutional thinking around staff training. While Britain continued to 
debate the role of staff training throughout the interwar period, missing multiple opportunities 
to reform different aspects of the structure of this training, both Australia and Canada quickly 
analysed the lessons from the First World War and established cohesive policies relating to 
staff training. Although both dominions pursued separate policies based on their own defence 
requirements, once established these policies persisted until the outbreak of war in 1939. For 
Canada, the interwar period was characterised by the continuation of the MSC established 
prior to the First World War for militia officers, whilst Professional Force officers passed 
through the Staff College, Camberley. These two courses provided the Canadian Army with a 
significant pool of officers trained primarily for junior staff roles who could then, through 
self-study and experience in regimental and staff posts, provide senior commanders and staff 
in the event of wartime expansion. Australia, recognising the increased importance of 
wartime staff work, pooled its professional experience into the Staff Corps and focussed post-
war officer training on that of commanders and staff, providing basic instruction in staff work 
at RMC Duntroon. Making use of pre-war localised staff courses to train both militia and 
professional force officers, Australia was able to offer continued professional training and 
development in staff training so establishing a pool of locally trained officers for junior staff 
positions. Alongside this, it made use of British Staff Colleges to provide both higher-level 
staff training and the opportunity for selected officers to gain experience of British training 
establishments to help improve Australian local provision. This policy led to the ultimate 
establishment of the Command and Staff School in 1938 and the realisation that through 
extensive local training in staff work, Australia was sending more capable officers to 
Camberley and Quetta than the British Army.  
In establishing definite systems of training alongside their own pre-Staff College staff 
courses for militia and professional officers, both dominions had established systems of staff 
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training which were better suited to the requirements of British and Imperial forces than that 
employed by the British Army. As a result, when it came to staff training, the dominions 
were able to take advantage of British training and methods whilst not surrendering local 
needs and requirements. As a result, it can be argued that the establishment of dominion staff 
courses represented a significant break from British methods by focussing on the creation of 
a pool of junior staff officers, trained locally, and utilising Camberley and Quetta for its 
ability to train senior commanders and staff officers. Furthermore, it serves to demonstrate 
that whilst the majority of developments within the context of the imperial army develop in 
the centre and disseminate to the dominions, in recognising the importance of staff training 
and the continued provision of officer education in the immediate aftermath of the First 
World War, the imperial periphery manifested change in officer education. This in a similar 
manner to impetus for reform within the British Army which, although aided by a few senior 







As established in the introduction to this thesis, the central research question under 
examination was that of why the British Army failed to reform its system of staff training 
between 1919 and 1939 despite wide recognition of problems within it. In examining this, the 
broader theme of attitudes towards staff training and officer education in general emerged as 
an important sub-question, alongside that of identifying and accounting for those factors 
affecting the course of staff reform in this period and how similar developments in staff 
training took place within other imperial armies. In addition, it has highlighted the 
transitional nature of the interwar period for the British Army in that the impact of this period 
hastened in a series of organisational and cultural changes to the army as a military 
institution. In setting out responses to these questions, this thesis fills a historiographical gap 
within the existing literature of the British Army in the interwar period. Although the British 
Army in this period has been extensively examined, staff training and officer education as 
discrete topics until now have been largely overlooked. Whilst sweeping conclusions as to its 
shortcomings and brief reflections on the reforms eventually adopted in 1938 have hinted at 
broader themes, the general conclusions simply speak to the failings of the system without 
accounting for why these failings persisted. As the answers to the above questions presented 
through this thesis demonstrate, not only was there extensive debate regarding potential 
reforms to the British system of staff training, but this debate centred on a generational divide 
within the officer corps of the British Army between those influenced by earlier cultural 
understandings of the role and character of an officer focussed on innate leadership and 
command abilities, and those pursuing a more professional mindset, acknowledging the 
benefits of progressive professional training and education as a result of the increasingly 
complex nature of modern armies. Furthermore, it has been established that the reasons for 
the failure to enact reform until the late 1930s are more extensive and complex than the 
existing historiography would suggest resting not just on the individual agency of the Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, but on the complex interrelationships between senior army 
officers and the dichotomy between British doctrinal assumptions and the reality of military 
requirements in the interwar period and a groundswell of resistance by key personalities to a 
broader trend of cultural organisational change within the British Army. 
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Furthermore the tensions resulting from these factors were exacerbated by the broader 
societal context in which the army found itself competing for a limited pool of young men 
from which to draw its officers with services whose reputations were less damaged by the 
experiences of the First World War and who offered seemingly more fulfilling careers with 
educational opportunities of benefit to post-service requirements. By drawing these 
conclusions together, it will be established that while some of the forces acting on the 
progress of reform were ever-present, others emerged as the result of the particular 
circumstances in which the British Army found itself in this period. By setting up this more 
nuanced understanding of the process of staff reform, this thesis provides a partial 
reassessment of the attitudes of key military staff at the War Office and other senior British 
officers towards officer education and training. In addition, it has established the existence of 
a generational divide in attitudes towards reform between those who held high staff or 
command roles prior to the First World War and generally reacted negatively to reform 
proposals, and those who experienced the early years of the war as regimental officers and 
progressed to junior and mid-level command and staff roles by 1918 who were more 
favourable to significant reforms.  
 
These arguments have built on rather than torn down the existing historiography which 
largely emphasises the British Army’s desire to reform in the wake of the First World War, 
although failed to include the development of institutional educational thought in its 
discussion of reform.731 Whilst recent historiography has done much to improve our 
understanding of the role officer education played on the development of military 
effectiveness in the First World War and the development of imperial interconnectivity, such 
studies have continually treated one or two examples of staff reform in isolation from the 
broader study of institutional attitudes towards officer education.732 In contrast, this thesis has 
demonstrated that between 1918 and 1939, staff training and its reform in light of the lessons 
of the First World War occupied a significant amount of time and space in the minds of army 
officers at all levels. Even when not directly commenting on staff training itself, interwar 
committees such as the Braithwaite Committee in 1919 and the CID sub-committee of 1923, 
 
731 See for example David French, Raising Churchill’s Army; Edward Smalley, The British Expeditionary Force 
and Bond, British Military Policy. 
732 See Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), 
Beckett, A British Profession of Arms, Aimée Fox, Learning to Fight; Douglas E. Delaney, The Imperial Army 
Project: Britain and the Land Forces of the Dominions and India 1920-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017) and Douglas E. Delaney, Robert C. Engen, and Meghan Fitzpatrick (eds.), Military Education and the 
British Empire 1815-1949 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018). 
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early examinations demonstrated clear recognition that officer education and training 
required reassessment in the face of the changed nature of modern, industrial war. Following 
these early examinations of officer education, those between 1925 and 1927 were more 
focussed and examined both the structure of the Staff College course itself and the process of 
allocating vacancies to the college and the impact of these allocations on the future of the 
service. Finally, in the late 1930s, the debates of the previous fifteen years were reassessed in 
light of the desire of the new Secretary of State for War and a younger generation of leaders 
at the War Office to press on with reforms they felt were long overdue. Together with the 
discussions held during General Staff conferences and articles published in professional 
journals, this thesis has shown that far from a stop-start affair, the subject of staff training 
underwent a continual process of discussion and debate throughout the interwar period.  
 
Crucially, there was little deviation or variety in the form the various proposals took. 
Primarily based on the experiences of the First World War, the most far-reaching proposals 
were based on the short wartime staff courses established in 1917 involving the division of 
the existing two-year course into shorter, functional courses split along the existing Junior-
Senior division curriculum. This division generally also emphasised training a larger number 
of officers in lower-level staff roles and recognised that the nature of staff duties in war had 
changed to become far more involved and intensive than in previous wars. Equally, such 
proposals recognised the different personalities required of officers in different roles and the 
fact that not all officers who were suited to staff work were suited to high command and so 
did not always benefit from two years’ instruction to fit them for all levels of command and 
staff work. Instead, officers were to undertake training in lower-level staff work, return to 
regimental or junior staff roles to obtain practical experience and then if deemed suitable (and 
wished to do so) could return for an advanced course to prepare them for higher level staff 
and command posts. These proposals are seen not just in the wartime short staff courses, but 
in the pages of professional journals, in memoranda by the Director of Staff Duties, 
Lieutenant-General Archibald Cameron, two Staff College Commandants, Major-Generals 
Edmund Ironside and Charles Gwynn and in the report of the Massy Committee on the 
education of the Army Officer. Consequently, there were not only multiple opportunities to 
enact significant changes to the system of staff training in the interwar period, but there was 
also a cogent proposal for change which largely addressed the shortcomings identified by 
contemporaries. Such continuity is instructive as it highlights that an effective solution was 
available to the army as early as 1917. As a result, it is possible to focus on the responses to 
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the various proposals as being reflective of the diverse range of institutional attitudes towards 
officer education and training rather than as a reflection on the individual proposals 
themselves.  
 
It has been demonstrated that throughout this period, particularly from 1925 onwards, there 
was widespread recognition within the British officer corps that the system of staff training 
with which Britain had gone to war in 1914 and reverted to by 1921 was no longer fit for 
purpose in light of its experience during the First World War. The opening months of the war 
had seen trained staff officers flock to France with the British Expeditionary Force, leaving 
many crucial posts in Britain requiring trained staff officers empty. This, coupled with the 
rapid expansion of the British Army through reserves, and later Kitchener’s New Armies, and 
the deaths of a number of p.s.c. officers in the early months of the war, dramatically 
increased the number of trained staff officers required by the British Army. In itself this 
served to show those responsible for establishing the lessons of the war that the pre-war 
system of staff training was fundamentally unsuited to the requirements of industrial warfare 
on the scale of the First World War. The rapid establishment of wartime learner schemes and 
lower level staff courses demonstrated that the need was not so much in the higher levels of 
staff and command, but at the level of Staff Captain and GSO3 and that the solution required 
a fundamental alteration of the existing system of staff training. This was reflected in the 
changes made in the late 1930s, with a much-expanded junior staff course at Camberley and 
a smaller war course at Minley Manor. With similar ideas having been put forward by 
Lieutenant-General Archibald Cameron, Major-Generals Edmund Ironside and Charles 
Gwynn and suggested as part of the Committee of Imperial Defence sub-committee 
examination, the reflection of wartime experience in post-war reform proposals suggested a 
clear recognition by a number of British officers that this amended structure best suited the 
future requirements of the army. Coupled to this was the broader recognition within the 
officer corps that recognised significant failings with the existing system, but did not link 
these failings to a clear and coherent solution. The ultimate result of this was the inability of 
senior officers in this period to agree both on a way forward, and a single definition of the 
role staff training played in the military education of the army officer. This inability took on a 
number of guises over the course of the interwar period and goes far beyond a simplistic 
belief in the innate conservatism of military forces. Indeed, as this thesis has shown, relative 
reformers such as Generals Sir Charles Bonham-Carter and John Burnett-Stuart came out as 
opponents of reform and advocates of traditionally held understandings of the military officer 
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and the role professional education should play in their career progression. It is only by 
drawing together the threads from the different chapters and examinations that the full scope 
of these disparities in viewpoint and attitude towards staff education within the War Office 
become clear. 
 
The 1919 Braithwaite committee report, although not establishing any structural alterations to 
staff training, was crucial in establishing the staff lessons of the First World War and 
establishing in the minds of those involved the successes and failings of the previous four 
years. Whilst serving as a very real effort to establish and codify the changes to staff work 
resulting from the much changed conditions of the First World War, by confining itself to 
generalities, it failed to take account of how these changes would impact on peacetime 
training and preparation.733 Instead, the Braithwaite committee’s greatest impact on both 
reform to the structure of staff training and the existing historiography of the interwar army 
was in its assertion that, ‘the outstanding feature of the evidence brought before us has been 
the success of the work of the Staff throughout the war. This points indubitably to the 
soundness of the general principles on which the Staff is organized and was trained before the 
war.’734 These two sentences, although not representative of the totality of views expressed 
within the committee’s papers, have long stood as the legacy of Braithwaite’s committee. The 
committee’s greatest influence on staff training in this period would be the result of two of 
the committee’s members future roles within the army hierarchy, General Walter Braithwaite 
and Major-General Robert Whigham. Both would continue to play prominent roles in the 
debates around the structural reform of staff training up to 1930, voicing their dissent and 
continually presenting the most consistent rebuttals to proposed reforms. As a result, whilst 
the report itself did little to reform staff training in Britain directly, it did establish an 
institutional attitude within the army which suggested that any problems identified in the 
system of staff training was exterior to the system which had proven itself during the First 
World War. This attitude was reflected in the constant referrals made during Field Marshal 
Milne’s tenure as Chief of the Imperial General Staff to the poor quality of officer attending 
the Staff College and the need to fix the Staff College student, rather than the system of staff 
training itself. Furthermore, it provides us with an early example of the diversity of outlook 
and opinion which would come to derail future discussion. None of the responses to the 
 
733 Report of the Committee on Staff Organisation. TNA WO 32/5153. 
734 Ibid. 
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committee’s questionnaire (whose memoranda remain in the archival record) responded in 
the same way. Indeed, whilst there was broad agreement on a number of points, much like 
later discussions between senior officers, the sheer range of views mitigated against the 
production of single institutional standpoint.  
 
A brief note of reformist action in this early period was the conclusion by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence sub-committee that the role of the individual service staff colleges should 
remain that of training officers in individual service staff duties and that a higher-level joint 
school was required to study the higher art of war.735 In a foretaste of what would be 
achieved in the late 1930s, through their unanimous agreement that the service staff colleges 
existed to train officers in staff duties specific to each service, the service representatives 
were able to reject calls to combine the three colleges and instead establish a higher college 
to meet the requirements of the Committee of Imperial Defence and dovetail into the existing 
structures of officer education in the services. In doing so, they recognised that the training 
received at service staff colleges was not enough to prepare service officers for the full gamut 
of responsibilities they would face upon reaching senior rank. It formally set the functions of 
the individual service colleges as being to train officers in staff work, strategy and tactics, 
organisation and administration of each service. Although recognising key failings in the pre-
war structure of staff training, the army responses to the establishment of the Imperial 
Defence College demonstrated the institutional belief that formalised training beyond the 
cadet colleges aimed to fit officers primarily for senior command, and therefore formed part 
of the broader institutional inability to understand the lessons of the First World War and 
fully assimilate them. Additionally, the success of the Imperial Defence College was then 
utilised as a reason to reject later reform proposals on the basis that it fulfilled the need for 
higher-level command training in the British Army.  
 
These institutional mindsets, that any failings with staff training were external to the system 
itself and that the focus should be on training future commanders, were reinforced during the 
discussions held in the late 1920s. In doing so, they form an overarching structure into which 
the diverse views presented by senior figures within the British Army can be located. For 
example, in examining the 1925 Report on Higher Education for War, a key part of the anti-
reform stance which ultimately lead to the failure to enact its conclusions, centred on high 
 
735 See Chapter Three, pp. 89-91.  
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junior officer casualties in the First World War. Those putting forward this view believed that 
the drop in quality of Staff College students and graduates highlighted by Ironside was both a 
temporary phenomenon and one which reflected a demographic crisis rather than significant 
failings on the part of the army’s system of staff training. Similar views were expressed 
during the 1929 Staff Conference at the Staff College where the continued poor quality of 
officer being put forward for the examination was discussed. Alongside the re-assertion that 
many of the best young officers had been killed during the war, blame was liberally applied 
to formation commanders for proposing clearly unsuitable candidates for the Staff College 
examination.736 Whilst undoubtedly true due to the continued hostility of many regimental 
commanders to the Staff College’s propensity to take their best officers away from the 
regiment, this assertion once again located the problem with staff training as external to the 
system itself. In both instances changes were made, namely the division of the Senior 
Division into differing ability groups and the removal of the quota system for allocating 
vacancies to the Staff College. However, in both cases these measures were temporary and 
only served to exacerbate existing tensions within the officer corps of the British Army. By 
the late 1930s, this attitude had largely disappeared with the Massy committee on military 
education establishing that it was the system of staff training which required reform and 
abrogating prior assertions that external factors were solely to blame for its shortcomings. 
 
The second point highlighted above, that of the focus on the training of officers for 
command, is similarly tied into broader opposition to formal post-commissioning training for 
officers. For those commenting on Ironside’s 1925 report in particular, the recent 
confirmation that the Imperial Defence College was to be established appeared to serve the 
purpose of providing higher level command training for army officers. Such a view 
undermined the views established in 1923 by the Committee of Imperial Defence, by Ironside 
and within King’s Regulations, that the fundamental role of the Staff College was to provide 
for education in the duties of the staff of the individual service, in this case the army. Equally, 
such views rode roughshod over the experiences of the British Army in the First World War 
and ignored the crucial lesson that it was larger numbers of officers trained for junior staff 
roles that were required and that only the best of those would advance to higher-level training 
prior to taking up GSO1 and command appointments. This lesson was well known to senior 
officers with the 1927 memo by Lieutenant-General Cameron establishing that in the event of 
 
736 See Chapter Five, pp. 139-141. 
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mobilisation, requirements for junior staff officers alone would require all trained and some 
reserve officers. Similar institutional attitudes can be found in the various responses to the 
removal of the quota system for vacancy allocation in the late 1920s. Although equally bound 
up in the regimental mentality which French in particular has shown to have been historically 
harmful to many attempted reforms, these responses equally highlight the belief that the Staff 
College existed to train future commanders.737 By focussing on the lack of regimental 
experience possessed by technical officers, those opposed to the growing number of such 
officers accessing the Staff College were primarily concerned with their perceived lack of 
leadership skills, rather than focussing on their academic or administrative abilities, of more 
benefit to office-bound staff roles. Such long-standing criticism towards technical officers 
was reasserted by the Braithwaite committee report’s conclusions on the role of technical 
officers on the staff and were seemingly easily transplanted to the appointment of officers to 
the Staff College.  
 
Built into this belief was the feeling among many senior officers that such formalised 
education for British officers was not required. Whilst not wishing to dispense with the Staff 
College itself, these officers put forward a third interpretation of its role, that put forward by 
General Braithwaite in 1926, that the Staff College existed to teach officers how to learn. 
Such views rested on the belief that the ability to command was inherent and therefore those 
who did not already possess powers of command could not be taught them at the Staff 
College. Such attitudes, much like those highlighted above regarding the command abilities 
of officers from technical arms, had their origins in the Victorian and Edwardian British 
Army and were often stated by generally reformist officers such as Bonham-Carter and 
Burnett-Stuart. Much like other examples which laid the blame for failings on aspects of the 
army external to the Staff College, in this instance it was deemed the responsibility of the 
regimental commander to ensure that his officers were adequately trained and encouraged in 
the pursuit of their own profession. Although certainly the case when it came to tactical and 
operational training, alongside questions of leadership, the intricacies of staff training could 
not be handled by a regimental commander. This continued emphasis on training in 
leadership, preparation for command and encouraging an officer to continue his own 
professional development, although not contrary to the purpose of the Staff College, did not 
follow the lessons of the First World War. It also represented a failure to understand the 
 
737 French, Military Identities, pp.334-352. 
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complexities and degree of diversity required of the Staff College in this period. Ultimately, 
what unites these overarching factors affecting the progress of staff reform was a lack of 
understanding and agreement over the role of the Staff College in the context of the changed 
nature of modern industrial warfare. Lacking this single direction, senior officers reverted to 
those institutional attitudes they knew best, which ultimately emphasised the inherent nature 
of command ability and failed to acknowledge the increased importance and technicality of 
lower-level, day to day staff duties. 
 
These views alone, being held by officers occupying the most influential posts in the British 
Army, represented key reasons for the failure to reform staff training in this period. However, 
just as dangerous were those officers who, although recognising the need for reform, failed to 
back reform proposals largely through their own indecisiveness. Included in this category 
were two Chiefs of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Archibald Montgomery-
Massingberd and Field Marshal Sir George Milne, who both expressed dissatisfaction with 
staff training, but failed to either express or implement coherent policy changes to address 
them. Also included under this heading were Lieutenant-Generals Sir Francis Gathorne-
Hardy, Sir Noel Birch, Hastings Anderson and Webb Gillman, all of whom occupied 
prominent positions in the War Office. The broad nature of such responses, when combined 
with the relative unity achieved by those opposing reform proposals in this period fatally 
removed the coherency of the reformist message, preventing proposals by less senior figures 
from making headway against the intrenched attitudes of their seniors.  
 
In this, they are highlighting the role of personality as a driver of change within the broader 
context of complex organisational and cultural changes within the British Army as a military 
institution.738 As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, the technological and 
operational lessons of the First World War established the complex nature of modern staff 
work and so led to a recognition that change was needed within the army’s system of staff 
training to accommodate and resolve these more complex organisational and logistical 
problems. However, in doing so, these requirements came into conflict with a military culture 
emphasising individual leadership and the primacy of the regimental system with its 
traditions and differences and outwardly eschewed centralised training beyond that given to 
 
738 The broader discussion of drivers of change within military institutions has been discussed in the 
introduction and its theoretical establishment can be found in Farrell, ‘Culture and Military Power,’ Terriff, 
‘Warriors and Innovators,’ and Fox, ‘The Secret of Efficiency.’  
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cadets.739 Instead, some senior officers believed that staff training should equip officers to 
continue their own learning, however the prevailing regimental scepticism towards officers 
perceived to be ‘bookish’ made even this approach contrary to the prevailing military culture 
of the British Army. Furthermore, as evidenced by examinations into the recruitment and 
retention of officers across this period, there was a clear cultural shift taking place outside the 
army which it was struggling to cope with. Young men in considering their future careers 
wanted to be intellectually challenged, have clear paths of progression before them and a 
reasonable chance of reaching medium rank whilst also receiving training in skills 
transferrable to a future civilian career. The British Army of the interwar period instead 
offered glacially slow promotion, the likelihood of long periods of monotonous regimental 
service at the edges of the empire and, if encouraging officers to undertake advanced training, 
failing to provide provision for such training to be available to most officers desirous of 
completing it. Such drastic changes to the prevailing military culture resulted in resistance by 
key personalities within the British Army restricting organisational change during a 
transitional period of organisational and cultural development. Parallels can be drawn with 
similar internal conflicts highlighted by Jannowitz in the shift from a heroic to managerial 
culture of leadership within the US Army in the first half of the twentieth century. More 
recent studies have dug deeper in highlighting why military institutions respond as they do to 
potential cultural shifts, despite widespread recognition that such institutions are not 
fundamentally opposed to change.740 Further work is needed to determine whether the 
responses noted in this thesis represent broader institutional cultural trends towards officer 
education and training in the Interwar British Army. However, in establishing a link between 
sociological studies of military identity, studies of institutional culture and management and 
more traditional military history, this thesis opens up a broader discussion of the complexities 
of military planning and reform in peacetime, particularly during periods of social, political, 
doctrinal and technological change. Such studies can help expose the nuance required in 
understanding these issues and encourage a shift away from the binary allocation of 
responsibility which has a tendency to emerge in any critical analysis of military and 
governmental institutions.    
 
 
739 See French, Regimental Identities, pp. 336-340; Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 21-79 and Hill, 
‘Military Innovation and Military Culture.’ 
740 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier’ and Fox, ‘The Secret of Efficiency.’  
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Whilst it is clear that, with the notable exception of Lord Cavan, the CIGSs of this period 
were relatively well-disposed towards the prospect of staff reform, the lack of support 
received from other senior officers, particularly when it came to decision-making by the 
Army Council, undermined their ability to push through the required reforms. It was not just 
a lack of agreement over methods of reform which contributed to the relative apathy of some 
senior figures towards proposals for staff reform. In the case of the 1926 Report on Higher 
Education for War, it has been shown that Lieutenant-General Archibald Cameron exploited 
this apathy to influence the direction of debate by writing to certain senior figures suggesting 
inclusions for their responses. In their replies, as well as parroting the suggestions of 
Cameron, these officers admitted to having not read Ironside’s memorandum in full. In doing 
so, those officers were showing a marked degree of apathy towards both the proposals and 
the reform of staff training in general. Such apathy and lack of formal support for change was 
despite a growing recognition of the failings of the system among senior officers. This 
ultimately allowed the seemingly more cohesive arguments against reform to come to the 
fore and influence the direction of reform in a manner disproportionate to their presence. 
 
Such diversity of factors acting directly on issues of staff reform does much to explain the 
lack of action taken by the British Army in this period, this thesis has clearly shown that 
additional societal and institutional factors influenced not only the direction of reform, but 
equally institutional responses to it. Although doctrinal developments, technological 
advances and the interaction of the army with the air force and navy have dominated much of 
the historiographical landscape regarding the interwar British Army, such issues were rarely 
present in discussions of staff reform. Instead, it was the combination of societal attitudes 
towards the army as a career and the need to improve prospects of promotion and career 
development which acted as the main brake on attempts to reform the system of staff training 
in this period. What united these two factors, was the growing gap between officer 
recruitment and manpower requirements. Multiple reports and committees highlighted glacial 
promotion at regimental level, long periods spent in inhospitable postings, a lack of 
motivation for the ambitious among officer cadets to achieve high rank within the existing 
structure of the officer corps and the lack of skills easily transferable to future civilian 
employment. In addressing these issues, it is evident that for much of the interwar period, the 
Staff College was perceived as a barrier to resolving them rather than part of any potential 
solution. This was despite the fact that the two lynchpin reports examining, and later 
 223 
implementing, significant structural staff reform had their origins in examinations of the 
officer recruitment problem.  
 
Indeed, the reference in the 1936 committee on the supply of army officers that they were not 
concerned with the outstanding man, but with the regimental officer best sums up the 
dissonance between the two issues.741 Whilst the subsequent Warren Fisher committee noted 
the desire to encourage intellectual stimulation and continued professional training amongst 
junior officers (sentiments equally expressed by the officers themselves through the pages of 
professional journals), the separation of the Staff College course into two courses continued 
to be perceived as disruptive. Both General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and Field Marshal Sir 
George Milne suggested that a drastic shake up of existing staff training practices, leading to 
the potential requirement for officers to relocate to Camberley twice in eight years would 
cause severe disruption to an officer’s domestic life and would thus discourage attendance.742 
In contrast, the examinations of the 1930s clearly identified expanded junior staff training as 
a means to both resolve well-known deficiencies in the provision of adequate numbers of 
staff officers and to provide an incentive to junior officers in the early years of their career.743 
As a result, there was a marked lack of understanding over the desired career opportunities 
required by potential officers. As a result, rather than seeking to integrate a reformed system 
of staff training into a broader system of post-commissioning training and career 
development, many senior officers perceived it to be simply an additional barrier to the 
improvement of conditions of service for regimental officers.   
 
These two latter barriers to reform were informed by the existence in the minds of senior 
officers of an institutional mentality informed by the development of the regimental system in 
the nineteenth century. As David French has established in his magisterial work on the 
British regimental system, this system and the mentalities it fostered within the British officer 
corps, served to influence and impede the pace of progress within the British Army in a 
number of ways.744 However, to this point, its influence on the staff system in Britain has 
been perceived to be primarily in attempts to dissuade good regimental officers from 
applying for the Staff College and a general hostility to the perception of faster promotion 
 
741 See Chapter Six, pp. 166. 
742 See Chapter Four, p. 124. 
743 See Chapter Six, p. 166. 
744 See David French, Military Identities, pp. 334-352.  
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and benefits associated with a role on the staff. As this thesis has shown, much like our 
general understanding of the progress of staff reform in this period, the reality is more 
complex. Although not directly the result of the regimental prejudices as established by 
French, throughout the various discussions on staff reform, it is clear that the experiences of 
the average infantry officer exerted a significant influence on the decision making of senior 
officers. Despite both the experiences of the First World War and continued advocacy within 
the pages of professional journals, senior officers continued to focus on the good regimental 
officer as making the ideal staff officer. This attitude overlooked the increasingly diverse 
requirements of staff work which led Major-General Ironside to observe in his 1928 Royal 
United Services Institute article that there was no single type of officer suited for all staff 
roles. This was a view echoed in the 1938 reforms and one that had been evident throughout 
the period, with officers from technical arms showing themselves as capable of understanding 
and applying operational doctrine in a staff context during the brief suspension of the quota 
system for the Staff College examination. Similarly, the historiography has suggested that 
some regimental officers, although recognising the benefits associated with attendance at the 
Staff College, preferred to resume their career in command posts and sought to refuse office-
based staff appointments.745 Notwithstanding this, the ideal staff officer was seen to be a 
good regimental officer, who was additionally capable of the theoretical thinking and 
planning required to undertake organisational and planning roles on the staff. Although 
widely acknowledged throughout the army, this belief resulted in the maintenance of a quota 
system based on an overemphasis on the powers of command seemingly only held by officers 
from fighting units. This misplaced understanding skewed the allocation of competitive 
vacancies at the Staff College in favour of infantry officers out of proportion to their presence 
in the officer corps. Similarly, the continued focus on advancing the career of the average 
regimental officer resulted in the persistence of the belief that any significant changes to the 
system of staff training would further discourage junior officers due to the complicated nature 
of the changes. In addition, the belief that the declining quality of graduating Staff College 
student stemmed from junior officer casualties in war and was a temporary phenomenon 
requiring no examination of the system was retained long after it had been thoroughly 
dismissed. As a result, although not directly complicit in the blocking of reforms to staff 
training, the broader regimental mentalities engendered within the British officer corps as a 
result of the regimental system can be seen to have influenced the way in which senior 
 
745 See Edward Smalley, The British Expeditionary Force, pp. 181-184. 
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officers responded to reform proposals, despite the evidence supporting the need for such 
changes.  
 
One factor conspicuous in its absence from this thesis has been the financial retrenchment of 
the interwar period. There was only one clear example of finances blocking the 
implementation of a proposed reform, that being the suggestions of Lieutenant-General 
Archibald Cameron in 1925. Beyond this, the proposal of the CID for the establishment of 
the Imperial Defence College proceeded despite increasing military expenditure in defiance 
of their instructions and other reform proposals either foundered before full Treasury 
assessments could be secured or were found to have only contingent costs. Instead, the 
overwhelming body of evidence either for or against individual reform proposals rested on 
the factors cited above, thus showing that whilst many other perceived failures to reform 
within the British Army in this period rested on financial retrenchment and Treasury penny-
pinching, the lack of progress made in reforming the system of staff training was purely the 
result of institutional military mentalities and beliefs. Indeed, the influence of both Sir 
Laming Worthington-Evans and Leslie Hore-Belisha in instigating significant investigations 
into the suitability of officer training and education are equally indicative of the absence of 
any significant external opposition to the reform of army staff training in this period.    
 
The clearest evidence that the failure of the British Army to reform its system of staff training 
in the interwar period was primarily due to institutional attitudes towards staff training, its 
reform and officer education in general, comes from the rapidity with which such reforms 
were introduced in the wake of Hore-Belisha’s sweeping changes to the Army Council after 
1937. Whilst the Kirke committee fundamentally shifted the army’s focus to operational and 
organisational matters from 1932, it was Hore-Belisha’s efforts, with the encouragement and 
advice of Basil Liddell Hart, to revitalise the army as a career through improvements in 
administrative efficiency and conditions of service for all ranks, which brought the issue of 
officer education to the forefront once again. All three committees of the late 1930s picked 
up on the desire of young officers to remain intellectually stimulated and have consistent 
opportunities for advancement. In doing so they recognised that staff training represented a 
crucial part of this process in allowing young officers the opportunity to advance to high rank 
outside the structure of regimental promotion, whilst also offering intellectual stimulation and 
professional training and development outside the day-to-day drudgery of regimental service 
in the peacetime army. Although largely the result of the continuation of examination into 
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conditions of service and the need to overcome the recruitment gap for officers, the reforms 
enacted reflected the culmination of a twenty-year effort to break the hold of long-standing 
institutional beliefs around the Staff College and to establish a system which best reflected 
doctrinal requirements to prepare and plan for the worst case scenario. Ideologically, the 
reforms of this period recognised that the army needed both men of action and educated 
soldiers in staff and command roles, decrying the lack of a system to develop officers of this 
calibre. They also echoed the 1925 conclusions of the Report on Higher Education for War 
that a large percentage of officers attending the existing two-year staff college course failed 
to benefit from the work of the second year. Structurally, the proposals of these latter reforms 
echoed those of Ironside twelve years earlier. Alongside the division of the course into a 
junior wing, located at Camberley and a senior wing, located nearby at Minley Manor, 
Farnborough, the reforms of 1938 also included the doubling of the intake for the junior 
wing. In addition, attendance at the two courses was to be divided by periods of regimental 
and staff duties for eight years and only the best graduates of the former would be invited to 
attend the senior wing. Ultimately, these proposals were enacted due to a combination of this 
desire and to improve the efficiency of the army more generally, through changes to the 
leadership cadre of the British Army in the 1930s and the impending European war brewing 
from the mid-1930s. These factors resulted in the removal of those senior officers who held 
such divergent, outdated views and the appointment of officers holding similarly reformist 
views to the new Secretary of State for War. Therefore, when the army came to consider 
issues affecting efficiency, including the structure of officer training and education, not only 
was there greater impetus for reform, but there was consensus over the direction to be taken. 
Much like the 1923 CID subcommittee, where there was broad consensus both in terms of 
what structural changes were required and concerning the role of the staff college, significant 
reforms could be made.  
 
In contrast to the inability of the British Army to come to a consensus over the required 
structural reforms to staff training, the conclusions regarding the imperial experience of staff 
reform stand as a useful counterpoint. As has been argued, Canada and Australia quickly 
came to recognise the importance of having a larger number of officers trained in junior staff 
duties to complement the officers trained at British and Indian Army staff colleges. Those 
attending Camberley or Quetta were generally marked out for senior command and staff 
posts in their respective armies in order to help disseminate British Army doctrine and 
continue the development of dominion forces in line with the British as part of the wider aim 
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to establish an imperial army. As a result, whilst making use of Camberley and Quetta, they 
each developed their own variation of a junior staff course or a militia staff course to provide 
their militia forces with officers trained in lower level staff work. These courses were 
generally overseen by British p.s.c. officers with curriculums based on their experience and 
knowledge. Although each of these courses was established at different points, all dominions 
recognised the two-tiered nature of modern staff duties and set out to ensure their forces were 
adequately prepared for the doctrinal ‘worst case’ whereas the British Army continued to 
vacillate over the issue. Much like the experience of the British Army, this was due to the 
unified understanding as to the role of the staff colleges and consensus over the need to train 
junior staff officers for the imperial army. Furthermore, the dominions continually expressed 
concerns over the lack of funding available for military education, reflecting their early 
recognition of its importance. Ultimately, whilst the British Army continued to debate the 
importance of a centralised system of officer education, including staff training, the 
dominions recognised its importance to a modern army. 
 
Overall a picture emerges which demonstrates that the British Army’s attitude towards staff 
training and reform of its structure was transient and changeable. Moreover, this attitude 
provides clear examples of the lack of consensus and diversity of interpretation as to the role 
of the staff college in the interwar army. As the above summary makes clear, on the two 
occasions where views were relatively coherent and unified, significant changes to the 
structure of staff training were enacted. In the first instance, the Imperial Defence College 
was established, providing vital inter-service training and that for senior command. In the 
second, reforms were enacted which completely changed the structure of staff training, 
increasing the number of available junior staff officers and separating the two levels of staff 
training to ensure that commanders and senior staff received their training at a more 
appropriate juncture in their careers. In contrast, for the majority of the interwar period, 
senior officers were unable to agree on the necessary reforms to the structure of staff training, 
despite general agreement that reform was needed. The result of this was a number of missed 
opportunities to recognise the extent of the problems beyond the recognition that the officers 
were not of the desired quality, alongside missed opportunities to enact often far-reaching 
reforms. Whilst the belief that the staff college served to train commanders demonstrably 
reflected the day-to-day realities of a British Army focussed on imperial policing duties, it 
was equally made clear to those at the top of the army, that any mobilisation (even that 
required to take part in an imperial war) would suffer from a lack of junior staff officers. It 
 228 
was only in the late 1930s with the appointment of Leslie Hore-Belisha as Secretary of State 
for War and his subsequent appointment of like-minded officers to senior posts (on the 
advice of Liddell Hart) that a single direction for staff training was agreed upon and the 
desired structural reforms were implemented. 
 
Consequently, the conclusions of this thesis are not seeking to tear down the existing 
interpretation of the British Army in the interwar period. Instead, they build on our existing 
understanding of the role of professional education in the British Army and demonstrate that 
it was both a combination of individual agency in the form of a group of senior officers 
opposed to reform and the maintenance of institutional mindsets regarding the characteristics 
and inherent abilities of the British officer which ultimately stymied the progress of reform. 
Alongside this, the thesis adds to the developing historiographical trend towards examining 
educational development within militaries and those examining institutional learning and 
development. In doing so it furthers the work of Douglas Delaney, David French and Aimée 
Fox (among many others) in providing additional depth of understanding as to the place of 
officer education and training within the British Army. Furthermore, this thesis provides a re-
evaluation of how to understand attitudes to innovation and reform and delineates a 
generational divide between those subscribing to traditional values of officership and the role 
of the army and those seeking a forward-looking professional army, providing career-
enhancing education and recognised that service in the army was not necessarily the only 
career they would have. Together with the continued support and development of existing 
strands of historiography, this thesis adds a new level of understanding to the complexities of 
the various ideas and attitudes held by senior officers within the British Army and how these 
interacted with the lessons of the First World War in debating and ultimately missing 
opportunities to enact significant structural and institutional reforms. This thesis also 
provides the first single study of the issue of structural staff reform in the interwar British 
Army. As has been argued throughout, whilst the existing historiography refers to specific 
individual examples as a way to illustrate their broader arguments, to date there has been no 
study which has traced the development of the British Army’s institutional thinking towards 
staff training across the interwar period. Though there have been a number of recent studies 
which have addressed key issues within the practice of staff training at the colleges, by their 
nature these studies understandably do not include the examination of structural reforms at 
the highest level. Thus, this study fills a gap in the history of army education through its 
examination of higher-level decision-making. In doing so it demonstrates that such decision 
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making was far from clear cut until the late 1930s when a political head was appointed who 
was willing to break from traditional patterns of promotion to could surround himself with 
like-minded officers and pursue a reformist agenda. In addition, the examination of imperial 
developments in staff training, largely ignored in Britain, suggests a better appreciation of the 
need for increased lower level staff training in the imperial armies. Whilst this thesis has 
established a new historiography surrounding the structural reform of British staff training, 
the wider discussion of dominion attitudes towards staff training is worthy of further 
research, building on the initial examinations of this subject by John Conner, Ian van der 
Waag, Mark Frost, Alan Jeffreys and Andrew Stewart.746  
 
Equally, this thesis opens up further avenues for examination, principally in relation to the 
broader institutional attitudes towards officer education in the British Army. Whilst 
mentioned extensively in the archival record, there has been no space to examine the extent 
of the contrast between attitudes towards the reform of cadet training at RMA Woolwich and 
RMC Sandhurst through the Army Educational Board. Building on existing studies of the 
regimental system and the conclusions of this thesis, such research would further develop our 
understanding of the complexities around attitudes towards formal education for officers in 
the British Army and examine in greater detail the process of replacing outdated cultural and 
institutional beliefs with those grounded in the experiences of the First World War. Similarly, 
a broader comparative study taking in both the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force educational 
establishments would build a comparative analysis of institutional attitudes towards 
professional education across the services and would serve to enhance our breadth of 
knowledge of the complexities of the various institutional attitudes and influences acting on 
the development of service educational policies in this period. It is fortunate that recent years 
have seen a growth of interest in the study of both military education across the services and 
the study of armed services as institutions. In following this trend, this thesis serves as a 
valuable building block in our understanding of both the British Army’s institutional attitudes 
towards officer education and training. By doing so, it serves as a base upon which continued 
exhaustive study and the testing of institutional ideas can build. 
  
 
746 See corresponding chapters in Douglas E. Delaney, Robert C. Engen and Meghan Fitzpatrick (eds.), Military 
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